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Introduction 
One man against Europe -- it is a sufficient paradox that 
such a thing is still possible in the democratic age in the 
~;1est. But at the Game time there is hope in this fact. 
For. what will be the stropger in the long run: the stub-
born will of one fl.lan whose Fifth Republic will not outlive 
h ,'m or the historic forces and necesai ties of our century? 
Ernst Fl'iedlaender and Katharina 
Foolte. Europa. Uber den Na tionen 
(Cologne: Bildungswerk Europa1sche 
Pol1tik, 1953), p. 88. 
But time passes •• history is slowly being made. And I 
don'"!:; doubt that one day it will see in DeGau1le a man 
who, in the end, hy his refusals and the delays he im-
poses, will have served Europe better than those persons 
\I/hose loud motions ana declarati.ons we read about these 
days -- and whic!: \1filJ. sink into oblivion. 
Herve Lavenir, "The Dishonest Europe", 
publizhed in Le Monde, December 19, 1967. 
As the above 'b.-10 quoh~s show, opinions on the European policy of France 
during the pI'esidency of Charles DeGatuIe have tende,j to polarize between 
portrayin;g DeGau1le an either a narrow nationalist or as the one European 
with a realistic plan for unity. Simply put, this polarization comes from 
what amounts to two func1arnentally different v'iews on how Europe should unite; 
whether aroung a supranalonal authority which would make the institution 
1 
of the nation-state obsolete or around a confederation of independent states, 
e2.ch of which would preserve its 0\\71 identity and sovereignty. 
Among experts, the former scheme has generally had the most proponents. 
'rhe supranat1.omll approach has l)oon scen as the only way for Europe to 
overcome the centuries of &1 v {6/0V\, and bloodflhcd that han I'esul ted from its 
. .~V(... 
organization around the nation-states. Authorities \IIho take this viewftsenerally 
:3ee~eGuUlle as a living relic from a outmoded past/who by defending the 
nntion-..stato merely prolonaed its life by artificial l,i0l"1.ns. When DeGaulle and 
his follower::: left the scen3. thoy would argue, Europ(l would. be able to resume 
lts "proper" path, that lending to complete integration through the supra-
national approach. 
Yet DeGaulle has now been dead for nearly ten years, and it is difficult to 
argue that Europe is any more supranationlllly united than ,-,hon he left office 
tn 1969. Naturally this must raise questions as to the inevitability of the 
supranC\tior'lal approach. Given the fnet that this appZ'oach hl16 not proceeded 
in the fashion that many of its proponents thought was certain to occur, 
perhaps it is time to take a 1 (~r)k at the other vision of Europe, re""evaluating 
it in the light of what has happened, or what has faileci to happen, in the 
years since DeGaulle's departure. 
This :is the purpose of this thesis: to study the ways in which DeGaulle 
can be thought or as a Europe&n, rather than merely a French nationalist, 
and to examine his vision of Europe. The period selected for investigation 
~v+4r",1s from the European summit conference of FebruC\ry 1961, to the resolution 
of the agricultural cr-isis in May of 1966. Chapter I m:amines the idealogical 4/ 
foundations ;"ehind this vision of Europ(;, discussing DeGaulle's political 
attitude, and his views of the State, the failings of sllpranationalism, and 
Europe's relationship to the superpowers. Chapter II will show \!That happened 
uhen DeGat;lle tried to enact his vision of Europe wi.th the Fouchet Plen e 
, 
Chapter III exanines DeGaulle' s atterapt to enacT the Fouchet P19n_ a ~e~ 
wi th \Jest Cermany, \'1i th the Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963. In 
Chapter IV we will see hO\,I DeGaulle i s opposition to the British application 
to the EEC is consistent with his vision of Europe and why he considered it 
impossible for nritain to join Europe at that time. The nnal Chapter shows 
what happened when the Gaullist and supranationalist visions of Europe .('#\~/~ 
collided in the Agricultural Crisis of 1965, and what the implications of this 
(;ollifJion:: \t!cre for Europe's future • 
.. -. 
Chapter I: DeGaulle' s Political Outlook 
Charles DeGaulle's dramatic return to power in May, 1958 signaled the 
return to the European stage of the most colorful, yet in a curious way most 
enigmatic French leader of the twentieth century. Embracing an outlook rather 
loosely defined as 'Gaullism', DeGaulle promised to renew French grandeur. 
both internally and externally, and restore France's commitment to, in his 
1 words, "an exalted and exceptional destiny." Beyond these ambitious though 
somewhat nebulous goals. the content of the Gaullist political outlook has 
Benerally defied precise description. In fact, authorities of no less stature 
than Stanley and Inge Hof'fm~n have concluded that Gaullism '.S ideologically ..•.. . ·. 
empty: 
Gaullism is a stance. not a doctrine, an attitude. not a coherent 
set of dogmas; a style without substance--beyond the service of 
France and French grandeur, itself never defined in content, 
only i.n context.2 
One undoubtedly cannot construct as compl"ehensi ve a pol! tical theory 
as one c(')uld for say, Hobbes or Marx. Still, as " p;uide to interpreting 
DeQaulle's European policy, the essence of Gaull1slO Can be described from 
a few sets of key concepts. One such set in the particular Gaullist 
attitude a its values and it~s style, which the Hoffmanns believe define 
the term of Gaullism. Others include: the Gaullist vie\'1 of the state. 
in particular why the state can neV€'r be violated and why the state is the 
only efffJcti ve organization in achieving European un! ty. the contrasting 
conceptual and practical failings of supranationalism, and the need for an 
independent 'European' Europe, free from the grand designs of either super 
power. 
I. The Gaullist ~.1~i tl!.d.~ 
Naturally. the Gaullist attitude is inextricably linked to the 
personality of General DeGaulle. Much has been written on DeGaulle's 
personality (perhaps too much, at the expense of obscuring the issues at 
hand), and this personality certainly seemed to pervade every major decision 
of the French government durinr, his presidency. Several of DeGaulle's 
ideals and values. as well as the particular style that resulted from them, 
merit particular attention here as a way of explaininp, the reasons behind 
..... 
2 
his unique and often misunderstood vision of Europe. 3 
Throughout his career DeGaulle went to great lengths to promote the 
mystique of the leader. DeGaulle's conception of the leader, like many of 
)li8 ideals, had both a theoretical and a practical basis. This conception 
owes a great debt to the philosop-'her Henri Bergson; ""hom DeGaulle knew 
personally and quoted a nunber of tines in hi s \ri'i tings. 4 Bergson believed 
in an organically changing world, resulting in a perpetual state of flux in 
which all mus·t struggle to sUl'\"ive through adaptation. As a device of 
adaptation, the intellect by definition can be only partly successful. 
l"or Bergson, the intellect understands by artificially removing and 
conceptualizing parts of the"organic whole, like a camera photographing a 
moving object. He writes: "Of the discontinuous alone do~s the intellect 
form a clear idea". ,,5 Since these mental snapshots are insufficient in 
dealing with Bergsonian reality, they must be supplemented by the use of 
instinct . Rather than a mechanical and artificial device like the intellect, 
instinct "is molded on the very form of life ••• [and] proceeds) 00 to 
lspeak, organically. ,,6 
The use of inotinct allows a particular type of vision which supplements 
the often narrow conclusions of the intellect. The posession of this 
vision and the ability to use it effectively is ~ne ~~ ~ to the leader. 
He (or she) must be a sp~cial kind of dreamer, able to form grand views 
of history and of the future, 8\'lare that he (or she) must often be able to 
see further than contemporaries, and be willin~ to accept the consequences. 
In DeGaulle's thiruting, this type of vision could immediately reeognizQ 
the moral bankruptcy of the Vichy regime, and thus justify what was legally 
treason. Likewise, only a visionary leader could ensure the survival of his 
(or her) followers, recognizing, in the case of France "that only vast 
l!:mterprisEls are capable of counterbalancing the ferments of diSintegration 
inherent in her people; that our country, as it is, surrounded by the others, 
as they are, must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal 
danger. 1I7 Ultimately only this type of vision could unify Europa, overcoming 
both the destructive elements of nationalism and the grand illusions 
8 of ~upranntlonalism. 
This necessity of standing apart from one'o contomporaries, of standing 
by one's vision alone .!f necessary in hopes of eventual vindication, is 
essential to the Gaull1st concept of leadership. Certainly it pervaded 
3 
DeGaulle I S own eareer. Andrtf Malraux observed that: "On several oeeasions, 
he had played Franee against the majority of Frenehmen. He derived a bitte~ 
and secret pride from this. Did he hope posterity would understand?,,9 
Correspondingly, to his own mind, he would at various times play Europe 
against the majority of Europeans, again hoping that history would prove him 
rights DeGaulle would play a role in his historieal vindication with regard 
/ to both Franee and to Europe by writing the epic M!moires de guerre and the 
unfinished Les M'moires d'espo~r. Mainly though, time itself would render 
the final verdiet, exonerating tho leader and his (or her) Vision. 
A corollary to this qaullist-Bergsonian vision is a eertain aleofness, 
nn introverted detachment which his critics found espeeially in~urlating. 
Jean Laeouture ~s written that DeGaulle "often gives the impression of 
conducting a guerilla warfare for a cause whose true signifi(.;ance only he 
understands.,,10 'l'he leader must cultivate I'ather than oppose this sense 
of aloofness o In 1932, DeGaulle wrote in Le Fil de l'epee: 
In the designs, the demeanor, and the mental operations of a 
leader there must always be a "something" which others eannot 
altogether fathom! which puz7.1es them, stirs them, and rivets 
their attention. l 
Through detaehing himself from the narrower interests of those around him. 
the leader can ensure the correctness of his (or her) vision through 
introspection and contemplatlon. l2 
If one can define the nature of DeGaullels vision for Franee and to an 
extent for Europe In a single word, that ~~rd would be a:andeur. With 
what was probably a calculated degree of overstatement, grandeur expressed 
one of th.! dominant thelnes of DeGaulle' s career after 1940: the need for 
the French to regain a post tive belief in themselves and in Frartce. 
Partieularly for those of us who have grown up in the postwar era, it is 
important not to underestimate how acutely the defeat of 1940 haunted 
France for years after the war. The collapse of a supposedly unbeatable 
.-
army, the extent of collaboration, and the shame of independence ~Ii th the 
Vichy regime left Franee demoralized and ashamed, despite the mors honorable 
role of the resistance. DeGaulle sought to restore Francels self-esteem, 
further eroded by postwar economic problems and the ordeal of decolonization, 
through expressing srandeur, that essential core of French greatness and 
4 
genius that remained constant despite all the catastrophes that France had 
faced. 
Grandeur enabled DeGaulle to claim in 1940 that France had lost only a 
lmttle, not a war. He could echo a past which would in turn inspire the 
future. Malraux writes: "He did not attach much weight to the fact that 
Napoleon left a mutilated France; in his view, the Emperor had proved to 
.3 
Frenchmen that France existed." Grandeur, despite the archaic and perhaps 
pompous implications of the t<)rm, enabled the French to acknowledge their 
own strengths. This apparent pretension of DeGaulle's had a firm basis 
in what he considered the reality of France's situation. While grandeur 
was in part l!l Masquerade tit held meani ng for most Frenchmen; it provided 
a kind of i~e .ological anchor, a basis for belief, as the French faced the 
postwar world. DeGaulle had a high appreciation for the importance of 
belief in any nation. Malraux writes: 
The General knew (it is not enoup;h to say he felt passionately) 
that 'the agony of France came not from the lack of reason for 
believing in here ... but from her inabi1i ty to !>elieve:ln anything. 
He had said to me once: Even if Communism lets the Russians 
believe in Russia for nonsensical reasons, that belief is 
irreplacfble.14 
Though gr.andeur was primarily a French phenomenon, the same basic 
premises a.pplied to the Gaullist idee. of Europe as well. Like, France, 
Europe had to reawaken an awareness of its o~m strengths , of the greatness 
of European civilization. The only obstacles to Europe's being more than, 
in Willy Brar.dt's often-quoted words, 'an economic giant, but a political 
dwarf', \>ler6 the fears and inhibitions of the Europeans themselves. 
Europe, by relying on its own genius, could regain the hist~rical prominence 
it deserved. Unfortunately, this European vision was often too closely 
connected to French 8ran~, and DeGaulle rarely did as much as he might 
have to dispel such connections. 
A final aspect of the Gaullist attitude that bears description here 
involves the actual practice of grandeur, or DeGaulle's political tactics. 
Probably no single factor contributed so much to the controversy surrounding 
DeGaulle during his lifetime, or is so well remembered when we consider hiS llre,51J~c(. J--zJ'1.
CJ
, 
-I<.<;(.!-,,-,>, t.o"'c.. ~ A-fe;" Yj..-ve.. '\"'\ r /) 
DeGaulle'sfi interesting pragmatic baSiS, will provide useful insights into 
interpreting DeGaulle's handling of specific issues later on • 




What will be called DeGaulle's 'grand manner' involved ~yfoifferent 
types of theatrics: his characteristically blunt way of stating his position 
on very delicate issues, his slow, deliberate, seemingly condescending way 
of speaking, and his habit of sitting at a raised desk during press conferences, 
accentuating his already considerable height. DeGaulle's sense of theatrics, 
which in its oWn way rivaled that of any leader in this century, served 
useful political purposes far beyond those of personal arrogance. A 
national policy of srandeur had to be expressed in a grand manner. Theatrics 
could reinforce the confidence building aspects of grandeur. Richard Mayne 
observes that DeGaulle's ugreatest gift was to use the grand manner to conceal 
his lack of resources.,,15 Theatrics had certainly helped compensate for 
DeGaulle's weaknesses d\~ing the war, through his numerous BBC speeches 
--'---. 
and his dramatic quarrels with Churchill and Roosevelt. During his 
presidency of the Fifth Republic, DeGaulle was a no less effec~ive performer, 
both at home and abroad, through key speeches, elaborate state viSits, and 
what Lois Pattison de M/nil has called the waging of "war by press conference. ,,16 
Through such performances, DeGaulle could personify a confident and determined 
France, aure of her Ol'm des'ciny, as well as that of the continent. Generally 
speaking however, DeGaulle knew the limits of the grand manner, and was 
a. 
not taken in by the meg~omania with which he is so often attr.ibuted. DeGaulle 
once whimsically remarked to Malrau~: 
Ac'cually, you know, my only international rival is Tin-Tin. 
[the French comic book character] We are the li'l;tle ones w'ho 
refuse to get taken in by the big ones. No one seee this, 
because of my height. l7 
Lending credibili ty to the grand mann'er was DeGaulle I s willingness to 
take risks in the face of considerable odds. One might even say that the 
whole history of DeGaulle's carecr can be written around the taking of 
various risk!;, from' his decision to flet up the Free Frcnch as a fairly 
obscure general with no legal authority, to risking the referendum which 
ended in his resignation in April, 1969. Taking 'risks was always sanctioned 
as a corollary to the Gaullist picture of the leader, whose vision would 
always be vindicated in the long run. Eventually, the risks would be seen 
as having been worth it. ' Given the guarantee of history, DeGaulle could 
make risk the cornerstone of his political strategy. He said to Malraux: 
6 
The integration of many efforts into one, the determination 
to double the stakes, th~ passion for risk -- all that is 
the essence of strategy.I8 
DeGaulle's vision of Europe naturally involved taking many risks, 
most of which resulted from his own intransigence. This intransigence would 
lead him to alienate practically every major European leader by the end 
of our period. DeGaulle the European carried most of the character traits 
of DeGaulle the Frenchman. H~ would sacrifice or narrow opportunities of 
the present in hopes of getting his owa way in the end. Each of the next 
four chap'ters contains examplf)s of this: the revisions of the Fouchet plan. 
the decision to pl"Oceed \1i th 'the Franco-German Tree,ty at the expense of the 
other four members of the European Community t the failure of' Sri tain' s 
application to enter the COft'JIIOn Market, and the Agricultural criBis of 
1965. In each example DeGaulle believed he was serving the best intereats 
of Europe, not just the best interests of France, by not yielding to his 
partners. According to his own reasoning, he kept Europe from pursuing an 
unrealistic dream which would have collapsed on its own anyway, and which 
~rould have decreased European influence in the world 8 By taking such a 
stubborn and inXlexible stand in the present, DeGaulle hoped to lay the 
foundation for a realistically united Europe in the future. 
II. DeGaulle and the Stat2 
The institutional expression of DeGaulle's political outlook is the 
nation-state. Simply put, DeGaulle considered the nation-state, despite 
all the cataclysms it was believed to have caused, the only effective 
means of organizing the people of the modern world. His ideas of the 
state are perhaps less notorious for their uniqueness than for the fact 
that he defended them so vociferously. The attributes of a sta'i;e can be 
summarized easily in DeGaulle's own Words. In a press conference in 1953, 
he stated that to be viable and 4ffective, any state must have a: 
••• political, economic, financial, administrative, and 
above all, moral entity sufficiently living, established 
and recognized to obtain the consequential loyalty of its 
subjects, to have a political policy of its own, and, if it 
should happen, that millions of men should be willing to die 
for it. 19 
7 
De Gaulle expressed the need for each of these attributes consistently 
throughout his career. Only a strong and assertive state could have forged 
a policy capable of dealing with postwar economic problems, like the policy 
, / ....; / 
of 'verite et se!erite' that DeGaulle implemented soon after taking office, 
which enabled France to participate in the EEC tariff cuts of 1959. DeGaulle 
believed that such a state had to derive its authority from the people 
at large through referendums and direct elections, rather than from political 
parties, ~dlose narrow interests it must supersede. The State must take 
final responsibility for defending the nation's interests both at home 
and abroad through independent policies. By protecting the nation's interests, 
the State can command the people's loyalty, which in turn insures its own 
leg! timacy. .()n~ With this symbio'tic relationship between the governn1ent 
and the governed can ~l~ nation-state face the extra~dinary challenges 
of the modern world. 
The third Republic, the Vichy regime, and the Fourth Republic amply 
demonstrated for France the consequences of lacking an effective state. 
The first two chapters of the Mtmoires de .g!-,erre, significantly titled 
"The Slope!t and "The Fall", describe the horror DeGE'.ulle felt at the 
diSintegration of the Third Republic, and the extent to which that disin-
te~ra'cion haunted him for the rest of hiG career. DeGaulle describes the 
government's failure to make a firm decision to continue resistance abroad: 
At the time when they were faced by the problem on which, for 
France, all the present and all the future depended, Parliament 
did not sit, the Government showed itself incapable of adopting 
aD a body a decisive solution, and the President of the 
Republic abstained from raising his voice, even within the 4 
Cabinet, to expresB the supreme interest of the country. In 
reality this a~lhilation of the State was at the bottom of the 
national tragedy. By the light of the thunde~bolt the regime 
\'1as revealed. its .ghastly infirmi ty, as having no proportion 
and no relation to the defense, honor and independence of the 
Republic .. 20 
The Third Republic, plagued with perpetual fragile coalitions, was unable 
to act in the nation's interests, even to save itself. Vichy constituted 
a cruel parody of the French state, abjectly cowering to the will of the 
foreign invader and acting as an umbrella for the collaborationist traitors. 
. ~ 
Probably the cruelest parody of all was the ruin of Marshal Petain. whose 
8 
last years as the administrator of France's subjugation obscured the 
services he had rendered earlier. DeGaulle writes: "Old age is a shipwreck. 
That we might be spared nothing, the old age of Marshal P6tain was to 
identify itself with the shipwreck of France.,,21 The Fourth Republic, 
created when DeGaulle's ideas for a new constitution were rejected, merely 
recapitulated the infirmities of the Third. DeGaulle never forgot what he 
considered this resurrection of particularism, with the politicians asserting 
their vanity at the expense of the State. He told Malraux: 
When I saw the politicians gathered together again 
for tho first time, I felt at once, no mistaking it, their 
hostility to everyone. They did not believe in the slightest 
that I was a cU.ctator, but they understood I represented the 
State.""'-That was just as bach The State is the devil, and 
if it exists, then they do not. 22 
When DeGaulle finally got the opportunity to write his own constitution 
with the Fifth Republic. he ~ook full advantage of the lessons of the past. 
His reforms aimed at giving the state, organized around the President, a 
power independent of the parties. The President, after 1962 elected by 
universal suffrage rather than by a College of Notables, could dissolve 
Parliament under cel"tain circumstances, yet could appoint a: new government 
if Parliament returned a vote of censure rather than necessarily hold 
new elections. Article 16 allowed the President to suspend the Constitution 
in a national emergency. DeGaulle sought a furthe~ popular base of support 
through his frequent use of the national referendum. A central premise of 
the Fifth Republic constitution was the protection of the State. Only a 
s .... rs4t4"'~ 
state capable of A the derisive interests that undermined the Third and 
Fourth Republics could hope to keep France a nation. France I s experlence 
between 1918 and 1958 proved just how deep and destructive her divisions 
could be. Events during his own presidency seemed to prove his point 
no less clearly, particularly during the trauma of extracting France from 
Algeria, whi.ch culminated in the generals' plot of 1961, and the riots. of 
1968, in which France seemed in mortal danger from both the Right and from 
the Left. 23 
For France then~ the continued existence of the nation-state was 
absolutely essential. In the present study we will see that few European 
9 
statesmen disagreed, despite much polemic to contrary. DeGaulle simply 
stated the necessity of the nation-state directly, often even bluntly, 
while other statesmen either obscured or avoided the issue. For DeGaulle, 
nationalism could be disarmed and removed from its most extreme ramifications; 
it could not be eliminated. Tr9ing to do so in the existing world merely 
distorted reality. 
Of course, DeGaulle could hardly ignore the interdependence of states 
which characterized the postwar world. Beneath the pomposity and the preten. 
sions, DeGaulle understood the diminished role of France and Europe on the 
world stage, and that France acting alone could probably never again play 
as big a role in world affairs as she had before the Second World War. 
Still, if France and Europe could no longer rule 'the world they could rule 
themselves and have final say in their own destinies. In a worlcl dominated 
by huge ~eopolitical blocs, Europe could regain the influence it deserved 
through unification. The logical conjunction of the need for the nation·.state 
and the need for European unity was DeGaulle's notion of Europe des 'tats. 
a united Europe of the States. No theme runs more clearly throughout 
DeGaulle's career a~ter World War II than the need for a united Europe , 
bu''; one united on what he would call realistic terms. In February, 1953, 
six months after the European Coal and Steel Community raised the spectre 
of supranationalism over Europe, OeGaulle said in a speech: 
Instead of an intolerable and unworkable fusion, let 
us practice association. We have already lost several 
years following chimeras. Let us begin by making an 
alliance of the free states of Europe. 24 
Understanding DeGaulle's stubborn and uncompromising attachment to 
what he believed was simply political reality is important to understanding 
his defense of the nation-state. The reasons behind the formation of the 
Fifth Republic G.re of course unique to France, but a tale leading to the 
Game conclusion could be told for each of the other countries of Europe 
as well. Each people's political loyalty is invested in their respective 
State, and only these States have the authority to act in their behalf. 
DeGaulle stated in a press conference in September, 1960: 
10 
The states are, in~ruth very different from one another, 
each of which has its own history, its own language, its 
misfor~mes, glories and ambitions; but these States are the 
only ent~ties that have the right to order and the authority 
to act. 2-
Since only the· States had the authority to unite Europe, Europe would 
either be un}ted around the States or not at all. With his characteristic 
willingness to take risks, DcGr<ulle risked the building of no Europe at 
all rathc.r' than one built on what he considered were groundless dreams. 
/ 
A more precise picture of what DeGaulle actually meant by a Europe des Etats 
will be provided in the next chapter, which concerns the Fouchet Plan~ 
Next we turn to examining more closely why Europe could only be built 
around S~~tes with discussing the Gaullist view of supranationalism. 
III. ~ranat!smalismt. Its Conceptual B!ld Pras~i2al Failing~ 
To most observers, particularly Americans, . the concept of European 
unification means one thing: the gradual dissolution of the various nation-
states, and their replacement by some sort of federal authority acting in 
the interest of' all. This is the essence of supranationalism. Around 
the Eu.."'Opean experience grew a veri table garden of integration models f 
some of whose scope and complexit~ must have sorely taxed even the imaginations 
of political scientists. Though the means often varied widely, the ends 
were all-rays the same: the creation o:f a new super-state, the Un! ted States 
of Europe, through the surrender of authority by the individual nations. 
The United States of America was often taken as a model, where a federal 
authority had wholly integrated the various smaller entities, resulting 
1n ~le creation of a political, economic, and military superpower. 
Supranational theories carried enormous prestige in the years following 
the war for &everal reasons. Perhaps the most compelling was. the desire to 
bury that institution which had apparently torn Europe apart for centuries; 
the nation-state. World \liar II had shown more graphically than pr'eviously 
imaginable what nationalism carried to its extremes could do. It was 
widely held that repeti tiom;. which would ultimately destroy European 
civilization were inevitable without an external system of control. 




be able to avoid anihilating each other. Almost everyone, including such 
.1\ 
diehard nationalists as DeGaulle and Churchill, advocated some form of 
European unity, as a way to reassert European influence in the bipolar 
world. In addition, unification was seen as the best way to deal with 
the alleged threat from the Soviet Union. with Stalin thus playing the 
rather curious role of European federator. 
Apart from producing an endless array of models, suggestions, and 
devices for arousing a 'Euro~oan conciousness', the supranationalist 
cr federalist movement proceeded mainly through the creation of 'European' 
insti tutions. Following the advice of their ide .o~ogical leader and mentor 
Jean Momlet, federalists took a so-called' functional' approach to European 
integrati.on, in which the various sectors of 'Europe' would gradually be 
placed under-supranational authority. The hoped for result would be a 
'spill- over' e,ffect, in which the un-integrated sectors ",ould fall into 
line like dominoes, the result being a supranationally integrated Europe. 
Edward Koldziej observes: 
For the federalists, Europe was already a reality and only 
the modalit~es and timing of its implementation were at 
issue-- essentially technical questions. • • • For them the 
development of Community institutions was tantamount to 
European union. 26 
Up to DeGaulle's reappearance in 1958, the functional appr~ach had 
been attempted in four main areas. In July, 1952)France, West Germany, 
Italy, Delgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg Signed an agreement that 
\'K)uld place their coal and steel industries under the authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). As well as constituting a 
first step toward supranational European unity, the ECSC served, at least 
in the minds of its foremost proponents t to make impossible any future 
war between France and Germany by putting these basic war industries under 
the control of a supranational orp,anization. Also in 1952, a plan was 
proposed to create a European Defense Community (EDC), which would contain 
inteerated units under a single authority tied to NATO. After two years 
of parliamentary battles the French Assembly voted down the EDC Treaty, 
with the Gaullists and the Communists for once ending up on the same side 
in opposition. In March, 1957, treaties were signed creating the European 
\" , 
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Economic Community (EEC or Common Market) and Euratom. The Common Market 
has been the primary achievement of the supranationalist movement in 
Europe to elate. While its first concerns involved the removal of trade 
barriers iWOng its members, its ultimate goal was European economic unity, 
which would in turn act as a springboard for further assaults on the 
nation-state. As a concomitant to the EEC agreements or, as it was generally 
called, tile Rome Treaty, the Euratom Treaty provided for cooperation in 
peaceful atomic development, as well as a sharing of technology and 
resources. It hardly need be added that the technical dif.ficulties of 
each venture were immense, so much so that when DeGaulle returned to 
power in 1958, the Common Marke"!; remained a largely untried organization; 
nearly all of ~he most controversial decisions remained to be made. 
DeGaulle was determined from the outset to see that these decisions were 
made in accordance with French interests. He wrote in Les M:e'moires 
dtespoi.!:: 
o~.our negotiators in 1957, caught up in the dream of a 
supranatlonal Europo and al1xious at any price to settle 
for something approachinp, it, had not felt it their duty 
to insist that a French interest, no matter how crucial, 
should receive satist'action at the outset. It WOUld, 
therefore. be necessary either to obtain it en route, 
or to liquidate the Common Narket. 27 -
The dif.feI'ences between DeGaulle and the supranationalists can be 
~tated .fairly simply and concern fundamentally different assumptions e 
Most fundamentally, DeGaulle argued that no nation can or should be expected 
to surrender its vital interests to an authority rising above the states. 
The popular will of each nation is invested in its state and can be invested 
nowhere else without direct popular approval. One of DeGaulle's most 
persistent complaints with the Bupranational approach as it had been under-
taken to date was the lack of a popular mandate, beyond promises in the 
Rome Treaty o.f a popularly elected European Parliament. DeGaulle regularly 
proposed a European ~eferend~s a necessary prerequi.site for meaningful 
steps toward unity. Without authority, which can come only through direct 
popular expression or an indirect expression through the States, 
supranational organizations are merely technical deVices, of little value 
.. ' 
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in confronting the most serious problems that Europe faced. In 1960, 
DeGaulle said of the existing communities: 
These organs have their technical value, but they do not 
have, they cannot have authority and consequently, political 
effectiveness. As long as nothing serious happens, they 
fUnction without much difficulty, but as soon as a tragic 
situation appears, a
4
maj or problem to be solved, it can 
then be seen that ,:'}r.l.,\-,"High Authority" or another has no 
authority over the various national categories and that 
only the States have it.28 
l-~or DeGaulle, 'Europe" had to be much greater than the arithmetic 
sum of the various 'EuropeL~' institutions. A Europe built without a 
popular mandate by technocrats who could hardly possess the special 
vision of the leader could only mean a Europe without real political 
authority or influence in the world. On the contrary, European unity based 
on an im~~inarytype of. authority would serve to continue Europe's subordinate 
role on 1;he world stage - Europe would hove to remain a political dwarf ~ 
As a consequence, American hegemony over the continent would continue. 
Equally dangerous to the aesthetically minded DeGaulle was 'the possible 
debasement of European culture. Like DeGaulle's view of the necessity 
of the State, this was a projection of his view of the nature of France. 
e. 
To DeGaulle, France was an almost mystical entity, unique and irreplacable. 
f\. f\. 
He wrote in the first sentences of the Me'moires d!!."Suerr.!:: 
All my life I have thought of France in a certain way. 
'This is inspired by sentiment as much as by r.,eason. The 
emotional side of me tends to imagine France, like the 
princess in 'the fairy stories or the Madonna in the 
~rescoes. as dedicated to an exalted and exceptional 
destiny .. ~1 
The culture of France belonged at once to France and to Europe f as part 
of a larger European ~'adition. The unique identity of each other country 
was no less precious, both to that country and to the fabric of European 
culture. DeGaulle believed that if supranational theories were carried to 
their logical conclusion, all distinctions between nationalities would 
eventually disappear, with the resulting creation of supposedly a tEuropean t 
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nationality. DeGaulle professed confusion as to just what the supranation-
alists wanted. whether an objective harmonization of interests, or to: 
••• achieve the total fusion of their respective economies 
and policies in a single entity with its own government, 
parliament and laws, ruling in every respect its French, 
Geman. Italian, Dutch, Belgian, and Luxembourg subjects, 
who wOuld become fellow citizens ofoan artificial mothe~land, 
the brainchild of the technocrats?3 
DeGaulle, as Callao observes, made an illuminating distinction between l'Etat, --
the State, and 18 patri~, ~he natlon. 31 Whereas the State involve~ the 
exercise of, in Calleo's words, "responsible power and authority~32 The 
nation involves the spirit of the !'~rSeill cHse;!an emotional loyalty to a 
national culture. States could be joined through a synchronization of 
interests end objectives o To attempt to integrate nations, however, would 
not only deny the unique cultural contribution of each country, but would 
paradoxically deny the European tradition as well. DeGaulle stated in 
a press conference in May, 1962: 
Dant~) Goethe, Chateaubriand belong to all Europe to the 
v.ery extent that they were respectively and eminently 
Italian, German and French. They would not have served Europe 
very well if they had been stateless, or if they had thought 
and written in some kind of integrated Esp~ranto or VolapUk.33 
As i:rri tating for DeGaulle as anything was h·is impression that the 
existing. supranational institutions had been built at a proportionally 
greater cost to France than to any of her partners. In DeGaul~s words, 
the ECSC, while effectively ending Franch claims to reparations from the 
Saar: "had been inaugurated under an agreement which, without offering 
us the means of restoring our devastated mines, exempted the Germans from 
having to provide us with fuel deliveries and gave the Italians the 
wherewithal to equip themselves with a large-scale iron and steel industry.1l34 
He also alleged that while France had maintained an Atomic Energy Commissariat 
for fifteen years, Euratom countries without nuclear programs were now 
in a position to buy American rather than European equipment with common 
funds. 35 Most important, the Rome Treaty had practically ignored provisions 
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for an agricultural common market, concentrating on relatively simpler 
issues involving industry and trade regulation. As OeGaulle put it: 
"The industrial provisions were as precise and as explicit as those concerning 
agriculture were vague.,,36 DeGaulle believed that in creating each of the 
existing communities French nogotiators had subjugated their country's 
vital interests to supranational dream. 37 As we noted earlier, DeGaulle 
intended either to restore the balance of interests expressed in the 
European communities or to have France leave them entirely. 
We see t~en, that DeG&ulle and the supranationalists had fundamentally 
opposed visions of a unified Europe. While OeGaulle advocated a Europe 
based on cooperation betweefi sovereign states, the supranationalist 
favored the graclual abolition of the individual states f and their replace-
ment by a E~pean federal government. Each considerdthe other's basic 
assumptions ~th unrealistic and counterproductive. Yet as fellow players 
on the European stage both working toward unity, the Gaullists and the 
supranationalists had t~ interact throughout our period. The question 
became whether any kind of ,!!Iodus vi ve1.!.9.! could be reached between the two 
visions of Europe, and what form such a compromise might take. 
IV. Et~ope and the Superpower~ 
Along with the preservation of the nation-state, the other sine qua 
non of' DeGaulle's vision of European unity was the necessity of a Europe 
independtmt of ci ther superpower, particularly the Un! ted States. For 
DeGaulle, Europe had to regain its independence to main:tain its identity 
in the bipolar world. Europe could be herself by taking responsibility 
for her own destiny, and with this independence COUld. regain the prominence 
in \!JOrld affairs she deserved. Again, this is an extension of DeGaulle's 
idea of the best course for France, the notion that Europe, like France, 
could re,n~w herself through a well planned assertion of her own resources 
and genius. 
The heart of the problem, of course, IIlas the Europe created by the 
Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the Europe agreed to by the two superpowers 
left standing at the end of "Jorld War II. As relations between the two 
superpowers soured, Europe divided along Churchill's Iron Curtain, each 
,. 
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half clinging to the superpowe~ that had liberated it from the' Germans. 
These countries became essentially client states of either the United States 
of the Soviet Union, dependent on one of the superpowers both militarily 
and economically. 
DeGaulle fought American hegemony in the West even as it was devel-
oping at the end of the war, deeply resenting France's exclusion from 
both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences •. He suspected, probably with some 
justification, that the Americans did not intend Europe to play a large 
role in postwar world affairs, and expected Europe to accept without 
complaints a world based on American peace goals. DeGaulle's quarrels 
with Roosevel't were legendary and started with Rooseve~tOs attempt to 
install the politically p!)iableGeneral Giraud rather the DeGaulle as 
leader of the French provisional government. DeGaulle describes f~osevelt's 
vision of the peace and his discomfort at French obstin~dePle.1>S~ 
••• from the moment America entered the war, Roosevelt meant 
th~ peace to be an A~erican peace, convinced that he must 
be the one to dictate its structure, that the states ~mich 
had been overrun should be subject to his judgement, and 'that 
France in particular should recop.nize him as its savior and 
arbiter. Therefore the fact that France was reviving in 
the heat of battle, not in terms of a fragmentary and 
hence conv~t\I ent resistence but ~~ a sovereign and independent 
nation, thwarted his intentions. 
DeG~ulle saw NATO as an institutionalization of American hegemony, 
an agent of subjugation which helped perpetuate the dangers it was created 
! 
to eliminate. While maintaining 'the guise of a supranational organization, 
which in itself could hardly have pleased Gaullists, NATO subjugated 
European forces under .American control. Americans also excercised exc1usi ~/e 
control over the devices likely to determine Europe's fate in the event 
of a war, nuclear weapons. As a result, EUropean security was essentially 
the captive of American foreign policy. The Berlin crisis of 1961, in 
which the United States and Britain appeared ready to negotiate Berlin's 
status, and the Cuban miss1e crisis of 1962, in which the United States 
went to the brink of nUclear war without serious consultation with its 
European, allies, seemed to bear out DeGaulle's theSiS •. Though he never 







France would never be subject to what he considered America's military 
hegemony. Taking advantage of the fact that the Origina~ATO treaty 
expired in 1969, DeGaulle phased out French participation throughout the 
1960's. Having been unable to assure French equality within the NATO 
structure, DeGaulle chose to develop a separate defense poliCy.39 
Scarcely more acceptable to DeGaulle were the proliferation of 
schemes in the United States advocatitrj '- s. 'Grand Design'. creating Q:n 
'Atlo.ntic Community.' Simply put, such grand desians intended to extend 
the role of NATO-like institutions to economic and political areas. 40 
Probably the' most popular artiCUlation of these ideas during our period 
~~s Joseph Kraft's The Grand DeSign: f~om Common Market to Atlantic 
Partnershi[>. which as Lois Pattison de Mlnil wri·tes "graced every 'daShj~ngton 
coffee-tabl~- by mid_1962.,,41 ~a:tt's book epitomizes what DeGaulle considered 
the curious combination of grandiose views and narrow interests that char-
acterized American attitudes toward Europe during the 1960's. While only 
vaguely defined. the Grand Desir,n was rather immodestly described as a 
ma,?,ic elixir for the 111s of the 'free' world. Kraft writes: 
It is a new principle of association in a period of 
disassociation, a force for positive unity, a4~owerful 
base for 'the D.sscrtion of mastery over drift. 
The Grand~esifln. as Kraft describes it. may be summarised as follows: 
a supranationally united Europe closely linked to the United States would 
form an invincible barrier to the. encroachments of the Communists, and 
1\ 
due to its inate goodness would head off any more German wanderi!".gs from 
the western liberal fold. After dissolving ~n~ · , differences between 
American and European interests, possibly throur,h sheer goodwill. this 
Atlantic: Community could proceed to modernize the Third \'/orld. The 
consequences of failing to adopt the Grand Design amount to nothing short 
of a ea tas °trophe : 
The European powers will almost certainly drift off into a 
nuclear defenGe of their own, •• Goff'ering for exploitation 
. .- -
by the Communist bloc a split of ginantic proportions, and 
virtually foreclosing an~ ' chance of limiting the spread of 
nuclear weapons. • •• Sooner or later the toll will be taken in 
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domestic upheaval or foreign catastrophe -- perhaps both. 
The United States will have to default on power; resign 
from history.43 
As Pattison de M'nil observes, American goals in fostering the 
Grand Design were twofold. 44 Neither were consistent with an independent 
Europe~ Since the end of the Second World War, America had supported a 
Uni ted Europe as a bulwark aE~!linst 'Communist agression.' American leaders 
assumed that the security umbrella they provided guaranteed that on key 
issues European and American interests could always coincide. Events in 
the early 1960's had undermined this assl!Jllption in tt'/O ways. The 
development of the Common Market had always had protectionist undertones, 
with .the liberation of trade barriers between members and the common external 
The creation of an Atlantic Community could stifle Europe's 
tendency to look inward, closing off lucrative markets to American pene-
tration. An Atlantic Community which included a supranationally united 
Europe could also head off what was seen as an alarming rebirth of Old , 
World nationalism. DeGaulle's ideas of a EuroEe des Etats had many 
supporters, particularly in West Germany. To such thinkers, DeGaulle was 
a "tiresome old King Lear,,45 who served only to reawaken dangerous impulses 
in Germany, and to fan the flames of traditional French recalcitrance. 
tb An Atlantic Community could thus strengthen th4Pax Am~ricana by containing 
the countries whose nationalism had best epitomized the fla1l1S of the 
Old World. 
For DeGaulle t th.e Pax Americana created by Yalta and Potsdam, as well 
as NATO nndthe Grand DeSign which. were its Instltutionalizations, 
represented a thinly disguised desire for hegemony over the west. DeGaulle 
~ 
wrote in the !!:l!!9ire! de guer!:~: 
The United States, delighting in her resources, feeling that 
she no longer had within herself sufficient scope for her 
energies, wishing to help those who were in misery or bondage 
the World over, yielded in her turn to that taste for 
intervention in which the insttct for domination cloaked 
itself. 46 
DeGaulle believed that a Europe whose very existence depended on a military 
organization controlled by tho Americans, whose monetary system was 
dominated by the American currency, and whose foreign policy was expected 
in all respects to emulate America's could never be an equal in an Atlantic 
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partnership. In effect, Europe would only be able to wave approving hands 
over American leadership. DeGaulle's foreign minister, Maurice Couve de 
Murville, writes: 
In the heart of an ensemble of two theoretically equal 
poles, the United States would necessarily be the driving 
force, their associates following them, more or less 
docilely according to their nature. In a European construc-
tion of this genre e we could, as the most optimistic 
proponents of this construction say willingly, "influence 
America." A pleasing perspective in their eyes, but one that 
shows well that there would be no question of Europe 
havina a policy of its own, no more the.n its own 
defense or even its own econorny.47 
As well as being an end iq itself, indeed a necessary goal of eman-
cipation, DeGaulle's vision of an independent Europe also sought to create 
a genuine basis for detente between the superpowers. Europe's division 
t!8.S caused by thE! Cold ~/ar, which in turn insured the division of Europe. 
The Soviets considered the American presence in Western Europe no less 
threateninp, ~an the Americans considered the Soviet presence in Eastern 
Europe, which made the perpetuation of their presence in Eastern ~urope 
essential. A Europe tied to an Atlantic Community meant; a Europe 
permanently divided. Couve de r,lurville writes : 
A Western Europe tied to Atlanticism meant the 
indefinite ,division of the old continent, and 
consequently, of' the entire world. 48 
DeGaulle sought to break the vicious cil~le that had entrapped the super-
pow'ers since the SecondWot'ld War. The Soviets would never consent to 
an undivided Europe tied to the United States. DeGaulle believed they 
might consent to an undivided independent Europe.49 With the immediate 
cause, and to DeGaulle,·the raison d'~tre of' the Cold War solved, a real 
• a , 
detente between the superpowers could take.place. Europe could regain the 
place it held before the mutilation of two world wars, that of a Vital, 
,...... , 
independent civilization in full control of its own destiny, and ex erting 
influence in every corner of the globe. 
Thus, in terms of plans for Europe's future, DeGaulle was certainly 
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one of the more radical thinkers of his day. He realized before any other 
major world figure that the bipolar world created by Yalta and Potsdam 
was artificial and bound to be impermanent. A resurrected Europe, which 
the United States had helped to create, was bound to challenge its leadership. 
DeGaulle was the first major European to argue that this challenge was 
not only feasible, but desirable. In the process, Europe could find herself 
and help diffuse the conflict her near selfndestruction had brought about. 
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Chapter 2 The Fouchet Plan 
By 1961, with France stabilizing at horne economically and abroad throuan 
a gradual. i£ still potentially explosive. resolution of the Algerian situation. 
DeGaulle felt secure enough to take the initiative in attempting to implement 
his ideas for Europe des Etats with the Fouchet Plan. The failure of this 
initintivo illustrntes the collection of conflicting goals and priorities, as 
well as the intransigence on certain issuros that all parties displayed during 
our period. The patterns that emerged during the Fouchet negotiation help 
explain DeGaulle's positions on the issues that will be discussed in the 
succeeding chapters. The Fouchet P Ian represented more or less DeGaulle f s 
picture of the'"ideal road to European unity; its failure and the reasons 
behind that failure hardened his resolve to oppose any road but his own. 
To a great extent then, this chapter sets the pattern for the rest of the 
1 
paper. clarifying the basic issues that were to be debated later on. 
Before approaching the Fouchet Plan. however, we should set the scene 
by examining briefly DeGaulle's dealings with his European partner.s up to 
the time our per.iod opens in 1961. To a great extent. DeGaulle accepted the 
work of the supranational organizations, and in fact lent them a rather 
unexpected amount of support. Yet in considering DeGaulle's policy during 
this period. we sec various indications of the problems to come~ and certainly 
a conviction that before any larger steps were taken toward supranationalism, 
that Europe should be steered on the 'right' path, that leading to a union 
of sovereign states. 
DeGaulle's return to power in 1958 brought about reactions in Europe 
qui't:e similar to those in France. f\1any welcomed what s-eemed to be the 
promise of a stable regime, but many Europeans, like many Frenchmen, were 
less pleased with what they sa"J as his conservative nationalism. However. 
nearly all Europeans feared a worse situation if the rightist Generals 
planning Operation Resurrection had brought a regime of their own to power. 
Fe\!! echoed tl~e sentiments of the West German socialist newspaper Vorwart&, 
which stated that DcGaulle did not take power legally.:!. In general, Europe, 
lil{e France. pre:fcred DeGaulle to Ie doluge. 
However, many doubts were expressed as to whether France would be 
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\lI'illing or even able to comply with the first round of tarr:lr cuts on in-
dustrial goods called for by the Rome Treaty, a 10% cut beginning January 1, 
1959. French economic problems had nearly reached a crisis stage. The 
French balance of payments deficit had grown from $1,345 million in 1956 
to $1,760 million in 1957.2 In addition, the Algerian war was costing 
France 200 billion francs per year. 3 The merry-go-round of governments in 
the closing days of the FOUl~th Republic had an increasingly difficult time 
securing loans to keep the economy afloat, which in any case only postponed 
""' dealing with France's basic economic problems. Accepting the 1:iariff cuts 
called for by the Rome TI'ea.ty wi thout 'taking draconian measures to solve 
'the l"rench balance of trade and budgetary deficits would only have deepened 
the crisis, and could easily have resulted in the collapse of the French 
economy. Any government. however 'European' oriented, would have faced 
grave difficulties in fulfilling the agreements that France had signed. 
To the suuprise of many Europeans, DcGo.ulle quickly made clear his 
intention to participate in the tari'iff cuts through econo~ic reforms based 
I' , ,,,, 
on his policy of verite et severite. The budr,et deficit was halved through 
an increase in indirect taxes and miGcellaneous budget cuts, includin!Z Borne 
painful reductions in social security paymento. Most important in terms 
of the trade deficit. the franc was devalued by 17.5%, making it again a 
viable currency on the I:/orld market. To simplify the mathematics as well 
aS i in DeGaulle's \'Iords, lito restore to the venerable French franC., whose 
losses were a reflection of our national ordeals, something of its former 
substance, the new franc, worth an hundred of the 01d,,4 was established as 
the new currency. The combined effect of these moves enabled France to par-
ticipate in the 1959 tarriff reductions as scheduled~ The success of the 
Cornman ~tarket in the first year following the 1959 cuts led the six states 
to speed up the tariff reduction schedule of the Rome Treaty, concluding an 
agreement with DeGaulle's blessing in May, 1960. Bymid-1961 import quotas 
/ 
on industrial goods had been reduced to near insignit~gance, and tariff bar-
riers between the Six had been nearly halved. 5 Trade between member countries 
of the EE1had increased 7~~ be~~een 1959 and 1961, while trade with non-
member countries had only increased 35% during the same period.S DeGaulle's 
flirtation with the supranationalists seemed to be paying off handsomelY$ 
.... 
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Still, even during this period of maximum friendliness betwoen the two 
schools of European unity, various quarrY; "'/hich would dominate the scene 
later beaan to tw<e shape. Since the spring of 1957, a nigotiating team 
connected to the Office of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), headed by 
Roger Maudlina of Great Britain had been negotiating wi.th the newly estab-
lished EEC to establish a free trade area including all the OEEC countries. 
By the fall of 1958, it became clear to the French that EEC goals of economic 
integration and the r.1audling proposals for a free trade area were irrecon-
cilable. Jacques Sous'celle, DeGaulle I s Minister of Information, made a 
fairly blunt statement to that effect on Movember 14.7 Maudling become of-
fended by this typical display of Gaullist directness, and suspended the 
negotiations. This foreshadowed the exchanges that would take place later 
between the British and the French on the proper role of trade between EEC 
members and other countries. Also d~inp' the 1958-1961 period, French 
agricultural surpluses accumulated to such an extent that creating an 
agricultural common market became a virtual necessity for France. The 
lag in increases in farm income, as well as dissatisfaction with continued 
surpluses led to mass denonstrations by French farmers in May, 1961. The 
problems tllat would ..culminate in the crisis of 1965 began to form bere.8 
On the whole, however, DaGaulle and the supranationalists were on 
better terms during the period 1958-1961 than at any time thereafter. The 
reasons can be explained fairly simply. First and probably foremost, was 
tho French preoccupation ... Ii th Algeric:.., which proved a constant threat to 
DeGaulle and the Fifth Repu'blic until 1962. DeGaulle did not even make a 
major statement on Europe until his press conference of September 5, 1960. 
With this threat to the South, DeGaulle hardly needed to make enemies in 
Europe. The economic triumphs of the Common l:!arket during these years 
seemed to open a new area for the expression of French lE,.andeur, and provlded 
a welcome diversion for French minds from the problems in Algeria. France's 
economic situation in 1958 was so severe that stronr, measures would have 
to have been taken whether the 1959 tariff cuts had been ne,r;otiated or not. 
To an extent, DeGaulle could make a virtue out of a necessity, capitalizing 
on the popularity of the European idea and stimulating the French economy 
in the process. By 1961, the EEC had proven its value to French trade. 
Between 1958 and 1962, French and German trade with EEC partners had do~bled, 
while FranCO-German trade nearly tripled. 9 
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It is also important to keep in mind that in 1961, the EEC was still 
quite a new organization, less than five years old. Removing trade barriers 
was hardly the highest goal of the supranationalists; their greatest assaults 
" on the nation-state were yet to come. Also, DeGaulle always conc eded a 
certain administrative value to the supranationQl organizations, as long as 
their prerogative was subordinated to the control of the States.10 Edward 
Kolodziej observes a usefUl distinction in the Gaullist mind between "low 
poli tics", th'e technical asp~cts of economic snd social policy, Whic~fmder 
.> PI{ 
sufficient guarantees can be administrated $upranational organizations, and 
A 
"high' politics" (1.e. foreign and defense policy) which must always remain ., 
under the control of the States. Thus. as long as the supranational organ~ 
izations were confined to theil' proper place, France could reap the economic 
benefits theyhelped facilitate with a minimal loss of sovereignty. However, 
it \/:as crucial ' to DeGaulle that these organizations relna.in the servants of 
the Scates rather the.n attempt to become their masters. This meant steering 
the whole unification movement away from supranational · ideals toward those 
needed to create an !,urQEe des Etats. This was the purpose of the Fouchet 
Plan. 
The French initiative which would result in the Fouchct Plan began with 
DeGaulle:s visit to Italy in June, 1959. The result was a Franco- Italian 
proposal to regularize meetings between foreign ministers of the Six. The 
followi,ng Novemuer, Couve de Murville sur,gested at a November meeting of the 
EEC Council of Ministers that such meetings be arranged t tactfully adding 
that these ought not prejudice or attempt to replace meetings of NATO and 
of the "'/estern European Union (WEU) .12 The basic outlines of the Fouchet 
Plan began to take shape with the meeting with Adenauer at Rambouillet in 
July, 1960, when DeGaulle sought West German support for his initiative . 
During his first major public statement on Europe during his press conference 
of September 5, DeGaulle sketched his proposals: 
The launching of Europe ••• requires organized, regular 
consultation between responsible Governments, and the work 
of specialized organs in each of the common domains which 
are subordlnat~ to the GClvernments. This requires periodic 
del ~iberations ' by an assembly formed of delegates from the 
national parliaments, and, in my opinion, this will have to 
require, as soon as possible, a formal European referendum 
so as to give this launching of Europe the character of 
popular support and initiative that is indispensable.13 
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Even as the basic provisions of what would become the Fouchet Plan took 
shape however, the suspicions and misconceptions which would ultimately 
capsize the French initiative began to form as well. To this pOint, DeGaulle 
had looked primarily to West Germany and Italy for support, raising fears 
in the smaller members of the Six of a paris-Bonn-Rome axis which planned 
to dominate Western Europe. Also, the problem for the West Germans of 
reconciling attraction to DeGaulle's proposals with commit~ents to the 
United States carne to be raised her~ with regard to West Germany's position 
in NATO. As a result of tl:e blooming friendship between DeGaulle and . 
Adenauer lower offici.llls were often excluded from major discussions. tlhia 
would lead to occasional misconceptions on both sides as. to what had actually 
been aareed upon.14 Such misconceptions had already arisen over NATO and 
the protection ot oxisting community institutions, which had to be resolved 
during a visit to Bonn by Premier Michel Debr6and Couve de Murville. Attar 
smoothir:ofut these probl~ms with the West Germ&ls, DeGaulle moved to present 
his proposals before the other European partners. 
A European summit conference was arraneed 1;!hich met in Paris in F.ebruary 
10, 1961. Around this time, the battle lines came to be morc clear'ly drawn. 
To Dutch Foreign Minister Joseph Luns, DeGaulle's press conference seemed to 
undermine the existing communities, and forewarn a Franco-German attempt to 
impose a Gaull1st Europe on the Six. Dutch objections on the issue of 
British participation, as well as on NATO and the future of the existing 
communities were already becoming known. Luns insisted that the final com-
munique of' the Paris meeting only establish a study commission to make 
further proposals, without allowing a schedule of subsequent meetings to be 
set. He man~.!ged to delay the next summit from May until July, by which time 
the British had publicly announced their intention to enter the EEC. As a result 
of the Paris summit the Fouchet Commission was formed, headed by the French 
ambassador to Denmark, Christian Fouchet. Ostensibly its job was to locate 
---some type of consensus, but perhaps it was, as Pattison de Menil observes 
"at the outset, a coverup for basic disagreement.,,15 Though possibly some 
grounds for a consensus could have been found at this point, the pattern 
of the negotiations quickly established itself. France with strong German 
support faced the Netherlands. The remaining three of the Six were presented 
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The second European summit, held in Bonn on July 18, 1961, managed to 
paper over the differences between the two parties. The final communique~ 
later known as the Bonn Declaration, called on the Fouchet Commission to 
submit proposals as soon as possible to the Six Iton the means by which a 
16 statutory form can be given ••• to the union of their peoples." The Bonn 
Declaration represents Ono/Of the more clever attempts during our period to 
reconcile the two visions of Europe. Made possible by 1<:ey French concessions 
on references to the Atlantic Alliance and the existing communities, the 
Bonn Declaration c1 "cd enough of the favor! to notions of all coricerned to 
be ac:ceptable. For tho supranationtlliats, the Declaration stated that the 
Rome Treaty :,"epresented the inspiration for political unity, stating the 
desire 01: tne Six to "give shape to the will for political union already 
implicit in-tho Treaties establishing the European Communi ties •••• .,17 It 
also encouraged the study of ways to expand the role of the European Par-
18 liament, as well as more closely connect it to public opinion. The 
Atlantic Alliance \'JaS praise~, stating the conviction of the Six "that only 
a united Europe, allied to the United States of America and to other free 
peoples, is in a position to face the dangers that menace the existence ot' 
Europe and of the \'Jho1e free world •••• ,,19 For DeGaulle, the central idea of 
his plans of . European unity, the synchronization of policies through co-
operation between states, \'laS officia.l1y sanctioned by the Six. They 
agreed in prlnciple: 
To hold, at regular intervals, meetings whose aim will 
be to compare their views, to concert their policies and to 
reach common positig86 in order to further the political 
unity of EUl~ope •••• ~ 
At i'irs"l; glance then, the Bonn Declaration seemed to point to a middle way 
between the supro.nutiodas and the French pOSitions. In specific terms, 
'I 
houcver, it remained to be seen how the supranational implications of the 
Rome Tronty could be reconoiled \IIi th Ull Eurol!£. des Etnts. What would become 
the most important issue to the Dutch, the question of British partiCipation, 
was aV'oided entirely. Despite its pleasing tone t the Bonn Declaration left 
most of the major issues unsolved. 
Two external events merit attention at this point in the negotiations. 




building between the Eastern and I:lestern blocs over the status of Berlin. 
The Soviets ;nsisted that West Berlin be dimilitarized and neutralized, 
while the Western powers wanted it to remain tied to the Bonn regime. As 
Soviet pressure continued to build through the spring and summer of 1961, the 
United states and Britain appeared ready to negotiate Berlin's status. On 
August 13, just over a month after the Bonn Declaration, the East Germans 
clQsed off \'Jest Berlin, and began building the Berlin Wall. Thus, the 
Fouchet Commission began its work during a period of considerable interna-
tional tension, and at a time \llhen many Europeans feared a softening of 
the Atlantic Alliance. The 1950's had shown that the impulse toward Euro-
pean unity wan strongest when the Cold \'Jar was coldest. Paul-Henri Spaa1:, 
who in 1962 would become Belgian Foreign ~Unlster, wrote: "Europeans, let 
us be modest. It is the fear of Stalin and the daring views of General 
George Marshall which led us into the l"ight path ••• , ,,21 Thus, differing 
views of European unity could be t 'Jmporarily submerged in the common danger. 
By the fall of 1961, when the Fouchet Plan was actually being debated and 
revised, the Berlin Crisis seemed to have at least stopped getting \'Iorse, 
neither side wantinr, to escalate the conflict any fur-there West Germany 
and Fran.ce, the 1;\'10 countries that most feared a. Western retreat in Berlin, 
remained distrustful of the American and British position, while the other 
four of the Six considered the direst threat to have subsided. Perhaps for 
both sides E~-opean solidarity became a less critical item, one to be pursued 
more with more conSideration for particular interects. 
Complicating the situation still further was the British application 
to the EEC, announced by Harold Macmillan in a speech to the House of Com-
mons on July 31. The most important question this raised was whether or 
not the British should participate in the Fouchat discussions. The Dutch, 
who for reasons that will be discussed later. considered Britain's presence 
in any major European decision absolutely essential, could now feel £ree 
to press the case for British participation even more strongly. Such a 
complication could hardly have pleased DeGaulle, whose reservations about 
the British application were already well known. In any case, Deaaulle did 
not believe that the British could participate in any political union until 
they had accepted the economic union as it existed up to that point by 
joining the EEC. At the !':loment however, all sides \</ere reluctant to force 
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the issue, perhaps waiting to see how the Fouchet discussions developed. 22 
Governments of the Six submitted position papers to the Fouchet Com-
mission on the ideas expressed in the Bonn/Declaration throughout the fall of 
1961. On November 2, the French gevernment submitted an actual draft treaty, 
the Traite d'union d'Etats, or as it became known, the Fouchet Plan. This 
plan COIlstitutes the clearest documentation during our period of DeGaulle's 
Europe des Eta~, describing the institutions and aims of a Gaullist Europe. 
It rep~esented DeGaulle's attempt to make sovereian States,rather than what 
he salll as the artificial supranational st!;'uctul~es) the building blocks of 
a union. The supranational organizations would be retained, but as servants 
of the States rather thon usurpers of the States' prerogative. 
The aims of the Union, were sp~lled out in Article 2. While avoiding 
o.ny mentiOl"l of the Atlantic Allio.nce, the union would seek "to bring about 
the adoption of a common foreign policy in matters that are of common in"ter-
23 
cst to the Member States •••• " Even more alarming for Atlanticists, the 
draft stated a desire "to strengthen, in cooperation with the other free 
nat,ions, the security of Member States against agression by adopting a 
common defense policy.,,24 The draft failed to mention either HATO or 
the Atlantic Alliance directly. To Atlnnticists, thi~> 'seemed to call for 
a defense policy much more loosely connected to the United States and tile 
NATO alliance, presumably under French leadership. In less controversial 
areaa~ the Union sought: 
•• $ •• to ensure, through close cooperation between Member-
States in the scientific and cultural field, the continued 
development of their common heritage and the protec~~on 
of the ~~lues on which their civilization rests •••• ' 
The institutions of the proposed union show the influence of the Fifth 
Republic constitution in the degree to which the States were to be protected 
and preserved. The real' 'power' of the Union rested in the CounCil, which 
"would meet every four months at the Head of State or Government level, and 
at least once in the intervening period at the Foreign Minister level."26 
The Council would take up matters submitted to its agenda by the Member 
States (rather than by some supranational body), and perhaps most discon-
certing for ardent supranationalists would "adopt decisions necessary for 
i.' . 
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achieving the aims of the ~nion unanimously.,,27 No Member State~'could have 
decision. imposed on it by the Union against its wishes, ensuring the safe-
guarding of each State's vital inte~ests. Of course, the EEC Council of 
Ministers also operated with the ~~animity rulo, but the Rome Treaty called 
for the institution of weighted majority voting in that body beginning 
January 1, 1966. The supranationalists could assume that no such evolution 
was likely ~ take place with the Fouchet union. The European Parliament 
embodied DeGaulle's fondest dreams concerning the role of parliaments, havina 
the prerogative to advise the States without having any authority to impede 
their operations. The Parliament had the right to submit recom~dations 
a.."1d ask questions of the Council, but it had no direct pO\'Ier over Council 
decisions. 28 The EUl'opean Political Commission, as the administrative arm 
of the Union, represented DeGaulle's concessions to what he saw as the 
technical advantages of the supranutionnl approach. Rather than a supra-
national body that would theoretically serve as the nucleus of a European 
government, it was purely an administrative deVice, with no responsibility 
to even 2.dvise the Council. Article 10 reads: 
The European Political Commission shall assist the 
Council. It shall prepare its deliberations and cat'ry out 
its decisions. It shall perform the duties that the Council 
decides to entrust it. 29 
Article 16 outlined plans for the future of the Union. It called for 
a general review of the treaty three years after it came into effect, 
"with a viaw to considering suitable measures for strengthening "the Union 
in the light of the progress already made. ,,30 'rhe review was intended to 
complete provisions for Il unif'ied forcip,n policy, and lay the groundworl: for 
"the gradual establishment of an organization centralizing, within the 
1 Union, the European Communi ties.,,3 To many supranationalists, this seemed 
to say that the Gaullist political union, rather than the existing group 
of economic communities, would become the center of efforts for European 
unity. In e:ffect, they feared, tho supranational steps taken so far would 
be swallowed up in the Europe des Etats. Once the existing communities 
had been coordinated into the Gaullist union, future change would occur 
according to the ideas that inspired the Fouchet Plan, (i.e. a union organized 
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around sovereign states), rather than according to supranationalist ideas 
designed to make the States obsolete. The goal would become a Europe o~ 
United States rather than a United States of EuroEe. Though the broader 
implications of the Rome Treaty seemed under attack in future plans for the 
Union, its economic provisions remained the standard for the acceptance of 
new members. Prospective new members had to "have previously acceded to the 
European Communities," and bEl accepted by a unanimous vote in the Council 
of r.Iinisters.32 Perhaps DeGaulle was already serving warninp: to the British, 
who had recently submitted an extensive list of special considerations to 
their \'/ould-be partners in their negot:f.ations to enter the EEC. that the 
economic provisions o~ the Rome Treaty had to be accepted for them to enter 
any political ~ion. 
Undoubtedly, the Fouchet Plan was a Gaullist document; yet ce.rtain of 
its objectives offered hope to the 8upranational1sts as well. For the first 
. . 
time, a plan was submitted to institutionalize political cooperation amonj 
the flovernments of the Six. The path to a unified foreign policy was 
virtually mapped out. The economic inotitutions of the EEC would have been 
preserved, though subordin~ted to the political W1ion. 'I'hi.4s, further 
economic integration could occ.ur directed by a lep.;itimate political authority, 
an organized W1ion of European States~ This union would assume leadership 
of the whole unification movement, bringing the European peoples together 
W1der the auspices of an orr,anization based on what DeGaulle considered were 
basic realities rather than on supranational illusions. Perhaps the boldest 
aspiration o~ the Fouchet Plan was to coordinate the supranationalist movement:; 
itself, accepting the technical value of its institutions, though substituting 
legitimate political authority for the imaginary authority that had previously 
served as their guide. Extending the prerogative o~ this W1ion was made 
a goal for the indefinite future, but was not abandoned entirely. DeGaulle 
wrote in Les MeE!oires d'espoir: 
My policy there~ore aimed at the setting up of a concert of 
European states which in developing all sorts of ties between 
them would increase their interdependence and solidarity. 
From this starting point, there \-ras every reason to believe 
tha.t the process might lead to their confederation, especially 
1.+ they \'/ere one day to be threatened from the some source.33 
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Until the basic realities of Europe's situation changed, (i.e. until 
the 'interdependence and solidarity' of the Europeans increased to the 
point where legitimate supranational authority was a realistic possibility), 
all major decisions of tho union had to be made unanimously. In any final 
analysiS, each member of the Six, no matter how committed to supranationalism 
officially, would do what was necessary to see that its vital interests 
were protected. Ironically, the Dutch would prove this point in loading the 
fight against the Fouchet Plan. A completely unified Europe could emerge 
only after a long evolutionary procoss durinn which the Europeans had to 
learn to live and work together, trying to dictate when this evolutionary 
process 'would be completed~would inevitably prove unsuccessful, as would 
the provision in the Rome Treaty calling for majority voting in the Council 
-. 
of Minimstors as of January 1, 1966. While Europe's evolution was taking 
place, the Europeans had to accept the battles and frustrations that the 
unanimi ty rule implied. 
The reactions of key supranationalists bear out the fact that, at least 
at first, the Fouchet Plan was viewed as a serious step toward European 
uni ty e After all, fe'Jl \'/ho supported any form of European union could object 
to an organized coordination of interests among governments of the Six. The 
supranationalist3 hoped to incorporate the Gaullist initiative into their 
own plans in the san~ way as the Gaullists hoped to coordinate the supra-
nationalists. As early as November, 1960, Jean Monnet had written to 
Adenauer: 
Are General DeGaulle's proposals merely for 'cooperation' and 
not 'supranational'? It is only by advancing that we shall find 
the answers to these questions, primarily on the political 
plane. I believe that some of the suggestions which you 
have discussed with General DeGaulle may usefully serve the 
development of Europe, and that we must act to give them 
practical shape. • •• ! have often told you that your 
presence as leader of Germany at the same time as DeGaulle 
is leader of France offers us a possibility of action 
today which may not occur again.f 
r'ionnet was as, much a pragmatist as he was n 5upranationalist, r;eeing' possib1li ties 
for his own ideas in the French initiative. He advocated the same tactic 
with the Fouchct Plan as hC ' would advocate with tho Dritish opplicatipn to 
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the Common Market: simply put, to sign agreements now and work out dis-
agreements later within the apporatuG already agreed upon. Honnet was 
.,.,,., .. t,l/t, 
willing to accept the French <1 to increase cooperation between governments 
as a prcrequisite to greater attempts at unity. Monnc~s support for the 
intlcdiate, if not the ultimate aims of the Fouchet Plan later translated 
into endorsement by Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of 
Europe. Not even Paul-Henri Spaal't, probably thc socond most prominent 
supranationalist after Monnet, opposed the Fouchet Plan at this pOint, 
though his eventual siding \'lith the Dutch \'10uld prove decisive in the failure 
of t."le negotiations. More supranationally oric-nted than the Dutch, Spaak 
hoped to use his blessing to obtain concessions from DeGaulle on community 
institutions .~d British participation. Still Spaak , like Monnet, {;cons:tdered 
the Fouchet Plan a viable starting point for negotiation on political unity, 
at least at first. 34 
Only th~ Dutch stood opposed to the French initiative from the outset, 
ostensibly on supranational grounds. Even before the Bonn meeting of July 
18, the Dutch submitted a report to the various governments which stated: 
liThe Dutch delegation •• ~ fears that the system of European institutions 
might be compromised by the creation of a political structure of an inter-
35 
r.overru::~ntal character.1I Examining the Dutch position, or.e often over ... 
looked or r.lisintt)l~preted in studies of the obstacles to European integration, 
is uoeful in underatanding the failure of the F'ouchet Plan, as well as cet-tain 
issues later on. Dutch attitudes on European wlion generally show a curious 
combination of tlupranationalist tali, nnd nationalist action. Alterio 
SpinelH~ whose book The EUrocrats ztudies the interactions of the various 
national delegntions to the: European communities, writes of the Dutch: 
In the abstract they arc ecnerally favorable to Bolutions 
\'1hich imp ly real transfers of authority to united European 
organizations, but in the concrete they always demand long 
and minute preliminary interRovernmental negotiations, which 
invariably help to strengthen that very Europe of the nations 
•. If'hich, as a matter of principle, they say they abhor. 36 
As inhal:;i tants of a small nation \"li th stable institutions but without reai 
prospects for defense, the Dutch people's long history of independence rested 
upon utteffi';)ts to remain neutral and pre'serve European equilibrium. \'lith . " 
•• 
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centuries of commercial connections abroad, the Netherlands resisted any of 
tho protectionist tendencies of European integration. The Dutch were among 
the strongest supporters of the Muudling negotiations in the late 1950's. 
Realizing that their prosperity and independence in the postwar world rested 
of some freedom of movement within the Atlantic Alliance, the Dutch based 
their foreign policy on close Atlantic ties and a desire to eqUilibrate the 
European Community through the addition of new members, particularly Great 
Britain. I-lore than any othor country, the Netherlands feared a Paris-Bonn-
Rome flxis which seemed to be emerging in early 1961. As the Fouchet dis-
cussions grew more extensiva, these fears increased, leading the Dutch to 
pres~ore strongly for inclusion of the Atlantic-oriented Britain to regain 
a balance. Allessandro Silj suggesto that the Dutch would have resisted any 
Europoan initiative tha"t would tie them too closely to the Continent~ whether 
Gaullist plans for a politically independent Europe, 0". plans to increase 
European economic insularity through the EEC. 37 They would show this oppOSition 
to economic insularity during the agricultural negotiations taking place 
. 38 throughout our per~od. 
By late 1961, the positions, or ao they were soon to become, battle 
. 
lines, were--basically knovm. France and the Netherlands stood on opposite 
sides. \'1est Germany. \ffiS firmly in the French camp. The Belgians had clear 
sympathies with the Dutch position, but had not as yet actually allied 
themselves with them. After Spaak bacame Foreign Minister in January, 1962, 
the attachment to the Dutch solidified. Luxembourg, the smallest and most 
forgotten member of the Six, generally sided with the Franco-German position.39 
Italy saemed to hold the most promise for obtaining a compromise at this 
point. Until the very end of the ne.gotiations, Italy acted as a mediator 
bct\Jgen th (. French and tho Dutch, a role to which she was sui ted in several 
\'1o.ys Q As the only 'middle' European power of the Six, too large to be 
considered a 'Gmall' power like the Benelux countries, yet lacking the 
economic or politicaJ ctrength of France or Wer.:t Cermnny,- Italy's position 
neemed to lend i toelf to finding a !il iddle way between larr,e and small power 
interests. Also, the merry-go-t'olmd of internal Italian politics, which 
would eventually playa role in the failure of I\l!gotintions, kept two 
Italian leaders \'lith pro-French syr;lpathies; Premier Antonio Segni and 
\.' .
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La seul qui pulsse reg order de Gaulle dana les yeux 
"Da enige die De Caulle in de ogen kan kiiken'; 
Source: Die TiJd-Maasbode, Iflarch 15, 1961. 
\" . , 
('I'M T!mSil) 
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Foreign IUnister Amintore I"anfani, from aligning themselves too closely 
with DeGaulle's camp. 
The European Parliament also attempted to find some sort of middle way, 
mainly through suggestions for modifying certain of the Plan's provisions. 
In September, 1961, the parliament's political commission asked a committee 
,;-
headed by Rene Pleven, (who had desiened the unsuccessful proposals -.for 
tho European Defense Community during the 19GO's), to review the Fouchet 
Plan. The Pleven Cor:t."Ili ttee findings cri tiS/zcd certain elements of the Pla.n 
and sug,g4!!sted changes, mQl1y of which Vlould be incorporated into the discussions 
40 later on. 
Recommendations in ~~Pleven report rangcd in scope from simple wording 
changes to major revisiollsin the proposed union's instutitions~ It stated 
that the original title of the Fouchet Plan, Traitc d'uniond'Etats. or .". 
Treaty of the Union of States, contradicted the intent of t~e Bonn Declar-
ation, su~gestinc instead thc title, Tho Union of the European Peop~. 
The report recommended that the var.ucness with regard to existing communities 
be resolved by including specific guarantees of the Trcaty of Rome. The 
ambiguity of the plun with regard to NATO could be cleared up by a statement 
that the h&rmonized foreign and defense policies must aim at strengthening 
the Atlcntic Alliance. 
The committee's report differed nost from the Fouchet Plan on the issue 
of the Union's institutions. According to the abridged version of the 
report appearing in H.S. Chopra's DeGaulle and European Unitl' the committee 
"objected to the institutionalization of a body comprising national func-
tionaries of' 'the Six' as a Political Commission distinct from the Council.,,41 
In short, this meant an objection to the Commission as the dependent tech-
nical arm of the Council. The report advocated instead the "nomination of 
a Secretary. -General i who like his counterpart in the European Economic 
COI:ununi ty. t'lould be independent of the Governments of the Member States of' 
the Union.,,42 This represented a fundamental change in status for the 
Commission from an administrative device to 0. center of sUpranational 
authority. The report also objected to strict devotion to the unanimity 
rule, mlggcst1ng that the Council refer problems on It/hich a t.manimous 
decision was unattainable in a specified period of time to the European 
Parliament for an opinion. Other recommendations for increasing the in-
fluence of the European Pnrlirunent included: giving the Parliament 
.,\. 
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approval over the Union's budge+. including the budget for defense projects., 
the right of the Parliamont to ratify international treaties concluded by 
the Union, and quick adoption of proposals for electing the Parliament by 
universal suffrage. Though the Plevon report certainly proposed major re-
visions in the Fouchet Plan with the intent of coordinating it into the 
supranational cause, the Plan \1aS accepted as an useful starting point for 
discussions on political unity. The neport praised. for example, the prin-
ciple of regularized meetings between leaders of the Six, an \'/e11 as the plans 
for e).-tcnciing the union alluded to in Article 16. Pleven himself said of 
the Fouchet Plan: 
All progress toward political union that does 
not question the results acquired and does not 
projudae .the forms and futuI'e developments of 
the European structure m~st be \'Ielcomed as a 
~ositive contribution~ 4J 
In January, 1962, several events occurred that wcmld in combination 
;3oal the fate of the Fouchet Plan, even before the Fouchet Committee could 
:::;ubr.1i tits recommendations. Spanl: become Foreign Minister of Belgium, and 
proceeded to align that governm.ent':::; position more closely to that of the 
Dutch. On January 16, the Six reached an important agreement on including 
agricul ture in the Comr::on r.larket, perhaps lessening DoGaulle I s need to fur-
ther appease his European partncr:::;.44 At the foreign ministers' meeting on 
January 18, the French took the offensive by submitting a new draft of the 
Fouchet plan containing \'lh;.,t they referred to as "quelques ameliorations 
de ot:rlc,,45. but which in foct reprctlented a noti&bly tour,hcnod version of 
the Fouchet Plan, one which, in Chopra's words, honorcd the Aosembly's 
reccomendations "only by ignorinr, them completely,!46 
Though the broad outline of the second Fouchct draft WuG tho same as 
that of the first, the wordin~ of mnny of the provisions was shortened 
considerably, while certain vague assurances r.iven to France's partners 
in the first draft \"lcre eliminated entirely. In Article 2, which stated 
the aims of the union, the cloudy reference to the Atlantic Alliance was 
~cL"/I'" 
onitt$4 ,tho 'stc .... J "(M1~:mly a short statement expressing the desire of the 
Six to "unify the policy of Uember States in spheres of conunon interest: 
foreien policy, economics, cultural affairs and defense. 47 Article 16 J 
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regarding review of the Union's achievements after three years, was shortened 
considerably. In the new version, any mention of the existing communities 
was removed, simply stating that the review would attempt to strengthen the 
Union by "simplifying, rationalizing and co-ordinating the ways in which 
Nember States cooperate.,,48 These and other sins of omission in the second 
draft seemed a deliberate flouting of what the five saw as their legitimate 
concerns, mainly the need to guarantee both the Atlantic Alliance and the ;><--
existin~ European Communi ties. ny shortening and simplifying the lang,,'age ~ 
of the second draft, OcGaullc appeared to prcoent his vision of Europe as 
a package dealt to be (lccepted or rejected in its entirety. 
Al thoughOeGaulJ.e, according to SUj, personally approved the first 
draft of tho Fouchet Plan, he "corrected" the second draft in a meeting 
49 
wi th Oebre. Couve de Murville, and Fouchet. The appearancc of the new 
draft suprised even the French diplomats involved in the negotiations. 50 
The reasons behind this new tactic are not entirely clear, since by delib-
erately provoking a confrontation with his partners DeGnulle seemed to 
virtually eliminate the French initiative's chances of success. To an extent, 
the new draft simply expressed frustration with Dutch intransir,cnce; the 
French position could throw the differences between the Six into bolder 
relief, and make serious work on the issues possible . Later on, in the 
spring of 1962, DeGaulle proved willinp.; to restore and even extend the 
assurances given in the first draft. At the very leastj the second draft 
would encourage the Dutch to take a clear stand on the p,oais of the union, 
explaining how they intended to reconcile what DeGaulle saw as their contra-
dictory attachment to both supranationalism and British participation. In 
justifying the new draft, Couve de Hurville wrote; 
At the very least we would serve notice that we were 
not the dupes of exasperatinH delaying tactics and that 
after all, if - as our October draft showed -- \'/e were 
prepared for reasonable compromise, since others remained 
immobile, we were also entitled to mark our preferences. 51 
\'Jhatever the reasons behind the new draft, it provoked a predictable 
response from France's partners. L'Anee Politique reported that: "This 
text had already incited great apprehension in several European capitals . 
Since then, the Low Countries who had previously found themselves 
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isolated in their oPPosition to the French views, were jOined on January 
18 by their partners.,,52 The January 20 issue of the Amsterdam newspaper 
A1semeen Handelsbla~ la~ed the second draft a giant step backward, a com-
plete reversion to narrow nationalism, that offered no hope to the supra-
nationalists .• 53 Spank felt free to drop any appearance of objectivity, and 
firmly joined the Dutch camp. 
The final draft adopted by the Fouchet Committee pointed to the reduced 
state of the whole French initiative. Its 'text' if one may use such a 
s 
term, provided 11 ttle mOI'e than a listing of difference' between France and 
her partners.~;f In the right hand column was printed the text proposed by 
the French; on · the left column was the text approved by France's partners. 
Occasionally throughout the document there appeared articles printed in the 
middle of the page, which were the passages upon which both groups had 
managed to agree. The disc~ep~ncies we~e predictable and sometimes mutually 
exclusive~ A:r.ticlo ~~ in the French version merely stated the aim to unify 
various national policies, while the other version stressed the importance 
55 of the Atlantic Alliance and the existing communities. The French version 
required unanimous decisions in all cases, while the other included a. 
rather peculiar provisiofl allo\,/in!\ tho Council to waive the unanimity rule 
in certain cases if it chose to do so unanimously~6 ~Iost signific.antly, 
the vcr~lion ell dorsed by the five proposed the creation of a Secretariat 
which woul.d function independently of the Member States, as well as a 
supranational C01.lrt of Justice responsible for interpreting the Treaty. 57 
This attempt to mal<e the union a least in part a su~ranational organization 
is at the heart of the differences between the two versions of the treaty, 
and sho.~ that the two versions called for two fundamentally different 
types of union. With regard to new member~ while both agreed that such ,.6 
tl.t ':r"~ vfASI#A. '"sISlfI,X 
states oust first have acceded to the existing European Communities,~on a 
lmanimous vote of approval by the Council, while the others proposed auto-
matic aGcession to the political union once access to the existing com-
munities was complete. 
From January to kpril, 1962, various attempts were made to reconcile 
the opposing views. The Fouchet Committee met in January, February, and 
March, the result being the somewhat schizophrenic draft just described. 
However, five days after the final Fouchet Committee draft ... ras submitted, 
~ . • 
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the Six agreed at the meeting of foreign ministers to dispense with the 
formation of the independent Secretariat. 50 DeGaulle himself attempted to 
mend fences that spring. In visits to Adenauer in February and to Fanfani 
in April, DeGaulle accepted the inclusion of references to NATO and the 
existing communities. 59 Thus, DeGaulle appearcd too willing to retreat 
from the hard line implied by the second Fouchet draft. Compromise appeared 
possible on most of the major issues: the Atlantic Alliance, the existing 
communities, and limiting the supranational character of the new union. 
Only the British question remained, whether the French would allow the 
British to participate in ~he political discussions without having yet 
joined the EEC, and Vl~ther the Dutch and the Belgians \IIould join a political 
union that did_not include Britain. Neither side would compromise on this 
issue, \'1hich proved the immediate cause of the failure of the French ini-
tiative. 
The demise of the Fouchet negotiations occurred in the late spring 
of 1962. ':lhile DeGaulle I s visits to Italy and \\lest Germany had helped narrow 
differences , they helped revive fears in the small states of a Paris-Bonn-
Romo axis. So, "lith the following combination factors as a backdrop, the 
foreign minister: of the Six met on April 17, 1962: France willin5~0 
make some cOr!(;.csions on several key issues, rising suspicion in the Benelux 
countries of their larger partners, and neither the Dutch nor the French 
willing to compromi.se on the Cri tish question. Italian Foreignr!!il"lister 
Segni, continuing Italian attempts to mediate, suggested a compromise 
along the lin~s of the DeGuulle-Fanfnni mectinr, of April 4. Luns and Spaak, 
however, suddenly insistcd on a general revision of the Union after three 
. 60 
years specifically to give it a more supranational character. Spaak then 
dropped 0. bombshell which left no doubt os to Belglum joining the Dutch 
cqmp. by I'l3fusing to sign any treaty of political union until Dritain 
became 0. full member of the EEC. Given the state of the EEC negotiations 
with Brl.tain at this point, this was hardly a condition that was likely 
to be met in the near future. Couve de Murville, who presided, adjourn!:u 
the meeting !ine die. 
DeGaulle's press conferer.ce of May 15 seemed to slam the already clOSing 
door. Realizing that the French initiative was a lost cause by virtue of 
the differen~es on the British question, he took the opportunity to take a 
" t 
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few rhetorical shots at some of France's partners among the Six in his 
most ironic and condescending manner. With a clear reference to Spaak and 
Luns he said that two "quite contro.dictory,,61 objections to the French pro-
posals, the supranationalism issue and the question~of British participation, 
were made by the same objectors. With characteristic bluntness, he remarked: 
"Yet everyone knows that Great Dri tnin, in its capa,ci ty as a great State 
and a nation loyal to itself, would never agree to lose its identity in Borne 
kind of utopian structure.,,62 It \cJas on this accasion that DeGaulle made 
his notorious bon mot about lOSing the various European cultures "in some --• ., ., 63 
kind cf antegrated Esperanto or VolapUk." DeGaulle reserved his mos"t; 
biting remarks for what he saw as the inevitable result of the supranational 
approach: th&,permanent preservation of American hegemony. He said of a 
supranc.tional union: 
But such an entity cannot be found without there being 
in Europe today a federaCor vii th sufficient pO\'1er, 
authority, and skill. That is w~ one falls back on 
a type of hybrid, in which the six States 'IIlould under-
tcl<e to comply with. what will be decided upon by a 
certain majority •••• but there is no wny, at the 
present time for 0. foreign mtl.jori ty to be able to 
constrain recalcitrant m'ltions. It is tru~ that, in 
this 'integrated' Europe, as they say~ there would 
pex-haps be no policy at all. This would simplify 
thines a ereat deal. ••• But then, perhaps, their 
world "lould follow tbe lead of some outsider who did 
have a policy. There would. perhaps be a federator, 
"but that federator \'1ould not be European. 64 
As if this \lTere not enough, DeGaulle felt obliged to commit supranationalist 
ideas to the realm of !.he Thousand and One Nights: "You see, when one' a 
mind dwells on matters of great import, it is pleasant to dream of the 
4 
marvelous lamp that Aladin had only to rub in order to soar above the real.,,65 
". 
Predictably. this press conference sounded the death knell for the 
Fouchet discussions, despite incr()aningly feeble attempts to revive them, 
".. 
mainly by the Italians, which continued the fall. As Pattison de MenU 
observes, the press conference \'1as curiously devoid of references to the 
British question, either to reaffirm France's p~vious position or to offer 
some compromise, which conceivably could have re-opened the negotiations. 
" .• 
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As she suggests, perhaps DeGaullc wao awaiting further clarification on the 
Dri tish posi tion:- via ~ vis the common nCricul tural policy and commi ttments 
to the Americans, which would come through the EEC negotiations.56 If these 
issues \~ere resolved favorab ly, the logjam on political union could be 
brol<en, and agreement acceptable to all reached at some later date. As it 
turned out however, the British negotiations would drag on for months, with 
diminishing hppes for success. That July DeGaulle made an attempt to 
form some type of Fouchet-like union with West Germany and Italy, the two 
countries \'/hich had initially been most receptive to the Fouchet Plan. 
tIith the celebrated 'openi~g to the Left' going on in Italy at the time, 
few Italian politicians wanted to be so closely related to Gaullist views 
of E~pe. So ... in the last half of 1962, DeGaulle pursued his views of 
European unity with his only remaining ally, Adenauer's West Germany. In 
the r.leantioe, the door remained Ol)en to the other partners, provided that 
they accept the provisions that had been refused when the Fouchet nego-
tiations ended. DeGaulle said in a speech on June 15, 1962: 
It is up to the States, as they are to organize 
themselves. Later on VIC \1ill see, either we or 
our descendants, what the Europeans will do, when 
tho people will have become accustomed to living 
together. It is still necessary that they bor-in. 
France has invited them to do so in the past, and 
she contik'lues to invite them today. 67 
The failure of the Fouchet negotiations, which DeGaulle had helped cause 
through his revised version of the draft treaty, brought about considerable 
resentnent on his part which undoubtedly poisoned hi.s attitude later on. 
The Fouchet initiative represented the high point in DcGnulle's interest 
in European political unification. The rejection of the Fouchet Plan raised 
certain issues which mal<e the whole episode a turning point in the history 
of European integration. Edward Kolodziej observes that: "So long as no 
r 
state proposed a formal union, there \"las no need to face the embarassing 
1\ 
C]ucstion of what kind or' union to establish. IIGB 'rh!3 . F.o\ichct negotiations 
had raised two such ernba~ssinp. questions: how supranational a character 
ought :further European unification have,anq under \'rhat conditions ought 
Britnin to be allowed to particir.ate? Answcrinn these two questions 
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constituted the basis of DeGaulle's European policy throughout the rest 
of our period. If DcGaulle toolt the Fouchet episode as an example, the 
answers to these questions did not bode \'le11 for his vision of Europe. 
Some bitterness appeared concerning particular nations as well. 
DeGaulle especially resented the lack of emba!assment Luna and Spaak showed 
at endorsing a supranationally united Europe with British participation, 
.~, which he conoiclercd mutually exclusive. The French 
failed to see how the small countries' intereGts could have been bettcr 
protected by a 6upranat10nal1st otructurc than under the French proposals. 
Couve de fI!urville w1"1 tes: 
If.~yer by chance - or mischance! - the large countries 
should work together in a supranational structure , ho\'l r~~ 
inf'luence would the voices of the small countries carry in 
Community votes, or ho'll could their representatives make 
themselves heard in an assembly where they would be sub-
mcrflccl by numbers? In truth, the only reasonable guarantee 
for the small countries is that offered to them by France, 
equali ty of the states and the principle of makinp. unan·-
imous decisions. 59 
Pattisot~ de "lenil observes that if majority voting, which the supranation-
alists claimed to s~pport so strongly, had been in place during the Fouchet 
nef.T,otiatioI1s, the D).ltch \'lOuld probably have been de:feated in 1961 and the 
Fouchet Plan would have been enacted. 70 As it was, DeGaulle suspected, 
that Belgium and Dutch ..s Ilpranationalism and the insistei'\<'(.. D", ke. PtS,rf«.'f~:""&tt ~ , 
..... ..-..... . .~ .... ~., ... " ..... -" .. -... 
of Britain v~s merely a cover for a desire to keep Europe in tpe tow of the 
United States, both ecpnpmically and politically. DCGaulle also resented 
the fact that the Italians failed to either mediate successfully Or +&1 
convincingly . join the Gaullist camp. He tartly remarked in Les Memoires 
d'e~oir that although Italian Foreign Uinister Fanfani had sufficient ' 
sympathy for DeGaulle's vision of Europe: "so simple and categorical a ' 
a resolve W?uld have been out of keeping with the political complexities 
characteristic of our transalpine cousins.,,71 
With the failure of DeGaulle's 'positive' initiative toward European 
unity. be became more willing to tf'J.ce tnegative' steps to see that no 
vision of Europe replaced his Ollm o If his Europe des Etats was not to be 
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sanctioned o1'1'ic1ally by Francels partners, he would see to it that on 
major 1:s:~uos only the States would bo allowed to malw decisions. DeGaulle 
thus set about realizing his vision of Europe through sheer obstinance. 
IUs first step W"'dS trying to incorporate that European state whose views 
seemed most in line with his ovm, \'Jest Germany, with the Franco-German 
Friendship Treaty of 1963 . 
51 
Endnotes to Chapter II 
lCited in Willis, France, Germanl. and the New Europe, p.275-276. 
2Ibid • p. 274. 
3Ibid • -
4DcGllulle. !.1!moirs of HOEC, p. 143. 
~1ayne, !,h!: RecoverJ: of Euro~, p. 259. 
6Ibid • 
7See Willis. France, Germany •. ..a.rd the New Euro£.!, p. 280. 
~or a ~O";e full discussion of these problems, see Chapter Ve 
9\\1i11is, [ranee, Ger!!lEln~~ ~~ Ee",! EuroE~' p. 281-282. 
lOSee DeGaulle's nress conference of September 5~ 1960, printed in 
t.1ajoX' Addresses vol. If p. 93 • 
...... -~-
llKolodziej, fren~nte~nation~l PolicJ:~ p. 249. 
12'~:J p. 292. 
13press Conference, September 5, 1960, printed in r.ll3.joX' Addr.,£..sses 
vol. I, p. 93. 
14r'or t1 discU/Jnion of these fllU tunl minconccptions rosul ting from the 
DeGaulle-Ade~uer meetinr, of July, 1960, see Allesandro Silj, Europe~ 
Poli tical Puzzle A Study of the Fouchet N(:p;otiations and the 19"§"~.J!~to, 
Occasional papers in International Af'fairs, no. 17. (Cambridge; Harvard 
University Press., 1964), p. 54. Hereafter refel~red to as Silj, Europe!s 
?olltical Puzzle. -
15pattison de M~il, 1I1ho Speaks For Euro~?, p. 67. 
16See Appendix 1. All succeeding quotes from the Bonn Declaration are 
tru<en trom tris Appendix as well. 
17Ibid• -
18Tb "d ~. 1 • -
19Ibid• -
20Ibid • 
21paul_Henri Spaak, Combats inach}V/s, 2 volE>. (f'nri.s:::Plon, 1969), -
52 
I: II, quoted in Rober~ O. Paxton, Europe in the Twentieth Century (New 
York: Harcort Brace Jovanovich Inc., 1975), p. 551. -
22r-1acmillan praised the Bonn Declaration in his speech to Commons on X 
~uly 31, (see Silj, Europe's Political Puzzle, p. 67), while DeGaulle 
declared his"support for the principle of British entry into the EEC, 
(see Major AddressSls, vol •. ~, p.147). 
23See Appendix 2, Artfcle 2. All subsequent quotes on the first Fouchet 
plan are taken from this Appendix. 
24Ibid • -
25Ibid.~. 
26Ibid" , Article 5. -
27Ibid• , A~·ticle 6. -
28 Article 'l. Ibid. , -
29Ibid • , Article 10. 
30Ibid • , Article 16. 
31Ibid • -
32Ibid., Article 17. -
33DeGaulle, rTernoirs of Hope, p. 171. Note that DeGaullc could have seen 
this threat as coming from either the United States or from the Soviet 
Union, both of whom en~angered Europe's independence Rnd sovereignty. 
340Y Ilovcmber, 1961, however, Spaal!s positio~ had hardened considerably . 
In a speech to the National Press Club in Washington on November 21, on 
Convienentl.s receptive ground, Spaak denounced the Gaullist view.of Europe 
and delTlP..nded P.r'i tish participation in the political discussiono. See 
L'Annee Politique, 19.§.! (Paris:, Press Universitaires de France, 1962), p. 597. 
35 Gluoted in Silj. EurQ,Eets politisal Puz~. p. 41. 
361\1 ti.ero Spinelli, The Eurocrats Conflict and Crisis in the European 
f$?mm~n!·tl (Bal tirnore: TheJ ohns ITo;i'd.'ns Un! ver';! ty Press. 1966), p. 82.-
37~;ee Silj, Europe I s PoU tical puzzle, Chapter 3, p. 40-64. 
38See Chapter V. 
39Even passing references to Luxembourg arc hard to come by in the 
liternture on the Fouchet Plan, but see Kolodziej, French International 
~ll£I., p. 296. 
53 
40These suggestions are excellently summarized in H. S. Chopra, DeGaulle 
{l.nct European Unlt~ (New DeIhl, Indin: Abhlnau Publicationu, 1974). p. 99-104-
r<ly discussion of the Pleven revisions is based on this summary. 
41~., p. 100. 
42Ibi9'~Po 100-101. 
43 ' ,/ Rene pleven quoted in L'Ann~e f,?litiguc 1 1961, p. G22. 
44See Chapter V for a more complete discussion of the 1962 agricultural 
agreement. 
45L'Ann~ Politique, 1962, p. 389. 
46chopra, DeGaulle and E~opean UE!~' p. 105. For selections from 
the second Fouchet draft, see the left-hand column of Appendix 3. 
47See left hand corner of Appendix 3, Article 2. 
48Ibidel Article 16. -
49Si lj, ~urgpe'o politi8~l ruzzlp, p. 149. 
SCrbill. -
51Couve de l.:urvillc, Une 1'oli tinue etrang~r!, p. 371. 
52 #~ 
L'Annee Politigue. 1~63, p. 389. 
53}:bid o;P' 388. 
54See Appendi~' 3. 
55Ibid., Article 2, (both si~es of the page). -
561bido, Article '1, (right hand column). -
57!2!.9. t Article 11, 14, (right hand column). 
58See Roger Hassip, DeGaullc et l'Eurooe (Paris: Glamrnarion, 1963), p. 78. 
59See Silj, Europe's Polit~£a! __ p~,u~z~z~l_e, p. 19. 
60~iee Chopra, Q£.Gaulle a,!!d European Uni~. P. 122-123. 
61press conference May 15, ,1%2, printed in MaJor ~ddresscG vol. I, p. 175. 
G2Ibid • -
63 Ibid. -
.. : , 
64~ •• p. 176-177. 
65Ibid •• p. 177. -
54 
66 ' Pattison de Menil, Who Speaks For Europe?, p. 77. 
67 ' Speech in Dale, January 15, 1962, printed in Jouve, Le Theme "Europeel,!" 
p. 84. 
68Kolodziej, French International Policy, p. 301-
69 ' Couve de Murville, £!!~ Politigue Etrangere, p. 3£31. 
70 ' Pc.ttison de ~;lenil, Who Speaks For Euroru;?, p. 18!. 
71DeGaulle, r·1emoirs of Hone, p. 177. Fanfani and Segni exchanged jobs 
wi th some l'egulari ty throu.ghout our period, which accounts fOl" previous 
references to Fa.nfani as premier and Sesni as Foreign Minister. 
55 
Chapter III: The l~ouchet Plan ~ deux: The Franco-German Friendship Treaty of 1963 
IJlhen by mid-1962 it became apparent that the Fouchet Plan would die 
stillborn, the Gaullist initiative shifted to the one country where DeGaulle's 
vision of Europe seemed to have a realistic chance of acceptance: Adenauer's 
West Gerr.~ny. By bringing about a formal and quite ceremonious reconciliation 
betvleen the two nations really at the center of Europe's two civil wars, 
DcGaulle believed he could demonstrate on a smaller scale the type of' union 
envisioned in the l"ouchet Plant and thus b.y a foundation for unifying 
Europe as a tnlo1e. Tying together the two largest and most powerful members 
of' the ESC could create a compelling example to the others if that union 
were successful. Yet the FranCO-German Friendship Treaty would suffer the 
sar.;e fate as the Fouchet Plan, though its demise would take much longer. 
By the end of our period, the Treaty was more or less ir,nored by both parties 
in the i-aaking of important policy doci!lion8~1 though it remained on the 
boales. ;·~ore clearly than with the Fouchct Plan, the question of Atlanticism 
and the degree of dependence on the United States vlould prove the main cause 
of the failure. This failure more cr lesG completes the rejection of 
DeGaulle 's vision of Europe by hiG Imrtnero. After\'lards, DcGaulle 'Jlould 
< 
,~ ' 
feel compo l.led to \'lai t for history to vindicate his vision of Europe, while 
obstructing further attempts to lead Europe do\'m the false road to unity 
through supranationalism. 
At the start, ho, ... ever, the Franco .. Gerrnan entente proceeded down a path 
stre\'ffi \'lith -the r03es that would b~" often used as a metaphor during the 
entire epinode. The rappro.cAeClent of our period actually ShO ..... 5 continuit:,· 
\lith French foreign policy during the Fourth Republic. Under Georges 
Bidault and Robert Schumann, the only two Foreign r·'iinisters during that 
otherwise unsteady Republic, Franco-German reconciliation had been p'~rsued 
as ' a necessary evil, and as a response to American Cold \'Jar pressure. The 
Schumann Plan, which created the E.uropean Coal and Steel Communi tSr, marked 
the higb point in Franco-German relations during the Fourth Republic, though 
the Frendl vie-.::ed it as being as much an opportunity to perpetuate at least 
partial control over German ... ,ar- industries ns 8. step toward unifying Europe. l 
.. ' .
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For DeGaulle personally, the entente he initiated concluded a gradual 
shift in attitude since the war. LH:e many Europeans, DeGaullc originally 
favored the dissolution of Germany into a loosely joined confederation of 
small s"Cates, somewhat similar to the German Confederation created by 
Napoleon. As late as 1949, DeGaulle continued to advocate such a confederation, 
particularly noting the need for an independent Ruhr. 
Erot:\ the day \'Ihen Germany \'Jill have received an orean-
izo.tion, ouch that ahe will be composed of Stutet tied 
together, doubtless with federative ties, but each 
mainta.ining its sovereignty, from the day when the 
Ruhr will have Ii: Europenj._ status, we "'Iill see Europe . 
appear in all her power. '-
At the sar.le time however, DeGaulle car.le to realise that any unification of 
Europe had to rely on Franco-German reconciliation. Even a truncated 
Germany ,laS likely to recover economically and poli ticnlly, and Europe 
had to incorporate this recovery, through bringing about an understanding 
bebleen its t\'l0 oldest and most bi tter foes: 
But reason requires that, to reach that goal, 
there be one day a 1:1a..v of establishing a direct 
and practical entente between tho Gorman and French 
peoples, responding to e1e fact that they are in so 
many ways conrlementnry to each other, and surmounting 
vicissi tudes of History. Deep dO\,ffi, that is the 
heart of t;he problem. There will or there will not 
be a Europe depending on whether an agreement without 
any interlopers can or cannot be possible between the .. 
Germans and the Gauls.3 
DeGaullo was elso hiChly aware of the emotional appeal of such a reconcil-
iation. This emotional side, which would play n major rolo in the rap-
£. proachpent, began to develop even before the end of tho\\fnr. DeGaulle 
wrote in the r.1ernoircs de guerre: 
Thus, amid the ruins , mourning and humiliation which had 
submerged Germany in her turn, I felt my sense of distrust 
an<;l severity fade \'!i thin me. I even glimpsed possi bili ties 
of understanding which the past had never offered; moreover~ 
it seemed to me that the same sentiment \I,as dawning among our 
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soldiers. The thirst for vengeance which had spurred them 
on at first had abated as they advanced across this ravaged 
()arth. Today I sa\'1 them merciful before the misery of the 
vanquished. 4 
solverP 
The Cold \lJar had effectlvelyAthe problem of potential German domination 
of the continent. Now divided and occupied by the two hostile superpowers, 
Germany coulo no longer threaten European peace. Thus, DeGaulle could 
encourage l'Jest Gcr.f.1anyl~ revival as n partner rather than as an enemy of 
France. Despite a ,Great deal of talk to the contrary, most European statesmen 
recognized that tho division of Gorm::my v/ould have to continue for the 
forseeable fUture; reunification would have to be put off to, in Pattison 
de Henil' s \'10I'~S, "the tomorrow of history. ,,5 DcGaulle himself put off 
reunification until un indepcndent united Europe \"a~l uble to negotiate a 
detente leadi.ng to the end of the Cold \'Iar. Dy creating detente to solve 
the German question rather thnn der.:anding a solution to the German question 
as a prere(;:uiai te to detente 1 DeGuulle hoped to make reunification a real 
possibili ty, ~10ugb on4a,:mi ttedly iar in the future . In the meantime he 
a~;lted of the Hest CCrl:1Ill1S: "acceptance of e;dstinp; frontier:::;, an ntti tude 
of good\dll in relation::. \'lith the Enst: complote renunciation of atomic 
t:\rr:,ar:lCnts, and unremitting patience ns regard:; rcunification.,,6 Given 
accept.::.ncc of these conditions, \'Jest Germany could be an ideal partner in 
the building of DeGaulle I s Eurore. 
The close relationship beblCen DeGaulle and VJest Germen Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer seemed to hold still more promise for the partnership. 
DeGaulle I s aJrniration for Adenauer began 'Vlell before the former ' s return 
to power in 1958. As early as 1950, he had refered to Adenaucr as a poten-
tially valuabJ.c partner in the unification of' Europe. 
Chancellor Adenauer is partisan of an entente and perhaps 
Gorne day a union between the t\'lO peoples. It seemed to me 
em several occasions that I could perceive in what this 
good German said, a sort of echo of the call of a Europe, 
l~uined. disJicO-tcd t \·;e0pin;.;, and cnlling on her children 
to unite. 7 
DeGaulle shovJed his respect for the Chancellor by the honor of arranging 
their nrst meetine at his country home at Colombey-les-dcux Eglises rather 
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than in Paris, which took place on September Itl,lSlf)O. The close personal 
relationship between the t"/O leaders began to develop here. Adenauer himsel,f 
vll'ote of the meetine: 
Premier DeGaulle--and ~ay this very frankly-- in no 
\'lay matches the image \'/hich one might have of him from 
reading the newspapers in recent months. He is a quite 
different person from \,hat he has been represented by 
the foreign press as \-Jell as our own. He is open-minded; 
he is not a nationalist; and he is well acquainted with 
foreign affairs. He is especially well aware of the 
significance of Franco-German relations for these two 
countries, for Europe as n If/hole and fBI' the shaping 
of international -relations in general. 
It is \,lorth noting that a1 though the meeting focused mainly on broad issues 
and goals, :it did produce 'b,;;o concrete !'esults. DeGaulle promised to con-
tinue his tough Une on the status of Berlin. In turn Adenauer agreed to 
support the termination of the r;audling ne,e;otin:tions on a free trade area 
attached to the EEC p 'negotiations strongly supported by the man 1I1ho would 
become Adcmauer' s successor, EconoFlic Minister, Ludwig Erhard. Thus, we 
Gee that a precotient "JUS set for a Franco-German bloc wi thin the Six three 
years bofore';ti:1e Fcuchet Plan was even subl:1i ttcn. We can also note that 
there were :llrelldy othel'" \'Jest Germon leaders on the scene \I/ho would be less 
willing to cooperate with French designs once Adenauer left office. 
r,luch has been written about the DeGaulle-Adcnauer friendship, and 
it is possible to c1 te a few similarities in style and outlook which help 
explain its basis. First and perhaps foremost VIas thelr age and the 
perspective th .. y brought to their roles ao leaders. When our period opens p 
DeGattlle was 71 years old and Arlenauer was 85. Both reached adulthood 
.... ell IJefore the First \','orld ~lar and could rer:lCmber the Ago of Europe at 
i tc heig,ht. Doth had "Ii tnessed the entire spectrum of twentieth century 
history, and carried a keen sense of this hictory to thei.r wor1<. Doth were 
devout Catholics, which at times lent··an aura of rcligj.~.ui ty to the 
Franco-Gorr.m.n rapproach:nent, ... ,hilo at the name time r:dsing fears in' 
Britain and other Protestant sectionG of Europe of an Europe des ·catholigues. -
The two shared a sindlar style, n prcoccupation with grand ideas over 




DronO time oxercioinr, tight control over thorn. DoGaullo'a royal manner of 
governing is of course 1:1011 Imovm, while Adenauer' s government was only 
half jokingly called a Kanzlerdemol{ratie. Intercstingly, both had also 
had troubled dealinen with the I3ritinh during the war years, DcGllullo during 
" his exile in London, and Adenauer \Ji th his removal from his post of Durger-
moistor of Cologne in 1945 for alleged incompetence. 
Though the DeGaulle-Adenauer entente undoubtedly facilitated the 
Franco-Germnn entente, it created certain problems, especially when Viewed 
from the outside. The close relationship bebreen the two men, ' I, kc.l, 
the emotional aura that surro1.Ulded the' rnppro£.ki'wnt, c.;ould sometimes 
cloud the real issues, particularly the question of just how independent 
the \,lest Germans could become of their American patrons" Equally important~ 
an entente based to a large extent on the relationship of two leaders 1IlaS 
bound to be fragile, particularly since o~of the leaders was obviously 
nearing retireraent. ThroU£l'1out the Franco-German courtship, the position 
of Adenauer' s government slowly but steadily declined. The Berlin cl'isis 
of 19G1 cost Adcnauer's Christian Democrats an absolute T;lajority in the 
Dundestu3' "lh1ch vade Adenauer replace his pre-French Foreign ~.1inister 
UeiDl"ich von 13rentone \'ri.th the Atlanticist Gerhard Schroder to obtain support 
!roc the Free Democra'l;s for a coalition-' governmeat. Even more damaging \'las 
the E!:.:t;: SUier:el affair, in which the editor Rudolf Augstein and associates 
were arrested on what were at best dubious legal grounds for allegedly 
publishing military secrets. As a result, Adenauer had to fire a pro-French 
Fr~,.L-
cabinet member implicated in the episode, Defense Minister Josef Strauss, 
as well as agree himself to -L'etire tho next autumn. \'/hen this retirement 
took plnce and r.!oreAtlantic oriented leaders took Adcnauer's place, the 
FranCO-German en:cen'ce woul;; suffer accordingly. 
Until he rotil'ed in October, 19G3, hOllrever, Adcnaucr remained the 
final {luthori ty on \<'cst German foreign policy, a.nd thUG theentcnte betllleen 
-, 
h,c and DeGaullc could begin what was at first a promil3ing course. _ In 
contrast to the FOtlchet negotiations, ".hich had begun under circUrIll::ltance:J 
of suspicion and basic dlfoagreement, the Franco-German discussions bogan 
in a \'!hirll.'lind of ceremony and popular acclaim. The courtship began with 
Adenauer's state visit to France in July 1962. DcGaulle recounts the 
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historic and religious signifi~ance of the occasion in the Les r.1emoires 
S'espoir: 
Standing side by side in n conmnnd car, theYLEcGaulle 
and Adenauei:J inspected a French and n German armored 
division which outvied one another in smartness and 
b'Jm~ing. 'l'hen, \",1 th their ministers and many dig-
ni taries around them, they \'latched theso heaVy units 
l:arade before them, while o.erio.l formations from both 
countries flew overhead. Tho journey ended at Rheims, 
the symbol of our age-old traditions, but also the scene 
of nany on encounter bet~een the hereditary enemies, 
from the anciont Gormanie invasions to'the battles of 
the Marne. In the cathedral, whose wounds were still 
not fully healed, the firBt Frenchman and the first 
German como together to pray that on either side of 
tne-Rhinc that deeds of friendship might forever supplant 
the miseries of \"rar.9 
DeG-aulle's reciprocal visit to \'Jest Germany that September was an 
even greatE~r spectacle J and in teri;1::: of popular support and high expec,-
tations 0.£ success, represents the high point of Franco-German relations 
during our period. Gince the public referendum DeGaulle believed to be 
a prcrcquisite to any Europea.n political union \'las forbidden by the West 
Gerr.1an constitution, he nought npprovnl through sheer popular acclaim. 
The \'.lest Ccrmo.n public did not tliD:tj'lpo1nt h;:n, anel Lo r,iondc \'lOuld observe 
that "General DcGaulle has Vion a vC;;'i table plcbisci to •••• ,,10 In fifteen 
opcecha~ Biven in six clays, all given in preciacly rehearoed German, 
DeGaulle extolled the emo:tional appeal of F.rancO-Gcrman reconciliation, 
sur:unarized in his often repeated statement: "Sie sind ein grosses Volk! ,,11 
Obviously \'lanting to conclude an agreement while ridinC this v/ave of 
popular acclaim, as 1:/e11 as perhaps belatedly taldnp; Jean r·lonriet I s advise 
on the Fouchet Plan to Sign nOi'; and work out the details later, the French 
government submitted a memorandum to Bonn on September 19 outlining 
Franco-Gernanagreer.1ent. Signific..antly, the West Germans did not reply 
until Nover.lber 8, and once they did they sur,gested revisions making meetings 
between leaders less a regularly defined institution)and requiring that 
any military coordination include t!I\TO. Still, Adcnauer \<laG also anxious 
to concluce an agreement, and a consen::::us was Ironed out fairly casily. 





to make so~e form of the Franco-German entente a mc~tter of law before 
he left office as his foreign policy testament to his successors. Since 
the Bundestag could only ratify a formal treaty, the consensus between the 
French and German pOSitions \'las rather quickly transformed into a document 
signed by Adenauer and DeGaulle in Paris on January 22, 1963. 
'l'lw Trea.ty itself consisted of four parts: a corilTnOn!occlaration and 
three s~~ctions dealing \'lith organization, program and assorted final 
Co 
provinions. The Cornmon Declaration listed 1)as1c p~mises and goals of the 
treaty: 
Convinced that the reconciliation of the German 
people and the French people, bringing an end to the 
age-old rivalries, constitutes a historic event which 
~)rofoundly transforms the relations of the two peoples, 
Conscious of the solidarity which unites the two 
peoples both \'l/i th respect to their security and \li th 
respect to their economic and cultural development, 
Observing particularly that young people have 
become nvrare of the solidarij;y and find therasel ves 
called upon to play the determinant role in the con-
solidations of Franco-Gerr:18n friendship, 
TIecognizing that a. strengthening of the cooperation 
bet\'{een the t\'IO countries constitutes a vi tal stage 
along the road to a united Europe, vlhich is the goal 
of the two peoples, 
Eave agreed to the or3anization and to the principles 
of the cooperation bett·reen the tv/O States as they are 
stated in the Treaty Signed this dny.l~ 
The organizations of the treaty imitated those of the FOtlchet Plan, 
though contained several siBnifi~ant revisions. The Heads of' State would 
determine how to implement the pronro.rn of' the Treaty, agreeing to meet at 
least twice each year for that purpose. 13 The Foreign rUnisters would 
carry out the policy directives given by the Heads of State, aereeing to 
l':'!eet at least every· three months. Similar meetings \'lere urranged between 
cultural, defense, and economic ministers. The treaty paid lip service 
to vlhat ';Iould have been the Political Conunission under the Fouchet Plan, 
t·ri th the creation of' an intermininterial commission. At best rather loosely 
defined, this comr.lission \'Iould be presided over by some high Foreign 




administrative role of the Fouchet Political Co~~ission, nnd the advisory 
role of the European Parliament. The text reads: 
In each of the countries, an interministerial 
commission \,lill be charged with following problems of 
cooperation. It will be presided over by z. hip;h 
Foreign Hinistry official and it will include repre-
sentativcs of all the aduinistrations concerned. Its 
role will be to coordinate the action 01' the I.1inistries 
concerned and to report periodically to its Government 
on the state of Franco-German cooperation. It will 
also have the task of presenting all useful suggestions 
with a viow to implomenting the program of cO£ieration 
nnd to its ultimate extension to now domains. 
Sibnific,9ntly'; '-this is the only specific mention of reVising and extending 
the tl"'eaty made in the entire document. Unlike the Fouchet Plan, no specific 
revie\-; \~'as- called for J , and any real progress in the union vias left depen-
dent on the ~-_oodwill and basic commi tr,lent of the two heads of state. As 
we will sec, havine this tyPe of commitment appeared to be a questionable 
prcspect eyen before the treaty was signod. 
The Program of the treaty stated basic goals in foreign policy, defense, 
and education. In foreign policy, the main objectiv<:l was clearly staJ~;od: 
liThe toNO Governr.1en'\:s will consult each other, prior to any deciSion, on 
all important questions of foreign policy, and in the first place on questions 
of commOn interest, with _a--:viow to arriving, insofar as possible, at a_ ".'. , -.; 
similar position. 15 Al though this point \-JaS parhn!;Js the most important 
[;00.1 of the treaty, it proved difficult to achieve from the very first. 
As t'te \'1111 see, both parties violated the spirit of this objective even 
before the treaty vIas Signed. The toxt went on to list specific areas of 
coo3lcratiol1. including tho \Jork of the European Communi ties, the Council 
of Europe, the \'Joatcrn European Union. and signifi<:..nntly, NA'l'O. The tt'lO 
countries also agreed to develop a common position \.'lith regard to aiding 
the undcrdClveloped countries. Economic cooperation bctwecrl'rancc and \'Jost 
Germany wao to be increased \'ri thin the framm'/ork of the EEC. Cooperation 
in ngriculturc. already a subctantial issue between th<:l French and the 
Germans was the fir~t sector cited, t'\long with energy, trancportation, and 
industry. 16 For obvious reasons on both sides, cooperation in defense was 
confined to specific technical arcan. Franco-German centers for Operations 
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Research \'/cre to be set up t and exchanges bet ... reen military staffs were to 
be increased. Both governmryets agreed to cooperate in conventional weapons 
research, \!/i th specific proposals to be submitted later. 17 
Tho program for Education and Youth turned out to be tho most enduring 
product of the treaty. Each country agreed to increase the teaching of 
the other'13 language, on the theory that such knowledge would become more 
and more ir:!portant as the union bctHcon the two peoples progre~sed.18 
Doth agreed to consider ways in \'Jhich o.cademic degrees could be granted 
equal status in both countries. Joint scientific research was to be in-
creased, through specific proposals wero put off to the future. Finally, 
exchanges between the yeung people of France and weat Germany were to be 
increased. This goal became institutionalized wlth the Franco-German 
Youth Office,'-;hich with a zcncroun budget of 50 million francs per year 
supported fellowships~ sroup exckmc;cs and other youth programs . The 
number of young people participatin[~ in projects funded by thhl office would 
reach 400,000 by 1964.19 
A $ection of Final Provinions cited variolts concluding points. With 
no provision for formally cxtcndin~ or revisiong the treaty, the Foreign 
!·;inisters ",Jore simply inGtrtlcted to l"eep an eye on its progress. 20 
Governments of EEC members were to be kept informed of the progress of the 
treaty. A rather vague statement \'1[;18 included ~ivinl!. the two governments 
the authority to make any revisions they might consider in order toward 
t!1e application of the treaty. As a signific,ant point for the \'Jest 
Gerr.lans. th.e provisions of the treaty, except in defense, \'1ere to apply 
to the city of ~est Berlin unless the Bonn government specifically requested 
otherwise. This \'las another gesture of French support for the West German 
position. 
For DcGaullc and the French, the broader Sdals of the treaty were 
t\\.'ofold: the, attempt to create an Euro12e dec Eta.t.:2. otarting \'1i th two key 
Stutes and the o.LtClnpt to coax West Germany part of the way out of the 
American orbit. COllve de r.1urville sums up the first objective: 
The objective of this tmdcrstanding was both to establish 
a direct coordination of policies and to conduct a renl 
cooperation in the practical and human orders, to 
correctly confer its renson to the henceforth fraternal 




By creating a union in political and economic spheres be~:Jeen Eur0l=lt's t\'I'0 
oldest and most bitter rivals, DcGaulle hoped to set a compelling example 
for the rest of the continent. Like the supranationalists, he hoped for 
a 'spillover effect,' but ontwhich would result in the Gaullist EuroE,e 
des Etats. 
In many ways, DeGaulle attempted to correct many of the unhappy 
circumstances that brought about the demise of the Fouchet Plan. By 
surrounding the discussions between the two governments in ceremony and 
historical signifi~oncet DeGaulle could negotiate in an atmosphere of popular 
acclaim on both sides of the Rhine, rather than in the atmosphere of 
distrust and suspicion that clouded the Fouchet discussions. Both sides 
wanted to conc;tud€ an agreement 'quickly rather than risk the lengthy and 
derisive debate that had helped capsize the Fouchet Plan and would help 
defeat tha British application to the EEG. I\s another \'lay of making a 
Fouchet-type union norc acceptable, DeGaulle consented to a notict.bly 
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weo.lwr document than the firGt vOl'Gion of the I'ouchet Plan. The Fouchet 
Plan specified the goal of achieving common foreign and defense policies, t'!ith 
the particula.r pa.th to\'lord a COliimon i'or0ign policy being clear-ly marked. 
Insti tu tiOD::;, though limited in r>cor> c, \'lore clearly defined. The Franco-
G(:rr.l:ll1 Tr'cnty, on the other hnnd, w:w r:lore n statement of good intentions. 
It listed ureao of cooperation r,lthcr thnn areao where a common policy 
\'lould be formed. Ironically, in hopeo of n:nldn~ hie ideas of Europe more 
acceptable, ,DeGaulle \'lealc,€ned their chances of being applied successfully. 
Alfred Grosser con~ludes: 
It wa.s a treaty based on '.lishful thinking. In general, 
a treaty establishes procedures or agreements; here, 
',/e find established the desire to arrive at an agreement, 
which supposes tha.t an agreement did not exir-.lt at the 
')') 
tit'\e of the signature. 1 , '_ 
The second French .o:oal was to locsen, though not remove, \'lest Germany 
fror.l the American orb! t. Contrar:t to what some of DeGaulle' s most vociferous 
critics believed, he never expected the \'lest Germans to give up their defense 
ties to the United States. As earl~.' 0.0 1958, DeGnulle informed Adenauer 
that he "considered it :perfectly natural that Federal Germany should adhere 
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unreservedly to tho Atlantic Pact.,,23 Tho Franco-Gorman Troaty called 
for coop':!ration in spccific technicnl nreo.s of defcnoe; it did not call 
24 for a common defense policy per se. DeGaulle never planned to give West 
Germany a role in French nuclear policy.25 Rather than an attempt to 
completely remove the Americans frOl,; Vlest German~, the treaty Vias a test 
of whether the Bonn regime would strive tov:ard poli tical independence 
from the United States, and by implication \'Ihether the United States \'Iould 
accept sllch a policy. Couve de Murville wrote of the treaty: 
It was not a question of Germany having to choose 
between France and America for the defense of Europe, 
which ''1ould be according to an expression of Gencral 
DeGaulle, a "poor joke" -The question was to know 
if~EUrope, starting with our two countries, would be 
capable of oraanizing herself to practice an inde-
pendent policy, that is to say, one no longer to be 
!3Ubordinate to Amcrica2~ while maintaining the 
indispensable alliance. 
In Donn. it seemed to bccor.1c more and more arparcnt that some kind of 
choice batt-/een Paris and \'/ashington \lould be necessary in spite of the 
Adenauer government·s nttcrapts to choose both. Adenauer's diplomatic 
tightrope ..... ould be ::.ho.l~<m by intcrnc.l \'Jest German politics and eventually 
by American pressure. As a direct product of the Cold lJ!ar, \'lest Germany 
\'laS more dependent on Ar.lcrican support than any othel~ western European 
country for its very existence. iiud1 more than France, \'lcst Germany 
governed. her f'oreign policy according to Cold VIal" assuT.1ptions of the 
incorrigibility of the Soviet bloc anll the il:lperativenc8s of American 
guarantees of protection. Out of very real, though at tir:1I38 sOr.le\l,hat 
ex~geratcd feara for their security, the VJest German::.; had generally sought 
these guarantees at the expense of other foreign policy goals, including 
the unification of Europe. Fear of the Soviet bloc retlained the number 
one factor in the minds of Hese German leaders. Adenaucr wrote in his 
memoirs: "I ''IUS forever preaching to my people 1;hat it \'fUS of primary 
importance that every foreign policy move be viewed with an eye to whether 
or not it strengthened Russia." 27 For the \'Jest Gerraan leaders leaders, 
the most effect! ve \'lay to avoid stl"engthening Russia was to remain as 
closely tied as pOf'loible to the Atlantic Alliance. 
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The all,.anee was coming under serious suspicion in Bonn when the 
Franco-German courtship began in the Gummcr of 1962. \lJith the Berlin 
crisis still fresh in their minds, many \'Jest Germans suspected American 
promises of protection, remembering the irresolute behaviour the Americans 
had displayed one year earlier. Adenauer was known to have held Kennedy 
personally responsible for the buildinfi of the 'wall of shame' in Belllin. 28 
Adonau{~r recalls n conversation he had wi ttl DoGllulle on tho eve of the 
signing of the Franco-German Treaty: 
I um very disturbed by the United Staten. I do 
not hnow what course of defense they plan to follow, 
when everything changes so rapidly there. The uncer-
tainty began with McNamara's public statements COfl-
eerning conventional weapons. Next came the Bahama 
A[,:recmento which are full cf loopholes •••• Ball's 
e:h-planations before NATO did not satisfy rne •••• 
Who kno\\'S what plans Americc. will have tomorrow? 
To be sure America docs not \-:ant to disappoint anyone; 
but then no one knows for nure what the Americans ,·Till 
')9 be thinking tomorrow •• , . L.. 
Relations with France, on the otlwr hand. seemed to hold much promise • . 
~·iore than any of \';est German)" s oth~r allies, th0 French had remained 
nbsolut.:lly intransigent on the status of Berlin. I'ioreovcr, Adenauer held 
some sympathy for the Gaullist vision of Europe, wherein his country would 
likely be able to wield more influence than it could as a. subservient 
1 " t f" i 30 c 1en 0 Hmer ca. At a certain level, then) closer tics with the French 
",ere certainly worth f-'lAr::n.dng. 
In the final analysis however, the United States would always hold 
the key political cards. Unlike France, \'Jest Germany could never pooess 
its force de 
". 
and 0\1.'11 fraPEe, hence the degree of independence from the 
American nuclear umbrella that DeGnulle enjoyed. Ultimately, Bonn's 
security would always depend on American goodwill, anel neither France nor 
any EuroEe des Eta~ could fill in the gap if the Americans left. To a 
great extent then, ','Jest Germany would always be a hostaf'(e of American 
foreign policy. As \\'e will see later on, the United States \lIould use the 
diplomatic leverage this position afforded it to lure West Germany away 
from DeGaulle's plans for Europe • 
. " 
67 
Complicating the situation still further \tlas the change of leadership 
about to take place in Bonn. A~~e noted earlier, the Franco-German courtship 
took place while .,Adenauer's position was steadily on the decline. The 
Berlin crisis and the S2iegel affair cost Adenauer his majority in the 
Bundestag and two of his most pro-French ministers, both of whom were 
replaced by firm Atlanticists. ThUG, a situation resulted wherein Franco-
r 
German reconciliation, one of the ~njor goala of Adenauer's carcor, occu~Cd 
at a time ',/hen that career \~as clearly nearing an end. The heirs apparGnt, 
Ludvlig Erhard and Gerhard Schroder, were likely to find this reconciliation 
less essential that did their predecessor. Thus, the central question of 
Franco-German relations became to what extent the, new West Gern~ leaders 
would p ... rsue Adenauer's attempt to embrace both the Atlantic Alliance and 
the Gaullist view of Europe, particularly in the face of American pressure 
against the French. 
Even before the treaty could be implemented, Several events Eltrong1y 
arfected its prospects for success, already far from certain. One event 
often cited o.s a pri~ary cause of tLc i"ailure of the treaty was DeGau11e's 
infar.-Ious press conference of January 14. Contrary to what most accounts 
report, tho press conference did not constitute a 'veto' of the British 
application, yGt DcGaulle did state in explicit and not entirely tactful 
terms why the nc~otiationtl \'wrc about to fnil. 31 In any caBo, the prese 
conference necmcd at the very least to defy the spirit of the treaty, 
since Ac'!enauer had received no advanco warning. Its timing was indeed 
unhelpful, just eight days bcfore .. thc treaty ">lias to be signed in Paris. 
This rnther blunt statement of DeG.,ullc' B position nnd the termination of 
the negotiations two weeks later SCCli1Cd to put Adenauer in thc position 
he dreaded most: having to choose between n Gaullint or Atlantic oriented 
European policy. The exclusion of Britnin from the EEC made it especially 
difficult to advertise the Franco-German Treaty as a step toward European 
uni ty, particularly vii th the Americans, who held Adenauer partly responsible 
32 for not taking a stronger stand with DeGaulle. Except for the problems 
it caused \"i th the Americans and thc Dri tish, Adenauer himself shed few 
tears over the failure of the Eritish application, perhapsscnsing the 
battles looming over agriculture in the EEC, and not wanting to increase 
hiS problems by having to consider the British position. 33 Though it is 
G8 
practically never mentioned in the l,terature on the Franco-German Treaty, ' 
Adenauer also violated the spirit of the treaty before it was signed by 
agreeing to participate in f'I.egotiations \'1i th the Americans on the Multilateral 
Force (~ILF) without any prior consultation \'1i th DeGaulle. 34 The problems 
r-
of coromi t ment on either side which ... rere to plague the treaty once it \tlas 
enacted began to show itself here. 
When the ~est German legislature came to ratify the Franco-German 
Treaty the .following May, the future direction of West German European 
policy began to make itself kno ... m. On March 1, the Dundestag approved the 
treaty on its first rea.ding, though at the sa.me time paSSing a resolution 
asking the government to apply the treaty with a view toward certain key 
.foreign policy gonls, such as rounification, strenbthening the Atla.!'ltic 
Alliance, and the unificatior. of a Europe that would include Great Britain. 
The Bundestag follo ..... ed thiG lead by requiring n Preamble to tho treaty 
H:;ting cc:rtai.n objectives of V,TC8t Ccrman foreir;n policy reunification, 
the inclusion of Britain in the Common Hnrl<et, and strenp;thening the 
Atlantic Alliance ' ..... upon which the treaty could not infringe. Signifi<;antly, 
the treo.ty' G fir~t rending in the j~tmc!entt\g came two days after the !I. t-
lanticist Lud\':ig Zrhard lias officially chosen ns Adenullcr I s successor. 
Hov! that he ,,/Us a lame duck clopendcnt on a coalition government, AdemtUer 
,'laS in no position to resist the pressure in favor of a Preamble, though 
o:lc: 
he was personally an:3ere:d by its inclusion."'>;:) With Adenouer IS p;rudging 
consent, the Franco-Ger~~n Treaty including its Preamble passed the Bundestag 
wi th no further diff'icul ties. 
The Preamble naturally displeased DeGaulle, who recognized the implica~ 
tions it held for \'Jest German fo!'ei.r~n policy after Adenauer I s departure. 
Still, he kept fairly quiet lor the moment, not wanting to risk further 
problems with the treaty's ratification. Of course, he forbade any Preamble 
to the French version, and pointed out that the German addition in no.·: 
way bound France.36 Couve de Murville summed up the French position: 
After the treaty, the .context into which the 
discussions between Bonn and Paris were placed had not 
changed. The central issues remained: the Soviet 
Union, Europe, and the United States. The divergences 
on these issues were well Imo\'m. The Preamble added 
by the Bundestag did nothing hi-1t underscore them, vii th 
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the intention of reassuring those people in the 
Federal Republic and elso\"here \>'99 worried about 
the Franco-German underst~nding. 
By that sun~er however, DeGaulle had clearly begun to lose faith in the 
treaty's prospects, as evidenced in a dialogue in the press between himself 
and Adcnauer. At a dinner with French officials at the Elysee on July 2, 1963, 
he made his famous remark: "Les trai tes, voyez40vous, sont comr,le les jeunes 
rilles et les roses: fa dure ce que ~a dure. Si Ie traite' franco-allemand 
n t etai t pas applique, ce ne serai t pas 10. prim~re fois dans l' histoire." 
/. 
"Helas! que j'en ai Then, quoting Victor Hugo's Orientales. he quipped: _ k 
vu mourir des jeune filles." Adenauer, an avid rose gardener, and pel~haps 
more optimistic about the treaty, replied "Les jeunes filles passent 
peut-~re vite, dit-il DeGaulle . , mais non les roses, et je m'y connais.1! 
DeGaulle returned, perhaps with a degree of irony: "Le trait~ n'est pas 
une rose, ni marne un rosier, mais une roseraie •••• une roserarie dure tr~s 
longtcmps quantA on Ie vcut. ,,33 
The treaty's prospects dimmed sUll more during the second half ef 
1963. The first meeting of the two IIca(l,D of State under the new treaty 
'."InS held in Bonn on July 4-5. Two wccl<s earlier, DeGaulle announced the 
\dthdrm:o.l of the remaindm' of the French fleet frol1\ NATO, in his usual 
blunt way with no conSUltation with Donn. The \'lost Germans expressed their 
disapprovo.l. though DeGnul!e's move hardly constituted u mo.jor shift in 
French foreil;3n policy. DeGaullc'G intention to remove France from NATO 
. "9 had been clear for o.t leo.st hve yearn.'"" Despite thia unpleasant backdrop, 
the two leaders concluded that the meeting had befm reG.aonably successful, 
though this seemed in part an a.ttempt to shove up sagging expectations. 
Both countries agreed to begin joint development of a vertical take-off 
cargo plane. the Transall. The Franco-German Youth Office. discussed 
earlier, was created as a result of this meeting, and would prove the 
most enduring product of the whole episode. DeGaulle, perhaps wanting , 
not to. aggr~vate the V!cst Germans \>,i th the change in lcaderGhip coming 
in October, declared himself satisfied with the meetinr~, and even mad,e a 
_. i 




Erhard, who Adenauer had once declared unfit to be Chancellor,41 did 
in fact assume that post on October 11. As a supporter of the British 
proposals for a free trade area attached to the Common r~arket back in the 
l:ltc 1950' s, Erhard remained an outal10ken proponent of including Dri tain in 
the EEC. He said in a speech in London in January, 19G4: "i'fithout Britain, 
Europe would only be a torso, ••• the e"1>res8ion Continental Europe may be 
a geo&l"aphical reminiscence, but it is not a political reali ty • ,,42 Erhard 
embraced the Atlantic Alliance even more closely than Adenauer, and could 
be even raore easily seduced by the vaQ;ue American - offers to participate 
in the Mul tilatera.l Nuclear Force (ITLF). As for NATO, Herbert Tint observes 
that: "Erhard appeared to feel the need f<;>r NATO in direct proportion to 
4'J 
DeGaulle's coolness toward it."" Still as leader of a Christian Der.locrat 
and Sociulist coalition government, he could not afford to offend too 
seriounly the prO-French wings of oi ther. party. HO\·lcvcr. Erhard's Foreign 
~linister, Gerhard Schroder, felt no such <luo.lms, and reroatedly stated 
his opposition to DeGaulle. On October 31, only twenty days after Adenauer's 
departure, LtEA~rcsn quoted him as saying: 'b ... _ 
Gaullist policy ••• h2.s destroyed completely the 
idea of European unification on a Guprano.tional basiS, 
iJnd more and more one is left to bclicvethc:t the 
General is seeking French hegemony \1ithin a grouping 
of European states. In stUdying the recent cpeeches 
of the General, the question arieen whether \'IC Jould 
not re-examine again the problem of Franco-Germah 
rclations. 44 
Complicating the 51 tuation still further was a perconnli ty conflict between 
Schroder and his French counterpart, Couve de Hurville. According to Pattison 
",' 
de f.lenil: "Relations bctl'ieen the two men were not merely reserved. they 
\'lere poB tcly,.. but openly, hostile. ,,45 Obviously, this antagonism boded 
ill for the execution of the treaty, which depended so much on the goodwill 
and gooc. intentions of the leaders involved. 
Another factor weal,cning the Franco-German Treaty throughout 1963 
\'laS the overt American pressure D.Dainst the Gnullist view of Europe. As 
\'Ie noted in Chapter I, schenes multiplied throughout the early 1960's for 
~ . .. 
,,,.', 
,. 
a 'Grand Design', an Atlantic Community that '.'/ould keep Vlestern Europe 
firmly within tho goals of American foreign policy and sagely out of the 
Gaullist snares. One of the most popular offsprings of the Grand Design 
was the Nul tilateral Force (r.ILF) \':hich, theoretically, would have coor-
dinated nuclear forces under some lcind of mul ti-nO,tional command tied to 
NATO. never particularly v/ell dofincd by the Americans, the HLF \'las none-
theless preached as the only feasible alternative to the various inde-
pondent dcterrants which seemed the logioal conclufJion of Gaullism. 
ICenncdy 's advisor Arthur Schlesinger wrote: 
Kennedy e.&reed vri th this praamatic r-eaction: MLF 
was the best available tool to reconcile interdepen-
dendb _ the indivisibility of the detorrent - with 
partnership - the building of a united Western 
Europe; moreover, it \'loul d fi 1l4~ vacuum in to' which, 
otherwise, Gaullism r.liE;ht seep. 
e. 
Despite its ambitious goals, the ;.;LF~ which DeGaullc Int;lcd privately the 
t mul tilatcl'al farce t 47, suffered from contradictions and Gimple illusions. 
The Ilas::::au o.grec::1cntu, fro;;, \':hich Drite.in recei veel the 'Polaris miss'ie and .. 
f::pecial technological assistance, scemed to ir.lply that all partners "/ould 
not be treated equally. Also, there \;TaS never any question but that the 
Americans \'lould be the final nuthori ty in any version of the nLF. The 
Americcns intended to give the Europea.."1s the appearance of having partial 
control over the nuclear wea!)ons placed in Europe while keeping the weapons 
ul tirnatcly under American jurisdiction... The French, predictably, were not 
ta1~en in by the aura that surrounded the MLF and considered it an attempt 
to split up the Franco-German entente. CouvP, de Murville wrote : 
\"Jashington E!i th the mul tilater-al force] sa,,": a vIay to 
give to the Federal nepublic apparent satisfaction. 
But vie clso perceived the intention to isolate France 48 
in order to lead her to renounce her national armament. 
The Americans made a major effort to get their European allies to 
a.ccept the f.U.F in the spring of 1963. Under the leadership of Livingston 
r~erchant, n GaleG crev.; of forty American diplomats was organized \v'hich made 
a. grand tour of European capitalG in its own private jot to \'lin support 
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for the scheme. For the most part, this support was not overwhelming. 
Italian enthusiasm was muted due to the instability of internul polities. 
The Dri tish, who hoped to I,eep a detcrrant of their own, were not enthusias-
tic ci the!'. For obvious reasons French support was not (l}~pcctcd. Only 
the l':est Germans received the project no favorubly a:3 ~Jnf)hington had hop3d. 
For Adena.uer and his government. the ULF represented the tangible reaf-
f'irr.l...'1tion of the American security umbrella that they 110.(1 beon woi ting 
for since tho Berlin question began to heat up aJlain in 19~)n. So creat 
"laS the t:est Germans I ent;husiasm that they eventually offer.ed to pay 40 
per cent of the cost. in an attempt to encourage other allies to join.49 
Such enthusiasm hardly lent itself to what DeGaulle saw ao the broader 
goals of the FrJiU'lco-G err. Ian Treaty. 
If there was any doubt about Bor.n' s enthusiasm for such American 
grand designs, Kennedy's visit to i'Jest Geri7'an:J' in June dispelled it com-
pletely. l!0~1 that Donn'::; acceptance of' the ini tinti ve on the HLF had proven 
the.r.l loyu~ to Ar:1ericcn forej_gn nolicy, and that the Berlin Crisi5 VIas more 
or less over, Kenncciy felt free to becl.")me a vociferous defender of VJest 
German rigl~ts an~ acpirations. This represented u noticf..ble shift from 
hiD posi tio~'l during the actual criDis ~ The pinacle of the iI/hol0 trip \lIas 
his cele1n"ated sf-,cech in \':es'C !!erlin on June 2D, 19G3 v/hcn he said: 
"All free r:,cn •• :hcrcvor thuy l:~.ay live, are citizenn of nerlin, and~ therefore, 
e.s a free r.'!ru1, I tal:e pride in the words '1c11 bin ein Derliner l • 1I50 
\Jhntever these v/ords actually meant in practice after !:cnnedy left the 
podiur:1 is not entirely clear, but their effect on his auc1icnce \'1as ab-
solutely electric. Kermedy himself rer.la.rket privately that if at that 
r;IOr.1Cnt he had asked his aud.ience to march over to the Wall :md tear it 
dO\ffi, t!1ey wo'uld have clone it~ 51 Under leoe hysterical circumstances, 
r.nny West Germans favorably compared Kennody's visit to DeGaulle's visit 
of a year earlier. \/lhilc DeGaulle stood behind DC.t'lin much more firmly 
then did r<cnnedy bacl< in 1961, he spol<e of reunification as the fond 
but unrealistic dream that it \'Ins as long as VJest Gcrr.:nny remained tied to 
the Cold 1:Jar. Kcnr-edy however, knowing that AI'.10ricn was prepared to do 
nothing to revise tI'le status quo in Derlin, VJ<l.n noncthclcsG willing to 
perpetuate Cold \Jur rhetoric. The effect 'i/a::> not lont on the Vlent Germans. 
Die \l/el t cdi torinlized: ... -
'/3 
Goneral DeGa.ulle a.ppcalou to tho Gcrrna.n people 
last July, and the Gernan people responded wholeheart-
edly when DcGaulle placcu llermany once again within 
European history and freed her fror.1 the past. nut 
the General did not go to Berlin, and he npokc only 
reservedly of German unity. President Kennedy ••• 
must have understood quickly that he coulel only win the 
heart of the German people by speaking of what concerns 
them-- the unit:y g~ the German people and ·the freedom 
of their capital. 
Though the Franco-German Treaty remained on the books throughout our 
period, the- combined effects of the Preamble. the change in West German 
leadership and the American intervention weru<ened it too much for DeGaulle's 
goals for a Franco-Gernanentente to ever be realized. ','.lith DeGaulle unable 
'Co outbid the Americans for Uest German ~,llegiance. relations between 
Paris and Bonn continued to \;orGon tilrough the end of lSlG3 and into 19G4. 
The West Germans remined ec.~;cr to )"lc.rticipate in the m.lo' J even On a 
bilateral basis. The new t.i.lcrican pl'csident, Lyndon Johnson, realizing 
tha.t the program ned no support else\!here, and being um-lilling to r:isk the 
political consequences of including ~onn in American nuclear policy On 
a bllatcral baSiS, quietly lo.id thc ::L1" to rent in l!JCIl. DeGaullc continued 
to lose 1'a.i th in the treaty, ac he de.:lonstrQted by the diplomatic r~cogni tion 
~I<.. 
of" People's Repu'ulic of China in J a.nuary, 18GIl., without consul tine Donn. 
DU~'ing his press conference on July 23, he lnr.lcnte<..l the inabili ty of the 
t\,'O countries to lao.!~e progress in coo!'dinatinr.:; their' ponit;.ons rcsarding 
c,"stern policy, pa.:rticula.rly on Eaotorn Europo, on ~)ouUh)arJt AGia, on 
the devclopinz countries, or on agriculture. lie rcmninc<1 gloOl:lY as to tho 
treaty's future: 
••• one could not say that Gormnny and France have yot 
agreed to nake together a policy and one could not 
dispute that this results from the fact that Donn has 
not believed, up to now, that this policy Ghould be 
European and independent. If this state of affairs 
\'lore to last, there would be the risk, in the long run, 
of doubts among the French people, of misgivings among 
the Gernan people and amon,Sl their four partners of the 
nome Trca.ty, an incrcaced tendency to leave thip'~s 




At the end of 1964, Franco-GerDml relatio~ sho\fcd a. marked, i f short-
lived upswing.' In December the \'lest Germans agreed to n COTilmon cereal 
price considerable lower than their own, and one highly favorable to the 
54 French. DeGaulle responded by inviting Erhard as a special guest to the 
inner sanctum of Gaullism, the chateau at narnbouillet. By the follo\'ling 
February, he X'e:fe:cd to their relationship as one of "friendly trust. u55 
A 
In March, however, the Italians proposed a summit conference of leaders of 
teh Six to discuss political union. All accepted but the French, who among 
other conditions required a final a.'.:;reement on agriculture as a prerequisite. 
Erhard t,!)ok 'the French refusal as a personal affrontf having stated publicly 
that he had DeGaulle t s support for a conference of that kind. 56 As the y,ear 
\'lcnt on, rel~~.!ons between the t"Wo countries became more strained. as the 
crisis of that summer neared. In the wake of the crisis, the complete 
demise of the Franco-German Treaty becnrac undeniable. DeGaulle would lament 
in a prcc;s conference on October 29, lSGG: 
It is CJ.uitc posG:i.ble that •• • our ncir.;hborn across the 
Ehine l1ave lost scveral opportu,ni ticr:; u5.rcgnr:lG \'Jhut 
could have becn the COi.l~on action of the t\'lO nations, 
becnu::.e, \':hile they \'/ere applyin,n;, not our bilateral 
treaty, but the unilatcrnl preamble that ch;:mt~ed all 
it::; menning and tlla L they th ... msnl vo::; hall u(lcled to it, 
events \:()re progrcmninl; (~lr:m:herc, part5.culnr ly l r. 
the East and perhaps even in Vlashington, confusing r. 
the factD of the r.lattCl' ao they \'lere at the Otl toct. ::>7 
The: slow death of the Franco-German Friendship Treaty marked the 
cOf:lplete raj cction of Gaull:i.st ideas by France's partners. For them, 
Europe had to remain tied to the Atlantic Alliance on American termD 
to ensure American protection. \'Jest Germany, once thought to be the only 
European country besidcs France where DcGaulJ.e's vinion of Europe had a 
chance of acceptance, wou1(' in time reject it no less decisively than did 
the othcr four partners. DeGaulle believed that the Franco-German Treaty 
failed net because his ideas and goals werc incorrcc:t, but because they , 
had not really been tried. Neglecting the role his O\1n particular style 
of diplomacy played in the failuro of the treat~T, DeGaullc blamed the whole 
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episode on a failure of nerve on the part of the \~est Germans. This 
failure of nerve involved the rest of ?rance' s partners a::.'l \·Jell. For 
DeGaulle, the failure of the Franco-German Treaty confirncd his suspicion 
that Europe ho.d no resolve to be truly independent of the United States. 
For his 0\'.'l1 part, if he could not bring about the independence of Europe, 
he could at least ensure the indepen(lence of France. The result of this 
\laD his oeries o'f diplomatic initi.1tivcs to the COnlmuniat powers that 
characterized his foreign policy duri118 the secor.d half of' the 1960's • 
• \ t the Gnr.le time. he 'l'lould continue to take ouch mcuourcc ao were necessary 
to protect and complete th~ economic foundations of a unified Europe, with 
regard to British participation in the EEC nnd the agricultural common 
," 
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Chapter IV: The British Question 
Of all the issues discussed in the present study, none brought DeGaulle 
more vilification from his critics than the termination of negotiations 
on the British entry into the Common Market in January, 1963, for which 
DeGaulle has been held primarily responsible. Nearly all books dealina 
with this topic i both general histories and more specific wo~ks, advance 
the same bnsic argument: DeGaulle 'vetoed' the British application to 
the EEC, in part to avenge certain indignities suffered by the General during 
the war, but mainly because the British entry would have threatened French 
designs for hegemony over the continent. 1 His opposition to British par-
ticipation durj,ng our period is often taken as another example of ths way 
in which DeGaulle stood in the way of those who wanted to build "Europe". 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that this situation was not as simple 
as it has often been p95trayed. Of course, few would argue that in the 
Ions run the exclusion of Britain from Europe was in Euro~' s best intel"est, 
and it is etually difficult to argue that DeGaulle's behavio:", during the 
whole episode ~~s beyond reproach. For our purposes, however, it is most 
important to avoid overly simplistic explanations. DeGaulle's opposition 
q 
to the British entry involved much more than revenge and meglomania. His 
" notorious press conference of ~anuary 14, 1963, was the product of many 
longe-range and immediate causes, both of which will be discussed hel~e. 
\'Ie will see that the French position~ while certainly difficult and perhaps 
even counterproductive in the long run, had a firm basis in the facts of 
the case., Perhaps the whole episode can be better explained by these 
factsthnrl by tho per30nality of the French preSident. 
In discussing the long range causes of the failure of Britain's first 
attempt to enter the European Economic Community, we should have some 
understandins of Britain's historic relationship to the continent, and how 
this relationship made Britain's permanent attachment to Europe a particularly 
diff'icult task. Generally speaking, we can note that until her conversion 
to the "European ideatl in +:he early 1960's, Britain intervened in continental 
af'fairs only to prevent the heaemony of anyone European country. Once 
some kind of' balance was restored, as for example after the Napoleonic wars 
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and to an extent after the two World Wars, Britain tended to leave the 
continent more or less alone, and ~ ~rsucd a worldwide role through the 
Empire. In an interview with the ~urday Evening Post in 1930, Winston 
Churchill summed Britain's perception of her role in Europe: 
We are with Europe, but not of it. We are linked, 
but not compromised . We ar~ interested and as-
sociated, but not absorbed. 
For a time, Britain's experience during the Second World War seemed 
e to reaffirm her separatness from the continent. Great Britain was the ., . 
only West European country whose institutions and traditions were actually 
reaffirmed by· the war. Unlike the defeated and demoralized nations of the 
continent, Britain had withstood the German onslaUllht in her finest hour, 
and had preserved a foothold in the West which made the eventual defeat 
of the Nazis possible. It was tempting for the British to beliave that 
their uniqueness rather than German strategic mistakes or simply geography 
had spared them the fate pf the continent. The victory seemed to mean 
that this uniqueness would be preserved. A~su~ed a place among the victo~s 
wi th hel~ Empire intact, Sri tain hoped :\::0 preserve Bome sort of world role, 
despite the economic and material damage she had suffered, and the emergence 
of' the American superpower. Preserving this world role meant that Britain's 
e.. \ 
separntness !is ~ vi! the defeated continent would continue. 
i\ 
As Britain's situation both at home and abroad began to deteriorate 
soon after the end of the war, the British accepted the Pax Americana 
as a natural successor the the Pax Britanni~ of the nineteenth century. 
This meant continuing to accept the secondary position they held in the 
American alliance during the war. Unlike DeGaulle. who opposed what he 
r 
uaw as American domination from the very beginning, the British prefered 
'1 
to work closely with the Americans within the Atlantic Alliance. In 
finding their niCherithin the Western bloc, the British hoped to assume 
the role of an elder statesman, guiding the superpower to whom they had 
helped give birth. 3 DeGaulle recalls Churchill's explanation of this pos-
ition in the ~moire~_de ggerre: 
.. 
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••• in politics as in strategy. it is better to persuade 
the stronger than to put yourself asainst him. This is 
what I am tryina to do. The Americans have immense re-
sources. They do not always use them to the best advan-
tage. I am try ina to enlighten them. without forgetting, 
of course, to benefit my country. I have formed a close 
personal tie with Roosevelt. With him, I proceed by 
~~~~i!~~4in order to influence matters in the right 
Though of tar overrated as a harbinger of Franco-British relations 
during DeGaulle's presidency, his dealings with the British. during the 
war nonetheless offer usefUl insights into attitudes on both sides of the 
Channel in the postwar years. DeGaulle certainly neve~ forgot what he 
considered were the indignities he had suffered at the hands of the British 
during his time in London as head of the Free French. As a :fairly obscure 
general heading a government-in-exile by virtue of his own initiative, 
DeGaulle remained at British mercy throughout the war, and was never treated 
as the guardian of French sovereignty that he pelieved himself to be. When 
confronted with British designs for the French territories in . 
Syria, as well as his exclusion from the planning for D-Day and the Tehe:'an 
and Yalta conferences, DeGaulle could do little more than protest vocifer-
ously. 
Most humiliating for DeGaulle was an incident he recalled in which 
Churchill clearly revealed his preference for the American alliance over 
the possibili t:i.es of Europe. He' quotes' Churchill: 
l,oJe are going to liberate Europa, but it is because the 
Americans are in agreement with us to do so. This is 
something you ouaht to know: each time we must choose 
between Europe and the open sea, we shall always choose 
·the open sea. Each time I must choose between you and 
Roosevelt, I shall always choose Roosevelt. 5 
We must, of course, accept DeGaulle's 'quote' with some reservations, 
considering that he was not always the most objective historian. Still, 
given the numerous confrontations between the two men, and the choice 
Churchill might be expected to make between DeGaulle and Roosevelt, we 
can imagine that he could easily have said something close to DeGaulle's 
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Quote. DeGaulle certainly remembered the incident years later, and recalled 
it in speeches, at cocktail parties, and even during a meeting with 
Harold W~cmillan at Rambouillet near the end of the EEC negotiations.6 
BeyonQ the heated circumstances which no doubt provoked the incident with 
Churchill, the two men clearly recognized the defferences between Britain 
and the continent. DeGau1le summarized the distinction in another and 
much more calm conversation \d, th Churchill: 
Mr. Churchill and I agreed modestly, in drawing 
this commonplace but final concluSion: when all is 
said and done, Great Britain is an island; Fran,e 
the cape 0:1:" a continent; America another world o 
Though both DeGau1le and Churchill left office shortly after the war t 
the dls'tinctness they recognized between Britain and the continent remairled 
a part of' British foreign policy for fifteen years after the war. Britain's 
record during the 1950's hardly supported the claims made during the 1960'a 
of Britain'seincere commit"'\nent to Europe. In 1950 the BritiElh were invited 
by French foreign minister Robert Schuman to participa't;e in the negotiations 
which were to lead to the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) • The Frencp government had eubmi tted in dr4ft proposal, the Schuman 
Plan, which the countries of what would later become the Six accepted as a 
basis for negotiations. The Schuman Plan called for the official pooling 
of resources in coal and steel pr.oduction under a single supranational 
authority. Consenting to negotiate using the Schumen Plan as a basis 
meant accepting the principle of supranational authority in advance. The ' 
British response could easily have been written by DeGaulle: 
It remains the view of His Majesty's Government that 
", 
,to subscribe to the terms of the draf't communique ••• 
would involve entering into an advance commit-ment to 
pool coal and steel resources and to set up an auth~rity, 
with certain supreme;powers, before there had been ' full 
opportunity of considering how these impor~nt and far-
reaching proposals would work in practice~ His Majesty's 
Government are most anxiouB that these proposals should 
be discussed and pursued, but they feel unable to associate 
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themselves with a ~ommunique which appears to take 
decisions prior to, rather than as a result of, inter-
governmental negotiations. 8 
By asking for a special status in the negotiations, that of not necessarily 
o.c-cepting the basic supranptional principles of the Schuman Plan, the 
British put a barrier between themselves and the nations of the continent 
which guaranteed their exclusion from this important first step in economic 
unification. DeGaullewould probably have taken a stand quite similar 
to the British, and had he been in power at the time the ECSC might well 
never have come into existence at all. As it was, however, DeGaulle would 
accept the ECSC and the other existing communities as a fait accomR!i when 
he returned to"power, and would in time vigorously defend the economic 
unification they had helped facilitate. We can note~ then, an ironic aspect 
of the whole episode of Britain's first application. Though DeGaulle and 
the British sl~ed similar political views on supranationalism, DeGaulle 
would insist that the British adhere strictly to the economic provisions 
set up by supranational organizations if Britain was to become a member of 
the Cowmon Market. 
Britain's rejection of participation in the ECSC set a pattern that 
recurred throughout the 1950's when other European communities were proposed. 
The British attempt to p~escrve some sort of world~de military role, in 
addition to their usual stand on supranationalism led to their rejection 
of participation in the supranational European Defense Community in 1952. 
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden remarked in a speech at Columbia University 
on January 11j 1952 that joining such a European organization "is something 
which we kno,., ~ in our bones, we cannot do." 9 A t the same time many other 
European leaders felt in thsir bones that they could ncitparticipate in such 
an organization without the British, particularly 0111ce the proposal in-
cluded the partial rearming of the West Germans. The British rejection 
of the EEC contributed to French distrust of the proposal, and in turn 
made it easier for the French Parliament to reject the Plan, which torpedoed the 
entire project. Since American Cold War pressure required that West Germany 
be incol~orated in European defense in some way, the Western European 
Union (WEU) was hastily contrive~ in which the West Germans would be admitted 
to NATO under the auspices of a non-supranational military alliance of 
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Western European states. The British, who accepted participation in this 
more traditional alliance system, maintained the rip'ht to withdraw their 
four divisions and tactical aircraft if an overseas crisis warranted it. 
The British rejected participation in the European Economic Community 
for the same set of' reasons they would require special considerations when 
they decided to join five years later. In June, 1955& the British were 
invited to join the Spaak Corrunittee~ which was charged by the resolution 
of the Messina Conference to form specific proposals for a European economic 
community. Britain did in fact send a representative, the economist R. F. 
b Brether1:on, who frm the first, in Richard Mayne's words: "pointed out tha,t 
II 
he was'.neither a delegate nor an observer, but a 'representative' - pre-
sumably to stress Britain's midway position of being neither 'in! nor 'out,.,,10 
By tha~ November the differing positions between Britain and the nations 
on the continent became clear, and Bretherton informed the Spaak committee 
that Britain's Commonwealth ties would probably make it impossible for her 
to join a common market. ll Shortly thereafter, Bretherton left ·the committee, 
putting to rest any question of Britain participating in the EEC at its birth. 
Still, the British hoped to deal with the new community on terms that 
they deemed mOre sui table to their economic ):"ols in the world, and at the 
same time J~eBist the protectionist tendencies that community implied. The 
hhJ~Q. e., R.,er f'i4.J(/tm, 
British ~overnment sent a team of negotiatora~to organi~e a free t~ade 
area open to all members of the office of Europea.'1 Economic Cooperation (OEEC), 
in wh:i.ch the emerging EEC would act as a single entity. Negotiations began 
in the summer of 1956 ~ Initially the British effort found s'upport in the 
low countries and in west Germany, where the enthusiasm of Economic Minister 
Ludwig Erhard seemed to hold out the possibility of a split in the EEC 
between the French and the West Germans. Yet as the negotiations dragged on 
for eighteen months, through November, 1957, and the British continued to 
insist cn many of the guarantees they would ask for when they finally decided 
to join thf~ EEC vis ~ vis the Commonwealth and British agriculture, many 
critics began to fear that if the British proposals were realized, the Common 
:Market could dissolve "like a lump of sURar in a British cup of tea. ,,12 
DeGau1le's return to power in May of 1958 sealed the fate of the British 
initiative. Having obtained West German support during the first meeting 
between DeGaulle and Adenauer in November, the French proceed to hastily 
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end the negotiations. The Maudling negotiations foreshadowed later battles 
over Brj. tain I s relationship to the EEe. Here, as later, Britain would press 
to open up the EEe to its world wide interests, while France would insist 
that increasing trade between members be the primary goal. 
Seeing their initiative defeated, the British proceeded to set up an 
orsaniza.tion espousing their own economic ideals to rival the EEe. That 
Novembex", an agreement was signed creating the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) joining Britain, Portugal, Austria, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, and 
Denmark, an economic confederation tha'l; became known as the Saven.. The 
EFTA, which Couva de Murville referred to as "les combats d t arri),re-garde,,13 , 
offered some of the economic advantages of the EEC without its political 
implications. As a strictly economic organization dedicated to reducing - .... --_.--
i.-rade bal"rieI'S, the EFTA could attr.act tradi tionally ne~tral countries 
like Swt:!de )and SwitEerland. Also, the Seven hoped to organi~e some sort 
of collective defense against the challenge of ~le EEC, whose protectionist 
tendencies such as the common external tarifr threatened to close off 
lucrative markets~ The British pad a few reasons of their own for organizing 
the EFTA. Britain hoped to apply economic pressure to those EEC countries 
that most depended on trade outside the Six. mainly the Benelux countries 
and West Gerllla.l'...y. With ove!' one fourth of Vlest German exports going to 
EFT.A members, t.l-J.e section of the West German business community that had 
' endorsed the free trade area negotiations initially led by Ludwig Er.hard, 
could ex~rt prest=lUro to make the EEC more amenable to the British designs. 14 
By loosening the West German attachment to the EEC, the British coui4; head 
off the type of Franco-German cooperation that had helped torpedo the 
Maudling neiotiatioL'ls. Though the EFTA was indeed viewed as a challenge 
by the EE~, it helped produce an effect the opposite of that desired by the' 
British when the EEC decided to accelerate the tariff reductions called for 
by the Rome Treaty. By removing !nore trade barriers between the Six, 
Benelux and West Germany would be less tempted to move outward toward the 
Seven. For its o~m menbers, the EFTA never produced results equal to those 
of the EEC in terms of growth and the expansion of trade between members. 
The British themselves showed their dissatisfaction with the whole scheme 
by applying for membership in the EEC only a year and a half after the 
EFTA came ~nto existence. Nonetheless, the EFTA experience meant that the 
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British would ask another area of special consideration, the economic ties 
to their EFTA partners, when they began neaotiat1ons to enter the EEC. 
We see +..hen, that the British record with regard to European integration 
raised serious doubts as to the plausibility of their alleaed conversion 
durina our period. Opposition to the supranational approach led the 
British to decline participation in the ECSC. The failure of the EDC 
encouraged the British to believe that Europe could not unite without their 
consent. When the Six failed to grant sufficient concessions to British 
interests like the Commonwealth and British agriculture, Britain rejected 
participation- in the EEC, instead setting up a direct challenge with the 
EFTA. The EFTA experience meant that the British would ask for still more 
concessions when they did decide to join the Six. Though DeGaulle shared 
certain ideological s:f,milarities on European unity w,1th the British, the 
fact that FrOOlce had participated in the European communi ties from their 
birth meant tllut French interests were considered all along as the communities 
developed. ~nlereas DeGaulle could help shape the communities' policy from 
the inside, the British had to ask for special consideration as outsiders. 
Thus, as the negotiations began, the maln issues involved determining to 
what degree. if any. the attitudes that had caused Britain to reject 
European unification in the 1950's had changed in the 1960's and how, if 
at all, these attitudes could be reconoiled to the interests of the Sixo 
The clima.te of opin:i.on wi thil'l Britain and in the Commonwealth tended 
to indicate that the factors that had precluded Bri tiah pai"ticipation earlier 
15 i -were still quite strong. Both part es remained politically divided on 
the issue of jOining Europe, and several influential groups opposed any 
British participation in Europe whatsoever. During the early 1950's, the 
Labour Party had been traditionally opposed to jOining the integration 
movement on the continent. prefering to concentrate instead on the ~eat 
socialist experiment taking place at horne. Also. as nominal socialists 
they maintained a certain ideOlogical opposition to what H.S. Chopra calls 
the "oonservative. capitalist, Catholic Europen16 which seemed to be emerging. 
ThougA these attitudes softened as the years went on, Macmillan's Conser-
vative government never conVincingly obtained Labour support for his 
initiative, and the influence of the anti-EEC forces within the party 
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increased as the negotiations dragged on.17 Before the negotiations ended, 
support from Labour had disappeared. Though Macmillan, led the Conservative 
Party, he confronted a great deal of opposition from that quarter as well. 
?-lany Conservatives favored traditionnl British ideals on free trade which 
would be undermined by participating in a protectionist Common Market. 
Conservati,res we,re also more attached than Labourites to the Commonwealth. 
Through e. great deal of maneuvoring Macmilla.n was able to more or leas 
preserve party unity on the question, though at the price of making pledges 
with regard to EFTA and the Commonwealth which he knew would bo difficult 
to ke9P if. the negotiations were to succeed.18 The British public at large 
remained fairly ignorant ot-the entire Common Market question. In a survey 
taken in September 1961, one month before the negotiations began, 69 per 
cent of thosa esked either did not know or answered incorrectly when asked 
19 if Britain belonged to the EFTA and/or the EEC. Several trade union leader-s 
expressed opposition. fearing industrial competition from the cartels On the 
continent which could put certain relatively inefficient British industries 
at a disadvantage, and undermine British wage standards. 20 Farmers were 
almost universally opposed, fearing the loss of generous government subsidies 
called deficiency payments if British agriculture were incorporated into 
a common fllarke"c. 21 
Opposition in the Commonwealth was nearly unanimous . The decline in 
impol'·tance to the Eri tish economy of the Commonwealth in the decade preceding 
our period encouraged the CommcTl\I/eal th countries to cling all the more tightly 
to those ties that remained.. While British exports to the Commonwealth as a 
percantage of' total exports had decreased from 50% to 39% from 1951- 1961, the 
percentage of exports to Europe had increased during the same period from 25% 
to 32%.22 In contrast to the anti~wt3stern movements sweeping other parts 
of the ,~orld. many Corr~onwealth countries welcomed an alliance less directly 
linked to either the United States or the Soviet Union. India under Nehru 
opposed British entry on the assumption that it woulu make India, as a member 
of the Commonwealth, more closely attached to Europe and the Western bloc 
than their non-aligned policy seemed to allow~ India also feared that as 
Europe became more inward looldng, the poorer nations would be forgotten. 23 
The natlons of the "white"Commonwealth, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand l 
opposed British ehtry even more strongly, fearing that their huge market 
for agricultural exports ~rould be closed off. Of the entire Commonwealth, 
,'" 
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only Cyprus and Trinidad supported the British apPlication. 24 
We see then, that Britain's application would have faced major difficulties 
no matter who had been sitting in the Palais ~/ElYs~. To join in the uni-
fication of Europe Britain had to dissociate herself from centuries of 
tradition which separated her from the continent. She had to coordinate 
her special tleeds with a unification movement that had proceeded for eleven 
years without British participation, and at times in spite of it. Even 
now t the British application faced considerable opposition at home and 
in the Commonwealth. These problems were not lost on the man who would 
become the ~te noir of 'the whole episode. General DeGaulla. For DeGaull.e, 
the central is~ue \18S whether or not Britain wa~ ~eady to make the fundamental 
transi tions tlaeded to become a full member of the European communi tie& .' 
DeGaullefs first public mention of the British application was a mixtux'e 
of c8\.\tion and optimism. When asked if he approved of the British application, 
he briefly replied: 
We ~he SiX] know very well how complex the problem 
[>5, but it appears that everythinp: now points to tackling 
it, and as fal' as I am concerned, I can only express my 
gratification, not only from my own country's point of 
view, but also from the po~nt of view of Europe$ and 
consequently of the world. 5 
Before considering the immediate causes of Britain's failure to enter 
the EEC, the negotiations of 1961-1963, 11]0 should summarize the rcason~ .. 
behind Britain's decision to join Europe and the advantases Britain hoped 
to obtain through joining the EEC. Throughout our period, Britain was 
in the midst of a long and painful transition period which saw the final 
setting of the sun on the British Empire. With decolonization effectively 
ending Britain's role as a world power, the Britisheage~ly sought a new 
role by pel"rnanently attaching themselves to the continent. Although nearly 
all of Britain's fermer colonies had been granted independence, emotional 
and economic ties remained strong; the sun had not yet set on Britain's 
world wide range of commitments. Indeed,erA·,')~ commitments had even been 
extended through the EFTA venture. Britain hoped to supplement rather than 
, .. 
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replace these ties through participation in the EEC. The EEC could provide 
stimulus tC) the perpetuc) ly sluggish British industry that the Commonwealth 
and the EFTA could not. The Question for the British was how to participate 
in the economic miracle taking place on 'the continent without abandoning 
commitments elsewhere that continued to pl~y an essential Tole. For the Six, 
the question was whether or not the British goals could be reconciled wit~ 
their own. 
For the present discussion the negotiations between Britain and the 
Six will be divided into two periods: the start of the l"Iegotiations in 
1961 through the summer recess of August, 1962, and from that September 
through the end of the negotiations in January f 1963. The August recesr~~ 
constitutes ,n .,!,ough dividing line separating the rise and fall of hopes 
for the negotiations' success. Macmillan announced Britain1s intention 
to seek membership in the Common Marke·t; in a speech to the House of Commons 
on July 31, 1961. In his cautiously worded statement, Macmillan cited 
varj.ous interests which had to be satisfied, noUn.S that no British government: 
••• could join the European Economic Community wi thou'l:; 
prior negotiation with a Viel'l to meeting the needs of 
the Commonwealth countries, of our E.uropean Free Trade 
Association partners, end of British agriculture con-
sistently with the broad principles and purposes whieh 
have inspired the concept of Eu~gean unity and which 
are embodied in the Rome Treaty. 
From the stru-t then, the British made their participation contingent upon 
the successful coordine,tion of their commi ttments and the principles of the 
Rome Treaty, assuming that changes could be made in the existing institutions 
if their needs required it. After the negotiations had failed, Couve de 
Murville would assert that Britain considered the provisions of the Rome 
Ti'eaty secondary, and that "Great Britain requested not, as it is generally 
believed, to adhere to the Treaty of Rome in Terms of its Article 237, 
but to study with us the conditions in which it could envisage its par-
ticipation in the Common Market •••• .,27 The basic issue raised then. was 
whether or not the Rome Treaty and the institutions it had created could 
/VI. 
be revised to accomodate the needs of new members. This issue would become 
.'\ 
more clearly defined as the discussions actually got under way. 
B~l d6 la 
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During the first seven months of the negotiations, a distinguished 
British delegation led by F.d'·'ard Heath provided an extensive survey of the 
problems Britain faces in entering the EEC. According to ROber~Kreiman, 
( 
the British deleaation during this period "seemed largely concerned with 
educating the Six in the details of Commonwealth production, from Indian 
cricket batsto Australian kangaroo meat to Bechuanaland customs- procedures 
•••• ,1
28 These elaborate discussions were intended to make the Six more 
amenable to the concessions that Britain would soon be requesting with regard 
to the Commonwealth. At the same time, the British delegation went to 
4ireat lengths to claim their allegiQ.nceto the final goals of the EEC 1 
even expressing their consent to the principle of the planned agricultural 
common market &~d the common external tariff. 29 Despite the conciliatory, 
-_.,. --... -
even flattering, pose of the British at the start of the negotiations trans-
lating agreements in principle to agreements on paper would prove an exbaUsting 
anti lengthy task. 
Jean Monnet warned that a lengthy process of negotiation could prove 
fatal to Britain's application. Nonnet reasoned that the longer the British 
stayed out of the Common Market, the sJn.:'lller the role they would play in 
shGping its development, particulnrly with regard to agriculture. If Britain 
WRS Signed into the EEC quickly on the baaia of a commitment to baSic prin-
ciples, it could become too poli tically embn~';lssing for her to leave rather 
than conclude agreements on the technical issues. Als'o, the French, who 
had already expressed ,great reservations about the British entry, would be 
encouraged to veto the application entirely, a right guaranteed by the Rome 
Treaty~if the negotiations went on too long. As we will see, after fourteen 
months of negotiations~ after which many on the most difficult itisues remained 
unsolved, this would in fact happen. Realizing that time would work against 
British entry, Monnet advocated a hasty conclusion of the negotiations aftel~ 
an agreement on fUndamentals. In a statement to Agence France Pre sse on 
August 1, 1'161 .. before the negotiations had even begun, Monnet said: 
T~e negotiations must move rapidly to avoid creating 
confusion. It is a mistake to think that wide--ranging 
negotiations are necessary. We must not let ourselves 
be impressed by the problems of substance: they are not 
all that difficult to solve. 30 
97 
-;-~ . .. _ ...... _-----












'. . .. ~~ ' .. , .; .. ~ 
Source: 
~Aurore. June 19, 1961. 
- .-.",- "' -
98 
A quick conclusion to the talks quickly proved unlikely, considering 
thath'~ither the Bri tieh 0r the French would consent to Dri tain enterini 
the EEC wi,thout agreement on the huge technical issues that separated BI'i tain 
and the Six. Of' course, a. detailed chronological examination of the 'nego-' 
tiations is beyong the scope of our purposes here, but a more brief survey 
can serve to illus'trate the problems to be confronted and what the prospects 
were of solving them. 31 For the first two months the parties debated pro-
cedures, finally deciding to concentrate on three major issues: the common 
external tariff' with regard to the Commonwealth, BI'it!sh Agriculture" and 
the EFTA~ In January, the Six moved closer to creating a common agricultural 
.. 32 
policy, with the agreement ot January 14. This immediately complicated the 
British position, since two of the three main issueR concerned aariculture. 
~ith the Six moving toward an an agricultural common market on their own, 
Heath remarked that Britain t s posi Hon "was l:f.ke negotiating on a moving 
staircase.,,33 The British also had to contend with what would become a risin~ 
tide of apprehension in the Commonwealth, particularly in Canada. In January, 
Heath began a major attempt to assuage Commonwealth :fears by visiting Ottawa, 
assuring the Diefenbaker government that Britain had no intention of entering 
the EEC without obtaining sufficient guarantees for the Commonwealth. 34 
Probably in reaction to the EEC agricultural agreement~ the British moved 
to speed up the discussions through proposing that serious bargaining on 
agriculture begin before the ene of February. O:f course, given the technical 
complexities of the problems and:;he unwillingness of the Six to conclude 
an agreement without solving these problems, the laborious discussions had 
to continue. 
In April, serious discussions rather than exploratory studies seemed 
to be ge'd.ing undenla.y. The British delegation submitted a plan for solving 
the problem of agrlcultural imports from the Commonwealth, 1n which the 
various products would be negotiated i.ndividually, and a trnnsition period 
determined. to allow the Commonwealth, countries to ad.just. AccoI'ding to 
Couve de I,~urville, the British originally requested that thls period be twelve 
to fifteen. years, obviously a much longer period them those who wanted an 
agricultural common market completed quickly could nccept. 35 The Six at that 
time were discussing transition a period of seven and a half years.36 In 
May, the British submitted proposals to steer the negotiations toward a 
)0' , 
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settlement on imports from the Commonwealth. On manufactured goods, Britain 
agreed to end Commonwea+th preference, provided that the Six negotiate in 
the upcoming Kennedy Round of tariff reductions with a view toward reducing 
their own barriers to the outside. 37 AgricultUral imports could be handled 
in the sa~e way. On other raw material imports, the British requested 
"temporary" exemptions ,0'(: niruties, :from the common 'external tariff on some 
twenty-seven items, includina aluminium, till lead, and journal paper, for 
which final agreements could be worked out at some undisclosed point in the 
future. 38 That tho Bri'i;ish stanco at this point was not viewed as entirely 
conduc. !.ve to Dri tain 's actual antry into the EEC was noted by Adenauer in 
an 'interview with the ~ on May 7, in which he strongly suggested 
that Britain might not be able to go beyond associate status in the Common' 
Market at this ' tlme. 39 
As the negotiations went into the summer, little progress wasrnade on 
the issues of nil duties or on Commonwealth agriculture~ Perhaps to cover 
for this lack of progress after nine months of talks, a meeting between 
• 1\ 
Macmillan and DeGaulle was arranged at 'I:;he ~hateau of Champs for June 2-3, 1962. 
" Shrouded in secrecy, the meetings concluded with a rather vague Joint communique 
stat:J.ng continued good in'tentions of all. 
After having confronted their views on the problemA of 
the situation, and confirmed these views and the community 
of interl~stD that unites France and Great Britain, they 
expressed their intention to make this spirit prevalent 
in the examination of the major international problems 
that they must face. It is in this e:ame spirit that 
they engaged and in which theyOl~een as following in the 
negotiations in progress at Br(~sels.40 
Finally, in August, agreement was reached on one major issue, manufactured 
goods from the :, 'white I Commonwealth. In this agreement, th0 comrilon external 
tariff was to be applied in stages, to be completely in effect by January, 
1970. Still, agreement remained as elusive as ever on Commonwealth and 
British agriculture. Britain oontinued to defend Commonwealth needs, and 
scheduled a conference of Commonwealth nations for September 10 to provide 
assurances. The negotiations were suspended for a summer I'ecass, to resume 
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As this first section of the nogotiations ended, the basic set of 
circumstances that would continue until the termination of the negotiations 
the next January become clear. After eleven months of talks, agreement 
had been r 'eached on only one major issue. the common external tariff for 
nmnufactured goods from the Commonwealth. The,~Briculturnl _ Question. either 
in the Commonwealth or within Britain, was nowhere near resolution. The 
entire issue of Britain's EFTA ties had barely been touch~d. Still i the 
Champs agreement meeting showed that both sides continued to show good faith 
and wanted to reach an agreement. The question then became hO\'1 long this 
good will could continue without a signigicant amount of progress on basic 
issues. 
The last foive months of the negotiations wrestled with these issues, 
though with diminishing axpectatlons of' success. The Commonwealth Conference 
of' September 1~19 involved baoically an airing of grievances without any 
major agrC:1ements. I.lacmillan asl<ed a benevolent' neutral! ty of the Common··· 
wealth~ promiSing again not to let Britain enter the EEC without safeguarding 
th&ir interests. In OctO-DeI', Labour Ll'}ader Hugh Gaitskell publicly expressed 
his opposition to Britain entering the EEC under the conditions he envisioned 
emer.ging from the Brussels negotiations, thus initiating a nC\\T wave of 
controversy within Britain. 4~ At around this time British de):iciency 
payments seemed to become an intractable iS9\..1.e in the negotiations, with the 
Six considering the EEC subsicl;) system adequate to meet the expected dif- ' 
ficulties, and the British wanting to either continue the payments indefinitely 
or phase them out over a long transitlon period. Another blow to the negQti .. 
ations came in November, when for four African members of' the Commonwealth, 
Ghana, N igeria, T(~nganyil,a, nnd Uganda rejectt~d association with the EEC v~ef' 
_Il '- {. . ~o~e... b -1 f 1 i ... tl S 4~ COilC/o/liDiA'S o/~1 4r ft?" ~nJoyed y 't 1e ormer co on es or 1C ix • ., By 
December, with no agreement in sight on deficiency -payments and other problems 
Wi~1 British agriculture, the EEC Commission special committee on agriculture 
headed by Co~nission vice president Sicco Manoholt was invited to a~~as 
mediator. The Man.sholt report was, submitted on January 15, 1~a3, the day 
after DeGaulle's infamous press conference, when the demise of the nego-
tiations was all but certain. 
One further complication resulted f'rom the Nassau agreements of' December 
1962, in which Britain was given the opportunity to purchase the Polaris _ 
missB.e from the United States. The British had been working on their own 
'10.' • 
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missile,' the Blue Streak, through the 1950's, but eventually abandoned the 
project as too expensive. At that time they were promised the chance to 
purchase an American equivalent, the Skybolt, then in the development stage. 
By late 1961 and through 1962, as development costs :for Skybolt soared, 
American defense of'ficials began to· hint. that the project might be 
(' 
dropped alto5j;ether. Faced with enormous political embarasament at home 
".t 
wh.i.ch could have brought down his government, lvtncmi.l1an Bought a substitute 
:from the Americans during a meeting with Kennedy at Nassau on December 18-21, 
1952. During these three hectic days, an agreement was worked out wherein 
Dri tain could pur;~haae the submarine based Polaris mi ssi Ie and receive special 
technical assistance in retUl"n for coordinating the British :force with NATO 
and f).greeing to withdraw it in only in case of a dire national emer~ency •. (.') 
Though the whole episode is perhaps overrated in terms of the ef:fect it 
had on the Brussels negotiations, it did produce the kind of Anglo-Saxon 
collaboration which .,;:t .. de the French especially suspicious of the sincerity 
of Bri tl:l.in IS commitment to t}~e continent. The French were in fact invited 
to purchase Polaris, but without the submarines or warheads which would 
44 have made it a viable weapon. Predictabl~DeGaulle tartly refused the 
offer in his January 14 press conference, and .Msailed what he saw as the 
conspiracy of' the Anglo-Saxons of which it was a product. 
So, the situation at the time of DeGaulle's January 14 press conferenc~ 
may be summarized as follows: e.fter fourteen months of talks J few tangible 
results could be sho\'m. Aside :from the agreement of the common external 
tariff on Commonwealth manufactured goods. substantial progress on nearly 
all of the major iSsues remained to be made. The B~itish desire to protect 
Commonwce.lth and do:nestic interests in agriculture remained as strong as 
ever. One might even wonder how much longer the British themselves would 
have allowed the n~gotiations to go on under such circumsta.nces. To add 
to the dif~iculties. the British had just con'luded an agreement with the 
Americans on nuclear weapons concerning which her would-be European partners 
were neither consulted nor invited to participate in any viable way. In 
a sense then, despite the good natured and hope:ful rhetoric that surrounded 
them, the Brussels negotiations constituted a house of cards which would 
colla.pse once attacked by a participant unwilling to see them continue 
under the present circumstances. 
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If tha~house of cards needed only a breeze to tumble do~m, DeGaulle 
,"-
supplied a tornado. In hi~. January 14 press conference, which took place 
durina an actual negotiating session 1.n Brussels,45 DeGaulle gave one of 
the more memorable performances of a very theatrical career. As though 
revealing eternal truth to mortals for the first time, DeGaulle explained 
hov Britain differed from the continent. 
England is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked 
'through its trade, markets and food supply to very di',erse 
and often very distant countries. Its activities are 
essentially industrial and commercial, and only sli~ltly 
agricul turnl. It lJas, throughout 1 ts work, very marked 
and original customs and traditions. In short, the nature, 
structure end economic context of England 2~f:ter profoundly 
from those of the States of the Continent. 
DeGa,ulle went on to assert that Britain could only enter the Europe in a 
monogamous marriage~ which seemed unlikely to take place at the present time: 
••• it is possible that Dri tair. would one d;;l.y come Y'ound to 
transforming itself enough to belong to the European 
Co!nmuni ty \';i thout restriction and \'.'i thout reservation, and 
placing it ru1ead of anything else g and in that case the 
Six would open the door to it and France would place no 
obstacle in its path •••• It is also possible that England 
is not yet prepared to do this, and that indeed apP2f's 
to be ·013 outcome of the long, long Brussels talks. 
Aft3r consolingly praising once more the key role played by Britain during 
"the Second \\Torld \'Jar, DeGaulle !'emarked that: "This very day no one can 
dispute the fitness and valor of the Dri tish. ,,48 r~his hollow tribute being 
paid, DeGaulle rather condescendingly remarked that if Britain one day 
makes herself acceptable to the Six, "it will be in any case a great 
honor fOI' the Bl"itish Prime Minister, for my f'riend Harold Macmillan, and 
for his Government to have perceived this so early, to have had enough 
poli tical courage to proclaim it and to have had their country take the 
first steps along that path that, one day perhaps9 will bring it to make 
fast to the Continent.,,49 
The press conference had a predictable effect on the talks in Brussels. 
Since accordina to the Rome Treaty decisions regarding new members had to 
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be made unaninously, the .Fr1.';nch ho.l1 a legal right to actually veto the 
British applicatd.on if' it (Wei' C~1.l:1U to a vote. Still ~ by :'",mch a di~pla;y 
of theatcics t without consulting e.ny othel'" govc1'I'1l':1ent, DeGRu1.lc shocked 
unLl ofi't;lne.ed hIs rsr"cners. T.e.m EOiln.a:': tl';:"ged Aclenaucr not to r.>lgB the 
I~O 
f'l'Sncc-'ieI'man Fricnd.sh5.pl'reaty until -(·he nezotif-::tinns l'r~J:'e !-eopcned. ~ 
\.If pole-:mic the basic concent of which h~::; not chan;;eu to thJ..s G<,,_y·. (m . 
.• '''''.\4 •. > .•.••• ,.! -I:',.n+:·.I. ·I '.'!Y· ·:s~ ... 11~~.':., ~~:.,.,,-: ;:,·. t:,v ,,1'(''''.1.'''. -i •• ", .... . , ··.r~'r·· ... . j ]' 0" ,··Jl"·" ~i"""" d4 --~.J """ . J. ...... - - - --- _._L --', ........ ~.""., .... c. ~ '''''-' ..... ,' "-'''' .:;;;_u_';;....!:..;:;.~, . 
.i.mplica.ti.ons 0:;:: tl1:iS -tl'ans:i.tion. In shn:i~t, i t : q:.'p€£.r~d to the F:-ench that 
ti:nE ht}::r~s or oi' n~Jd ll£.; t~10se COif,mun:i. tifH1 less I Eur'Y(l',an' by -.::han3:tng them 
to suit i,:.rihdn. ~ f. r.c:-..J.~~icu\ar ne"-"G:2. The French naw their move as preGorvlng 
I Eu!'one ' as i~ had b~~(jn built ur ·to -tb;"l.t time. Couv~ dt': i'liurv:i.l1e wrote: 
Ones again 'the Hec::;d of state (oeGaulle] assuDGd the 
rCGr'~ms :., .. b:i.L"\)·. HD st::d:;c{i, the evidence and c1.-:'O'':'' the 
logical ccnclusio,n. Se got rilJht to the hC8.!,t of the matter. 
preter'ring to asstu:iQ the rupture rather than to prclong the 
E.1mh:i.guitics and ZO on t ·oward ruin, ,dth a f::'nal rmmlt that 
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1::o .... Lld htflf0 uec,n no clin.cl'ont; \:;lla1; is tt, say that in any 
cas<s it 'would be :Ln~umbent upon France to take char~e ot~ 
~'1e crisis or to tak0 res~uns:i.bili -cy for -i:;h(:ruin. 5 .... 
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v;l!i~1.f! tl'le ne ,lot;it~t:i1,.3 s!~~,sion 'u::!S tA..King pl3.ce ~ 
E1SS~;~~. p. 274,. 
Sf'!(1 I!i8.yne ~ The ~.e:(NI(,I'~ of 
---~.-~:-. 
46t..,~",., · •.• , .. ,·.: '~" -"""·i._1·"~.,~','.' t ..''' ... 1.'.'' '"" .J·""" ""'~.:"",,~r 1,.,0.." . ·l··~()"1 in :.I!~i;-'l· A'-~"l""' ~'~el" ·"O.L~ T ») ')1'" ~ ~""L '."L _ . ___ " " .... _,; ":" ' --'1 1.1 'j~" ""v .• ~ ';i~" "_~ . • ~ "-' . 
47.,. . . • ., '. c. 
1:l2:.~. t :r. I:..L 'j ~ 
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Chapter V: The Showdm·m; ',i'l:,O Agr:i,cu.l turnl QUCS ·tiOil und !;ht;: CI'L~ls of leG!) 
Th~ evolution of (;vents disci.:csed 1n the pr0(:ceding four chapters sp.err..ed 
"to point to a sho·i."do\'ll1 bob-men the Lv!(! visi'::ms ()f Eli.Y.'ope. The tr1.,;.ce that 
(1.'mel'B;ed between De(iac;.11e and tb.e sUI5Z':omat:i.onalisb1 ~tfteZ' :r,eCaulJ.~ y'esurned pf)wer.' 
in 1358 carrie a.part O';!'adually throughout our period as DeGau:.t.l;;:: attempted to 
.1. ... eal:ze his vision of ~uroll~_des E'~~. as ittUi.'lled out \'Iit1lo' .. \.'I; a great denJ. 
o:t 3t;~Ces~.. tJi th the G9.t:'llist attelapt b:- ~l'eatG {-\ !~pe,,~~ut.t~~ havi.n;; 
f'fdlft~\t -the time seemt";d ap:.)1.·opriat~ 1'Ol'" a ~upra:na:l;ional:i.st cotmtcl"attad,: . 
Thr:· long delayed iso).vL'18 of -the a,zricul ta:cal clues'l;ion seGued to prcvt(jc an 
um.t~U2,11y go(';d o;PP<H;'tunit.-y foX' thif; ccunte-rat'l:;ac1~. DeGau1 Ie h =.:d lcmz cOl'lsider."€d 
the «0'!:;t;in;~ap of ;m ::lgr1.cul t'...iral 0OT·llwa m~u:'k'ilt the riUlI·ber on':l' god. 0-£ 'the 
prJ.' ;;E':a ';;li"! .tnclusi':::n c'f: agricul ttu'e .in t.he COmmO!l M£',rLet,< bu); ill return wen';:-;ed 
ccr.c("'~' zi.ons fron. DcG::'.ulle ~ ':l"i~h \IonIa a:Llow the strer..gthcning ;)f: th0 suprF~- . 
• ~'O\l!)l:!,' '-'lith t'. p->::'J.-!:ie<,u 111'O";rlu:5..0tl o.li'l':'ad!r 1:ll:'i'l;1;I,z,TI :i.nt',I t:h~ HO;IIU 1'!·:;,at.y: th(~ 
ill'St:auttor. (;f ;:wjority 'i"O".J.l~.z in tl\0 I'E:C Crmacll ofr;Jnisc('ll'S. No see ther. s 
the,t tlle £' itue:t;iol1 pC'ird::cd to e:i.. thcr c, lemdn,al~1~ CC!;1p .. ~omise 01'" an t:1lpl'ecedentcd 
·,k~3t w f.c~ert:::lblc eGi.:.;tion to tJ.(; ';'n'mch act-ul'llJ.y cont:, Li h')+,oc1 0 S~cono11y the 
[.I0litical. ~)ot>i tic:ms en;' tho p!'ot.f~gord.(; t::l w:Hl be o~:·pl':.\;i.r;ed~ 'bhcao of thn Fr'Ci'IJci.-.. 
'\.;he 1'J0;~t; Gcrr'lI:lmc:. t OJ1(~ tn\.'; ERe Conud.snlon. The gradual ref.lolu::;i' .. ~m of!;b~ 
:;.,conomic 8i tU:'ltion wi2-l t.hcn b 'J tV Gcu:"f;ed I ::1ho\lllna b-:,;" .l!108-(; o.t tht) r=:'onch 
:l"a'1'Ui:':-CTlient2wt:l'e zatisfled~ HI';:';;, we \\'".ill ~e0 how' the attempt of -the Con1il1issio}l 
to colleci:; ~ol~_ tit::aJ c0n~!e;::;siol'ls in r ;,~tnru for the ~~cn()mic solut::l on f.lctually 
;11"f.!cipi -"cated the crisic by pu'cting the Froncll 2,nd th(~ EEC CGT!1'mission in clear 
0P:Kisi'l::ion. Fhlally, tfe will ShO\1 that althotigh DeGaullE. won a shor·t run 
victo::.'y. the i'ailure at: 'che supranational inH~i,,~t:ivo deepcmcJ the I'ift 
neb-men Fram~e and the :five, creating on uncnsy, stalemate bet"Jeen the tvJCt 
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Vi£licmt1 of Europe t.bu-:; would .['(Hl1uin u;'ltil DeGaulle left office. If DeGaulle f S 
policy cJ: the tcmp'cy chair t could ntop the supranatd.onalists s it could not 
c,!\ellte an ~UX'ope des Etats. 
The ba.si~ economic problems may bo sUmIlk'lrh;ed us folloVla. On thE': suri'E.ce 
the sJ.;;uations of' Fr~lce and her partnerlJ seemed cornplementsry. Itlest Germa."1Y, 
cut o:f:f I~rcm the tz'o.di tiona,l agl'icul tun'll l"egions in tho East, nnd be,sl9t with 
ov.;:rly decentralized end ine:fficient farm£\p hac to .import $2.!5 billion \!orth 
1 " (,) ',f ,rOQ(~ the Y'~.?,l' the CClilmon(~Q1'l{(:t opened in 195B.. The Direction. Gencrale 
l' Ag~:·:i., c'l.1J. tur.?' of t:.,iC EEC;.lst:tmated in tho.t yea .. " that WCiJt Germany '0 113t::U to 
:i.mpo, .. "t; :r('.,od ',<l~lul-t1 in.cz'oase by ~1.9'lO. 2 Eelg:iUJII, Luxembot.1t'89 and the Notherlc.nc.f.! 
;vl.d tu 1,lI1J:ol't f(:h)d durina,this period ae Hell. France, on th.;l othe.r hanu, 
had tc dp.&l ','lith !;iru:'l~ets :!..ncrca.sir.gly ,glut t ed ':.d th domosth: sUI1JluoeE:.. The 
E(l',te:r'nmont-as:zi:1';;ed modernization pIe,;). of 195R-19G1 han. l'osul ted in 
French farmern zb)'Jl'cd their frustration ill a pr'otefJt in !',;R:/, 1361, i n t!h :tch 
the;!" blockeu highu ,:lY:J v;i t \1 un801d surpluses. The only hope tor· :1.,ncl':'easlng 
n!3rici,ilturel rmpe~90wE;re as the Unit",::.\ S-:::at~s and ,(;ho II whi'i;e " C?;;llnonwealth~ 
The cr"..L'< of' the ~,rl"ole agricu}:tural pro01er;t du:r·5.ng Oil!' ilQr'ioC'. 1 si:hat 
}Jrcfe;."Ct! 'to buy i'rOti t he \lorld I'tar1w 'G . AJ though France ','mt3 eXI)(;r t ll.".g m~re 
,food to Commun.i"bJ ~:1er'lbcrs t:b.tm :~.ruv iou"Jly , the Fr~p.ch Ei :1:W much room :ror im-
~)r()V'q;rn~nl';. '1.:n lS5fJ ~ Fre'ld! a,gricul tU1",;.l export s to 'I;he five cansti tuted 19% 
oi' total !7r€tl.ch agY'~,cul ture.l exports, while in 18m this figure \'I~f' 32''£0 3 
EEC member French imports as a ~b 
Gf total agricultural 
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It mw:d: b~ !Said that In.ch5.G : 'f;:.:rq €ct. thc3pid. ·i: ~~nc1 
'~:(~'~~.;:.~ i':' .::- t.;lf~ r~lreu r.J, c:f ·i.1oLt\ ~ dl~l ~'l()t ,' (lC(Jt (J'Jf' cr:'}Jl.t1.')' f ~~ 
.t"cquJ.rt)n:cnt~:j. TLt~ :\.1'1(!'lC{t;l~l:-:J. P:i,"'!,YvIf·':ioTlj2; \~!(;r.{,) W.n r,.t'()c:~.,~}c 
nr.r:. 1'~:,pli(' i t Ht' ·:~hor;c e,.:;,}ccrn2.nc: : 'L)':~cul·ture \';'-;)NJ Vt1.[;.-ae. 
Tbi'. w.,,::; clJ':Ldcntlyduc' to the fu.c·:; t\l})'G ClUJ." ij.~[;ut:I ntorn :Vl 
1£57, CClc1ght up 5.n th~ dr<"!am. of a Rllpr~rv:.tj.cn').l GI,';X'QPC and 
t.L\J.:d.ous n-t tt!)J! r,l'i ::~ · to 80+';-;;10 lur ,3c,r;,ethin.g appX'o;~chlnc 
.1::; ~ !',i:~d H:)t J."e:l t i.t t.J:~d.\' dUi~J ,to jnrd Tt thn'~ n r.N:(!C;'. 
inter~r_d~, no me. tb:~T" ;,(: .... J c:::,uci . .gl, so s;wuld recl}}"J(~ 
;~ati&:C\~.ctJ.cn f2~on~ tIle outset. D 
T.n. L:llrn, prog ... 'ess 
:.,r::.d .. , in induEitr.;;. 
• I 
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French negotta·tors continually stressed the special considf!ration agriculture 
needed in the Common Market. In indu:,rtrY
I 
the normal calli tRUst mechanisms 
\Jere able to produce a i'aiI'ly stable equilibrium lIJi"i:;h a relatively 10\'1 
level of' governmental intervention. Agriculture t en tile other hand, much. 
more dependent than indnstT'Y on the whims of nature, needed more regulation 
t .o ensure equi11briUI:l. Though the rel:;ulting techriical problE'IDs involved ::tn 
("['cating en agricultural cornr.lon ::t31'ket in Europe \',ere much Greuter, the 
FI\Cach b01iev ... ~d that a. Common f,I:ll'ket not including aa:r-ic1..'tl tUrn ,,:as not complet0 
alld hclnce one 1n \'1h1ch ltrance could not participate. An the ClJ;,'l'icul tural 
ni!gotiatic·:tls during the elarl!" 1960' S occured nnder a running French threat 
ttl wtthdra.-w from the Europea.i. Communi ties entirely 9 ThZ' ul ternative to such 
.u al"l,! ~,r'GUY'c was Co~vnH;y p,t"e!'eren~e tn l':4?,icul tm-al ~o()ds, with all 'the 
~ n~ 
(.'~onG~'!lic ~ .. ~!af1.iua·tlHC'nt.r:: th;:~.tihitl i;apUed for· Fr:1.'1ce t s partnerno '" 1!:r·t:~1!.ch can:e 
to ~Olll"'lect a conmit:.r:ent t(;· Cc.'llU'l!un:i ty 'Pt"'Gi'eNmce 'co a cornmltment to I::urope . 
I'h(\ 31'1 tish, v/l!.r) llLiifti3tl ~~~ch a l cu'£/' P(-::N~011'Lt:ee of t.lcir :;l,gr:Lcult;l.1x't:;il 
r:-:-·oduct;:: f:.."'orn th~ Ci'Xl!!',lom';cal t;lJ p we:'." ! j ,cdged un 1'1 t to join Euror)t. on 'chi.::: pl'in~ 
c:'.!11c ~ T.he f:!.vu pa.rt!,~C:l"t) of FHH'.e ·':) [',1;;'( to be judL1(',d on 'the snl1\~ pI'inciple, 
U'~~ v(rdict dQ'b)l'nd flinE '.I!H'·!:J:(':;;' or llO l; Ft·ti.rICO WOLilt; con:Llnuo \;0 p,lr'l":ic1r:at3 
le'J.r;'~:hs to l:t'~!~() SHre Umt t.his participation cont:i.nu('~,~ . Europ':l<:\)"\ integration 
cC'l.ld ~'LnS inc!eao had procceded wi. tho'ltt I:ri tain t i1lrt: it wou.lei colJ.apsc: 'N! thO'('1'1:: 
~'rance. X:c.Gaulle gambled, c01'rer.tl y as it turneci out, 'L;:1at the F~ vo would 
participation at all. In ties!; GC:~l'many t ',ii GIl hoth the Chriotian Democ;r'ata [;nd 
the Soci:;,lis ts publicly cOlmni"tted to the rrinclplo of ec,or-,mn:ic int:e,gl'atjon, 
reGcn"11e held n certain CllPour,t of' rhetorirml leverage c-vo;('f.;:('hr:.rn' s sh'lJ':y 
:::oa~1 tion. ,\ppealE\ to complet;in.g the nome 'l'1.'(N't'ey w:tth :t'(;lg.~.rcl to h£'('j,oul t\l!;'1') 
carried influence in other BEC membe:.:' cnr,itf:l1s as well, p€'.rticularly considoriJlg 
the support DeGaulle received at the ouf'det i'rc.m tho EEC C0I!17:1if.;;3lcm. F:l.nal.1.y, 
:')eGc-lAlle 8&\,1 the establishment of an agricul tnrc:~.l com'llon mEU"ket WJ H \tray 
to reEP;';orc thl3 balance or ad·,.,,:u'lta,ge::; obtained by the Euro11ean Communi ties. 
As one of the world IS najor industr5.al powers, West Ge:cnv3ny, eVC!l in its 
truncated form. had be~n better able to take ndvant8,ge ~f -ch;~ indus"b","'ial 
7:'r'ovislons of' the EEC than the more agriculturally oriented F:-ance. Since 
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i~Of:jt Ger,7I(my lI!Oulc1 bo the E:~c.: n:'3mbcr' forCEH1 tu P:\Y' tho lalx~t for Community 
pl'~:ferenc~ a1.~ tho &roatest impnrtox' of food nmon~ the S:tx t concer;iS long from 
Bonn were seen as particularly crucial to ol)t~irl.ing an agN~oment in agr'iculturce 
DeGuulle soid :In 0. ;;1pt:!cch in H)Gl: 
The Commoll MF..!'ket 1.:3 .2E..~.2:....?-~~ ot.....;~1J :;;0:-£\. fi:..t tho 
point o:f clec:l..s:tcnJ ~;e have done a g;."eat denl fo:!.' Ger;:luny: 
the ECSC. Eure:i:;om» ti:;he EEC. Ita rua,lly time fOl"' h0i' to 
do 30mething :t'o!' \is. 7 
Tho \:'est G~'rman poait:ton cent?r'ed t"L!'cun("l tl--yine to obtain the C',reateat 
!;~O 111:1ca1 i:~dnB at: 'i.::he small (lEt 6con(';r.d.c coots. AS the ETiC member. forced to 
re,y 'th;3 most t(J es+.;,ablie:h, Com.muni ty p]'E':f{lr,,~nce ~ the v!erJt G,'¢f'l'ylmlS Vll?re ert~dcus 
h"l Ivwo the eCOnc.I"iic ~l'O'rifd.'=mE of the l:tgr5.cul tvral common tr:£'rkct au \',.'eS3l1. as 
iLi the lH70';::" liould. ;.~B~i.li~,:,e ~1.~-J("r ;U~:;loc:nticna hiJlh1y Impo:t)1.n.fu:~\'.lith 1:;et~1~ 
GCrt~:£ ',1 J'F..xr:;rn'e.. ''chI'' ~':·ar·r.1':n,'8, tradi ti':" "-:,"lJ 1y ~" Cln'is t.J.1'"i li ten",oc!"nt:k ~i;ron9)l(:ld, 
il:l. th I\'(i'.'i!~'llle;C'" I ~ dCI'[\xtup~ C::lHC 'i;hn (C.nd of tile p(,rioJ of l'!r:st Grrman idc(J-
l02h~i'.1 Lij·llip.tth.,. ,,:.nd t:c'~:;,,)t'1·c:tio,1 wl:i;!l T.'f~Gaullcj,-: \-'ia:i.on of r:uroi"". The tlEJ"l 
n 
Tr!f;,~:i~' u:ftCl' Adn.nr-ucr :i:'J.nally J.cft tho eccllc.o 
inst.:1. tl.ltlons o.s a ... my to tar.lO French in1'luence .in Em:'opn. In:J. supranational 
,'-
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(Il"ganization \vhos~ authol'ity was theoretically independent of' the states, 
West C-ermany ~ s economic strength could improve her s'l';anding among her partners, 
!)fll'ticularly if' 'l.:he B.gricul ~Jral provisions llTere not toe) co:~tly. 9 By 
asscrt1r.g t1.1emselvcs vi thin the EEC, the l~jcst; GCi"li1an hoped to fac1.1i·t;ate the 
entry of' Britain, t~!-}us addi~ another ~heck to the French. Fin,ally, Erhard 
nut:~d~,J some kind of diplomatic 6UC~(,SS 1;0 shore up ~1is position domefd:ically. 
'N1;.'VU:t' f\E';, s'l::~bl<f/H3 ;~ to preJOt;6SSor, the :::rhard eonl1·ticm wn;; comlng undt;;r in-
<!I"G:tsiJ18ly heaV"J t~ri ticisllt near the (~jv3 of our peri oc: from the pro-·French 
\"ir..fI or th!~ C~.;;:"iuti(al nt:m(l~ratit; r.':il'tYe leJ b,Y ;J'!'tU'l.;::-J'ocuf' Stl'::lUSL1. !f a 
vh"::t~IY'Y 9V'(~1' +~hf') 1;':'<~ni.('h cIa COflUmml t:;, in~ti t'l.lthms coul,! 1)8 ;,ei".iovod without; 
t:'ies troy lug El'.'hal."(P s sup)ort tHi10ng VlO!-3'1- G~~ril1l'ln farmers, i,l'CFC her0tics could 
hr- qll:i.et<:'d ;.md Et'hf ... rd'::: POE1.t::i.on i';tr,:'nsth~n('d. 
Ii' the :f/.'eJ:v;~h w;.;.mt(,,(l a:i1 :'[~~:r·.tcultur;)l Cr.i'l1iiOn narket IJJi thm.!t ])(,l1'::;ic8.J. eon.coas:~.Ot.lCi 
1'~ we~.t (.c"""' .... <4.J<tAkJ. wItt.. p"".it4( (.IH"~~;f(O"1 
a .• ,d) e V!o?e.!-: S[I"l(;ul tt:ral Gommon ,,::;,r:k:::t J. the f.'omrnisc:i'on w~'nt('r.l h .. '}·J-;h pol i t~_cal 
"i:ho CO';,!!-:US;:;iC;fl "'Klnlli ~l~' e, kt'.:j ·w;dia{.in.~ ;t'f)lt;: r1u£'inf.r. \:i"l,;} ne::'ir.ult;li '!ll 
;:""iZt,tiaticJ:1.s :trom H)f)1.-19Gi1 0 o:ft:en fR':0P(l!'i:;:lng t~b0 F,'I,puh posii:j.tm .:md wo~"rd.nf~ 
propc3ais La t:hJ.3 ef':fed: 1:fOuld actus.ll..! set oi't' the ~J'. ·i8ic of 12(-;3. 'J::rU:l Cum-
'rhQ Six ci.id Hot f:r.,~:.."':':'ously set c.buut creating a;l ;:...gr'icul turaJ. cormnon 
D'-4j~ke't ,)),;:1... (1£ th.::> ' 'I21.CUO:: set of ve·,''''!:;! contaln~d ill the lloltl(: ':!'re".t.;{ un ·c:1.1 1961 . 
~:hrou .. ~lOut thu_t y~t~r, ·i;il.;i COilUi~iGsi()i1 t \~hc Council of i.ii.:1.L1ter3, o.nd a s.pecial 
of particular prcJc1ucts ~ The French renai!1ed {'aiI'l~r q1.liet t',n til June ~ perh.a;.s 
ned; \'i,Jn1;lrg t.o ~.:,W'lE: probl(;iHs :for t;.H:) upcoming Fovell",'!; nf)~otiu-(;ions. In June, 
hC·Vlev'~.r, t;lfl FrG!lch intm:'1:l0d the Cor:.rnunity t.l1c;;d; f'rt.nc;~ 1'10111;.1 ,'I(lt P<':~r·(;i.d_puta 
in '1:;h~ I1c:xt cl0t of tm'if:f t::'~,ta already Rgroed upon by the ~;b unld:3s 3ubsbmtif.:!.l 
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progress were nao,e on an a,gricul tural agreement by December 31 ~ 1961. Premier 
Nichel Debre""expr-ess03d 'che French government's dissatisfaction with the lack 
of progrese be:fol~e the National Assembly that June : 
No r.eal progress ••• has been registered, but we hays taken 
not.;! of tho accuf!1ult:','i;ion of thtl Bj;;t.t),ntiuf) contt,)ntjr.m~ on 
:tnterpl"'~til1gthe clauses of the tr"'aty.... All our efi'ort 
Hill lead tt>fU'ds ae'ctlng the l':lrst agret:!'l".e1,'lt 'lcc~ptedt and 
to':Jtlron the ci"'lxttiQn 1;1' mew (;Oil\IilG!~ctr41 ClU'Nmts t thl'lnks to 
lc,nglas'l:;ing: contrAct-g. He slt(1l1:;,d be. c.o"c,d!<f1'o(''j ,b"k W<l1. 
-:) ,,, ... 1& 5\0 I- IJe. ~"'f'.e.S. 10' 
finelly reach.r.:<l em 3i.l'E:E:);r,ent F.:i; 5::2.:JAI! rm January 1'1,. which V'i:leD finally 
!"er,U.zud wClllt1, COVDl.' ~~3::' oi' C;:)ilmHUli t,y 2,t:;J:"Lcul tural produc·i;::.cm.:1.1 
\'.;01..11d l't:lI'l'CGent ,~}\C: h;.i·'l'!:~)t )1!'J.ce' at the ci~l::i:i,!'('d equ:l.Hbrium. (p *) • )'f the 
... r-·--...."-
:iial~b::, t pt'iclZ :t'(;~!.l tc p .. c~)rtQin ueSl-~c I 0 p<!.(';d·/¢~ ot- ttt ,.qe.+ 
b,? 10""/ t::ht:. t;£)'t'gct ~)r:!.ce, to 'cho l)oin t (! ." " . I f /I, f Cr vG4t '!-rv/,-, fl (,' (<:£.J ( "\ 
le8ll';i1~i.tcd M, -the? in'i;f~rV~~::ltion !~Il'ice • 
G~id 
cer€:q I .. · I;) 
';;l~ice Vl€lS ru :'~~tQrecl -. 1'1 .... 13 t:arg~-t pr-; .. cc ~ 
< 
vir:ul!~ 'bo ~;p.t nnn\.1r.llv 'i'or ench ocunt:i.'v! 
v • I 
I 
d"L'rl;l~ the 7}~ y~~",r trrm::::i. tiQn pe:t.'i(;d ~ [, 
at the ,:me (I:f l{hieh enn:1nl [?:'ices, 
.... ,O\.lld 'r><.,: :::.;,t for the COnTfI'.!ni ty as 1:', 








price minus the lo,\;,;est w'orlCi price. FRrmers coulci export cereals at the "/orld 
price 0 receiving a l:3u'bsidj' covering the difference boi:-V1E'<m the domestic pl"'ice 
C'xld "::.he world pI'ice. During the transi ti'.)n period the Community would PElY 
the farmers p:.u-t of tile difforonce in }:lrices bebleen EEC I!lcnlbers ~ but only 
a p~,rt to en~ure POVGm(j~'l.·c tOWQ!'d C')'.munity pref€rence~ Other !Ji2t'kets W'3re tt" 
be coordinated tht'ou.::;h l.::;ssalubora(;cl mC .. H1S. 
:..~ hf:ch sLorter perini t."iS.n t;11e ::1y-i t1 sh, ~!ho by nO\t l';C!'(~ l1Dgo'!':;iatir:.g to enter 
t:l\S" Lire, had ill ml!ltl.) 




on levies on imports would have Lean e.::::pecially costly. lIm..,. the f\;Lna 1I/ould 
:function once the agricul t'Ural m::!rl~et came fully into c~dstence remained to be 
dr.!cided. Proposalu t-O 1:1Una&C tlile fund sulllnittsd in 'the surnrner 0:(' 13G5, 
hcaV'l./ in their poli tical implicntioru~, '/101.11tl touch (jff the cri.sie. For the 
time being, however, so ma'1.Y difficult issues remained to be solved that tbe 
.i"26.? ngr't1(ii-:10nt, which :in s.nd eaco 0I.1y COVDl'cd. JUf:st QV~l!' hu1f of Comlm,mlc:>, 
:::!~~r:tcul tm:'al proci.ucts, r!,w::;t be comJiGer'ed to ::t large e:ctent only an agn;;clllent 
t;<., ",.,tree. 1;1 .J:.iP-U3r;'l, !96~1, the Si~; pror;-;iuod to mt:ttmd the pro1'':'1t':ed agri'~ 
C;Ult,"11J;"'Cl1 l..1n. j,(..'n 'bv D'~ccmb\.~r 31. "iq6~~ .. ) , 
'!'his ~~.ti,;n::.;ioo rcnu.l t{~(1 aft.')!' <:lnoth;£,,r Inn,,:,uthon nt~gc t.tat'i.ng wr):3zi(m l';t'C)E: 
D,\>cer.:b~r li3-~~3~ 1903~ vhich ~\:dlo\,;t'd hJ(I ::r':;~;,r:; of ."lnss succcdRful tHJkc. Th:ts 
'~ui:racle of Dt"u~sels,,12.3£1 i "G CBt:lC tlJ 1;;e c.,.llcd) S~Cil i,d to confirm what 
t;l1.rn(h:: out "co' bt:?"~;m ~c:rl'oncous impx·es::::1.on thl:'t the Si;r. could solve acy iSI!i1.to 
ii" 'G.'loir j'epr.'es('m·t.J.tives ..... ~:"e locb:;(! it H x'o.:>m for' 0. long f"nO\:~ ~t}r'io(~, of 
• f\ __ ,~it, 2'JZ;:t.'\E;e:JHel1"~ [lUG t 'b-e con.c ), ::~3eu .(or t'h.c rE~a~-3f)u. tI"l8, t 
t;h~ ·t~ .ritf J-~o:.~oticxi;i<.)ns be"tlVt: (:"!.1 the tIn!.t~:: ~~ S~j~ut;,,,:~·!, al1. (~ 
Et;/'QjJl:: are ·]ne t ·) Opel! '1::,6 'l'e~ct 8~)!'ln~ f.\nd that ::r,CDI'l 
J"',,-<.:.e of {~!',e stCl'l,lS which '1!ill. no:; fail '!:;O corr,c 1.') on 
'\:1'10.1; DCCi;V: !U,'I, .1 t1,-:1 1.1 ')(7 n0cf'~f;tr~"~r then "that tbe.: C""Mn~n 
Na.!'k~t D(, st.:}I'hUng or.: i TS ;fe~t ~ COlil;,l.;:-, te (:mc 28St'.2'ed, 
or th;ac :t t dis?ppecu". 
'l'h'}.f:i the yeC'"r 1953 is (1<:ciD i va for thl3 f'u"~;ure of fl, 
un i-\';", C'. Eur'o'P~.!. If, a'c the heart of' the world, a 1'<' :;.1 
cm'1r::uni ty 18 e::;tabli8hed Of_ h'~el'i the Six 5,1! thD eCi.i~lOmic 
dC:'le,:!.l~ 0 :I t r,l:1:: in<.1cod be thou~~ht: that; thc~~' wn 1 bo Jed 
(,lOre th3.~' tl:~y CU'e to ~rgani~;~ 'Ll.le':lsel v<-;s :n;grder of 
co',.dll.ct CO[3{; ';h6r a :rolJ.cy ;'l~ncl) 1.S Evrop<?a(i. 
Th~ 19G~ aer.·$(Jihnn'i:;, uhidl included afrangemenb.~ .fer 85% of COnTI.~\mi'l;y 
P,JeI'icultm:"~ ',\r(:1"3 sui:,,:,:~Gar.-(;i V~ enough for DeGaulle to chdm tha.t f;t.,!ff'icisnt 
pl'o,gr'es:s har} be(:ln u"ldc to nm.'p~'r:d his t; '-I!~EH~t to lenvC' the Ef':C, whlle still 
f'nilin;:; to folve tIle ;nost c.ilf'f'icnlt i~: i';ll(m.14 An in 19G2, an f1..a:r.'ef:ment had 
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b&8n r(;ached througb COl1cc.:;ssionf:l fro'!! tt'te Frt':nch and the vJest GcrmE,ns. The 
~"f!st Ger-m8,ns a,&;reed to hring their be~,f 0!ld a dait'Y prices in.to ,tine with a 
r'\ 
price e::::tablished by the Communi t."Y by the end or a 'Gre,Of.::: i tio~'1 period beginniI16 
on Jetlu91",}" 1. 1970. ~Iost importantly f they a&reed to comple'tely turn the 
SUb8idizi.~S cf asricu1 tUI'd.l expo:.. ... ts ove.!' to t'ile COliiffiunl t-y by 1970. Fir..ds 
:.'or ".:hCi3C ~:ubsidies would come from a combination o:f th~ l"evcm..!f~S :frcm levied 
on ~lupc:,:,t.~, ,J.nd :from no.tio.1.al contributi.ons. Thlfl Vj~S 'i.he cort.mi tl;,ent to 
i;'!.(:'ire.::tly Bubsidili;;ing Fl"ench e~i:poI'tc; th<.t'i; honn hud been r:;: luct.ant "Go r;uake 
!;"'\i~fb l ~k,~.:t'a tion. Q f t:~,'Z': 'i·::,~m.::ho!, t C lJlllJlli':: (:;(~( I :; propo~JD.le fOl' COrM10~'l. C't):£'eE:,l l,1I'ices 
"l r:" 
lirlt.:.iJ.. ·tr!.(~ Grrj,nn ~J:f' ,'1Se,~· ... j .. ~: DioCtl ~Jsl()n ~f' rlr-~!lnii~lg t-i".\c corlilt011, l~u!' J.rl ~I~!r:l~ 
l":e·;yi; Ce:,'l"i'ctnt3 fJn;~JJy J:it.!lded~ iltJ..lJ:'=-n~ipleJ 'but tha pl'inclpl'3 1'!ar: to postf)or!.Q 
t;~:1.') c lB.i::'h. ,,1.':, 
'fhe ~..1gric.ul tuZ"al cowr.or~ mar'itet )Hurt be con:pleted t 
f~tiJ. in!.; ;'Jh:i..:::b. \:h,c iuulJstrial COU'Jnon r!:.9.~"ket wl11 perich. 
The T'I' o'01C'm :i.s not 1.(.) knovl ':-ri1"ther Or' not WI) will h ',ave 
'\:.h6 E'Jrope~.n ECOXlOl.dc COlTLl1l11t: 1'::;y. If Frane:e, at one time 
OJ' ,1,11otiH;)r f ('Cmsid(n~z t::;~ Common :i1m:-l-::ct mortally 1t!"undac1 
:h.l its fi,::ml 31':'1.1. in its deep oot~ntia.liti.0'3~ w€ll, it wll1 
diG- <':, rml:u;::'al death, regn:clJlees of the ':;0XtS and 'Lerm3 
\ddch hl",ve been)J.'cvi ded :for ap£l,icntion f'.Y.1U w'tl1ch t td; 
tl~at tiI:'le cct.:ld not bl;) appli(~d. I 
is:::n.l ':-;, La ;;h :tilteJ:'l:i}.',ll:r and Gxtc'!''oz.lly. Facing elections :l n the fall of 1965 in 
t:he Euna(ntag. -tht;) E);,(I,arrl go·,,':;rnmm:t \\l',S ~articlilarly anxious not to alienate 
124 
i til £rt!'on~ iJupport eunongt;h~ farnlors . J\C1'icul tural Niniste:r' Werner· SchVlU1"t:z 
told the Bundast.ag on February 4. 1964 thEAt "the West German ~overmnent would 
not: con~eiJ1; to lo':;erin,g on oel'oal pricc ~: during ·the next ,y-~a.l,.18 \'!ben ·Pn ... <;;. - fo'SeP 
~~t~~ausG t s ::ll~(I-Ii'r;undl w:i.n,g of' tho Chr'L~t tna Democrat Pf:!rt.,i tliiue an ors:;::nized 
attempt 1;0 attack Erhard'li) Euz'opeerl poli~y wi thin tIlo CDU tLa'c SUnm!f!r~ t;hcy 
we-re l"eouffe(i by tj'ie pnrty as fl. whole.. Ei'hm·J I s poLLey of df.:;la.y:!.n(1 fl. flnal 
H.~i',)ell\ent l~m 'i~;.~ i~ul b.'r''': setJmt:·!l to b~,· P£;,ying off o.t hO!lln ,1 '} Two pY.'i."ibl0!n;;.! 
wi th the 19[;2 agrec::il1enb3 :ror~sha<'lowed Bonn's posltion t(.I'da:r.'d th'J ,,:nd 02 UK;·'!,. 
"11 ?.Cl . ,' . 
. ;~i.Qr'~~;-r.; or Gor.LraL':.1i ty :f\.~;'"i(1G it!, COin¥")c~~na tiD!l .fox-' \ifcf:t G '~~I 'T1EHl f'3J""hlers ~ to, hE:..;'" 
"11 
B'.lppJ.S1:10ntod b:.~ l\.ll.'l<.J.S f:::'Ont ~al'm. r_ .\h!c, the ~;est G€PTD8..l1S 31.!.gJ,,!!,33te:i that Etll 
d12..:;i3::'0))::; r0ga.r(;iH,g [;.g::'io::ul turc 110':'. i.) ,;, d('tE'~Y'mitled by majority voting in the 
':i'i.lis ho.rc.ly coir~cid('d \<i.1.th ':::hc sq:T(.nnt.i.ol1al icieal::; the \'Je!:O t Gerr'l8ny claimed. 
Fl'en:..~h p()r.i:~~or·, on. !i!E!jol':.!. ty voting hod [-l. preGcden'i~ 1:f:1.th cno of her p!: .. rtuct'& 
,llose 'E.ur.'on':;rm\ ct'<:'.lentJ r.l::; 1'Ie!'c GUr:'0!:W(ll,Y ' .prlS f-IVI~"' . 
The Sixa.J;rcccl au a COf,'f]1on "'o'!1Gai.; rlrice in th,~~ SfHtlE'i h~(;ti(;, presrJuroo. manr:cl' 
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it'). which they bHd rcaehed the nrcvio\ls ;l[;r€Oi!,c·ntE:. The ?,Tanshol t Cornmi ttee 
• , .. ,I"/ft' 
suggested its o\lm se~c of ,guidelinesM COffinuni ty \'Jheat price of 425 DM/ton 
'co begin on July 1, 196G, with 560 million 1'l8rks in compensation. 23 These 
I .. PI'"". tl?Ol\ ~f~"c.t "'''( ~e",. ~MI,er, Po"'" ,IIiO .. ,fI,e", ~ar,.r liltS 
propoEe.l~3 were 15 DIVton 10werAin compen13ation than the Uest German proposals. 
The bolO plans were reconciled in and all-night bargeining session taking 011 
December 14-15. The Six agreed to a price of 425 DM/ton but accepted the 
11.;est Germ::.m datI;' or Julyh ~ ~.967 :for implementation. 24 A provision was 
included allmdng trle common price to rise ,,,,i-l:;h the cost of' living~ A fairly 
small Sill';) in c91'Pcnsation was agreed upon, roughly haLf the amount included 
in the Hm1f;hl)lt prop()sol. but the COlilmurd. ty mcrabm."c were ,tllowed to supplement 
25 
th~$e subsidies at their min expense. Tbis rne~m-t that the Erhard governl ent, 
'i'aci.ng elections in tbe fall of 1965, could maintain itr3 base of support 
amon.g the lr"lie l:,ur:1ber of' Christian Democrat i'ar!TIers~ if' it chose to bear the 
addi t.ionnl <"Xi)f.!Hse. \'Ii th the wheut price settl0l1, tho other coreal pt'ices were 
n.a':'l;)cd upon fairly quid(ly. Th~ only maj or i::;:Jue tbH I: rema.ined was (Jstablishing; 
provisions ['01.' regulating the common fund. J\ppo.rently taking a lesson from 
the precc€:r1ing r'J.Sreemen ts 0 in whi c11 a aeries of' mar'etho!) s~ssions had proch.leed 
a. settloment, tho Six prowised to agree by ,July ~l, 1965 to re..1tc,.l.. 4.~ .::{.Jre~et'rfo,,-f(.,e 
regulation iSSU0. 
To sum up the a.griculture taIt-r.s so for, we can note that by the end of 
19f.4, the French h .... d £,otten most 0 f wbat they wantl1d. in crea:cing the agrl-
cu1 t;'aal common l:1l:.I.rket. Community preference wa., '1;;0 be established through 
the setting of' COW,lon prices hlghly favorable to French farmers. Levies fr.om 
the sub8tantial food imports tovlest Germany would subsidize French farmers, 
since the Ii'rl';l:.1ch would receive far mo:i .. "e than they would contribute from the 
cor.won fund. The French, by forcing her partners to import foodstuffs at 
a priCe higher tha.n the world price, could claim sa.tisfaction for what they 
considered they proportionally greater benefits thHr partners had received 
!~rom the COJ1ununit;ies already in rlace. Even DeGaulle would declare himself' 
pleased \'lith the results t n~)':;ing the possible political implications of' the 
agreement:s. CQUV~ de :lurville said in a speech to the French mi.nisters on the 
day after tb.e agreE!pent \lIas reached: 
G~neral DeGaul1e ~>:pressed in conclusion the wish -':hat 
the same s,tate of' rr-, nd, which had a110woo, the 8i l( :1tat()s 
to make thin key step in that ""hich concerns economic 
Eur?A\.to go much further on a political plan. 26 
w~lJl}). a I~o fl,rll&,+' r (Jrt:rf( 
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Source: E,.ari:J press,~ - 111ntran,~lgean~, December 17, 1964. 
The COflunission, of course, had its mm ideas about the political implications 
of the agricul tura:( agreement, specilically with regard to the common f\md. 
NO\'/ the.t ~conomic side of the issue had been decided on terms highly favorable 
" to the French, it was up to the : ·" .:".,;ll to provide corresponding concessions 
on increasing the eutho::"'ity of' the supl 'anational communities. The Com-
mission planned certain proposals to that effect which, combinod with the 
applic~,tion of majority votir. ,l in the Council of Ministers, would have con-
stituted the greatest advance in the f3upranationnlist cause Gince the EEC 
cams into existence in 1957.- In revealing their plans, the COJrunission hoped 
to beat DeGaulle a°'; his own same. C.ommission president \Ilaltel~ Hallatein opted 
to set theae prOposals before the deadline at a seSBion of the European 
ParliaMent of l,1arch 23, l~athcr than through trad.i tional diplomatic channels 
or even through the Council of rUrdsters raceting scheduled for April 8. To 
DeGaulle, this confirHed his suspicions that loIaJ.lstein imagined hirnsp-lf at 
the head of sone im~inar:{ super-state~ submitting his program to the legis-
lative bra"1ch of his government for approval. 
'The Commission's proposals included three major areas. 27 Part I Ln:02.v,;;,.i 
financing agri~ultural subsidies during the two year transitional period. 
The FEOGA would pay for two thirds of the subsidies during the first year, 
i'ive sixths during the second year, and the entire cost by July 1, 1967. 
Part II, dealing with EEC £inances from 196'fn~ contained the most daring 
proposals. In 1967 it was expected that levies on agricultural imports would 
not produce enough revenue to completely pay the costs of agricul t-ural 
~,. 
subsidies; the Commission proposed that industrial duties be paid directly 
"t o the EEC. t:hich \'Iould be resi, 'ondble for making up the deficit. In 
future years, when it was expected that industrial and aii~:i.cuitural levies 
\~ould far exceed the coato of the subs idies, the EEC could e1 ther use those 
l'cvenucs toward o 'thor pro.jects or return them to the States. Part III gave 
the: European Parliament the power to approve the EEC budget:. Also included 
\lias a proposal which said that only agricultural export8 included in Community 
trade aggreements 1t!ould be eligible for Community subsidies. This was a 
clear attn,ck at French plans to sell whea'c to the Soviet Union and to the 
People's Republic of" China. The effect of these proposals, particularly when 
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combined with the insti tution..:of majority voting in the Council of rUnisters 
is quite clear. The EEC would become the powerful supranational body its 
f'oWlders h.ad envisioned in the 1950's. It would posSess an income totaling 
-1 
billions of dollars, and would exercise exclusive control over agricultural 
and industria.l tariffs. Majority voting would place further restraints on 
the recalcitrant French. The !';<.: .. L:; .. c>n-state Vlould at last be dealt a severe 
blow. 
Somewhat sup~isingly, the French did not withdraw immediately, and 
in fact t~ed for three months to work out a compromise o The French in 
-'\ 
ract favored paying revenues from levies derectly into the FEOGA, but opposed 
allowing the EEC control over that fund. On June 14, Couve de Murville 
submitted counterproposals illustrating the French position. At the same 
time, the French sought support from the West Germans, who themselves had 
great reservations about the Commission proposals, since if industrial levies 
28 ';!ere included they would be paying for 39% of the EEC I S revenue. Couve 
de Murville's proposals delayed the paying of levies directly to the EEC 
until 1970; in the meantime the FEOGA \"ould continue to be funded by direct 
national contributions. This v:ould effectively deflate the Commission pro-
posal for expalldin~ the prerogative of the European Parliar'lent, since the 
Communi ty' s .revenue ' .... ould continue to be controlled by the States. The 
main issue then was getting the five to accept the continuance of na'l:;ional 
fl.mding until 1970. 01' course, this also meant delaying the broader supra-
national implications of the Hallstein proposals for B.t least five years. 
Durine the Council of Ministers meeting of June 30 attEJmpts to corne 
to an o.greemcnt brol;:e down completely and tho criois came to, a head. The 
Italian and the Dutch delegations resolutely refuEled to accept longer than 
a two year period until the Community was financed through agricultural and 
industria.l levies. . Carl Friedrich clr\irns to have learned from "unimpeachable 
sources" tha1; the actual brenk came when tho Erhard government suddenly reversed 
.i te position on an agreement previollsly woriced out with the French on indus-
trial tariffs. DeGaulle, feeling double crossed p ordered the negotiations 
terr:linated. 29 For whatever reason, such agreement as had previously existed 
'~et\'{een PElri:3 and Bonn broke dovm, and as Pattison de I\;enil \'Iri tee:: "in the 
context of a general atmosphere of pandemonium,,30, the session ended. The 
French began their policy of the "chaise vide" (empty chair), withdrawing 
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their peroanent representatives in Brussels shortly thereafter, and ceasing 
most of their participation in work groups.31 
The larger issue at stake was no less than the long awaited showdown 
bet\'leen the two visions of Europe. The split between r·'rance and her partners 
that had been evolving even since the ,..ejection of the Fouchet Plan no\'1 
evolved into a state of open wac:~:_L.'(.. The Commission, having granted France 
a very generous settlement in agriculture, nm; expected real concessions with 
regard to the authority of the supranational orianizutions. With a spirit 
more l"emini~cent of the 1900's than of our period, the Commission presented 
the Six 'iIi til an extremely ambitious set of proposals in a manner which 
seemed to deliberately provoke that t\'D~ntl0 !" enemy of supranationalism, 
General DeGaulle. The crisis, actually precipitated by the Commission pro-
posala, ~ros a test of whether DeGaulle could successfully defy all five of 
his partners on' the future of the Cor,lmuni ty, and if he were unsuccessful, 
,-.:hather DeGaulle would actually ~sstlme the internal and external risks of 
permanently leaving the Community. 
For their own part, the French considered t!1e settlement on agriculture 
a right merited by the unequal a c1van tag 9 given to industry rather than a 
privilege granted by the Commission and the five. and that concosEdons on 
supranational author! ty were neither 8;1propriatc nor porwible. The French 
placcd the blame for the crisis!sQU81'C':ly on the Commiaslon 0 who~Je unexpected 
esso.ult on the natlon-state jeopardized Franec'fl vital interests. DeGaulle 
said in his press conference of September 9, 1965: 
•.• the intervention of' this body the @ommissionJ which 
is essentially consultative and whose members htwe never, 
hl any countr:r e been elected :::'or that purpose, would only 
aggravate the usurpatory character of what was demanded. 
Be this as it may, the combination.....,:>remeditated or not--
of the supr&.natiional demands of theBruBsels Commission, 
of the support that several delegations declared themselves 
ready to give theme and finally. of the fact that some of 
our partners at the last moment \vent back on what they 
~lad previously accep~2d, forced us to bring the nego-
tiations to a close. 
To DeGa.Ulle. the c""'i5is represented the inevitable clash between the 
F;,upranationalists and the realists. France's partners had shown themmelvee 
unwilling to include agriculture, a vitul interest of France, in the Common 
~' • 
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Market wi,thout accompanying provisions which would have made French protec·tion 
o£ this vital interest impossible. As DeGaulle put it: 
F'rw'lce would be prepared to Sec her hand £orced in any 
economic matter--therefore social and o£ten even political--
and, inparticular what would have seemed gained in the 
agricultural assa coul~ be) despite her,placed at stake 
at any moment~ 
To DeGaulle, the majority votina clauses placedr..in the Rome Treaty, was an 
unworkable wa~ of solvina Community problems when one member's vital interests ~ ( 
were at stake. The Dutch had demonstrated this fact in a less dramatic way 
by their rejection of the Fouchet Plan. DeGaulle connrmed it by the present 
crisis 0 On major issues, the unanimity rule was a fact of l:l.fe. Couve de 
Murville \lIri tes: 
It is clear that nothing can be accomplished without the 
agreement of all the participants: the 5"C(C$5 of f'll ~kGlo ift",;7riif 1$ 'f 
daj.ly illustration of this; the failure up to the present 
time tg
4
create a political unionp.s, negati'!ely. further 
proof. 
The proposalB of the Commission to extond the autho:r.'i ty of the supranational 
npparatus and thi3 application of major-ity voting 1'0 the Council of Ministers 
l'epresented the anti thesis of DeGaulle' s ideas for an F:,uro.;pe des lit~. 
Hithout any devise for obtaining popular approval, the States were expected 
to cede autho.t'it--.r to the suprantional organizations. For her part, France, 
determined to have £inal. say i~\."the defense of her vi tal interesta, coul~ not 
participate in the work of the Communi1fies under these circumstances. ~Gaulle 
said in his September 9 press conference: 
This claim or supranational authority was held by a 
.~ 
technocracy, ~or the most prt £oreien, destined to in-
. "\ 
fringe upon France's democracy in settlina problems that 
dictate thever,y e~istence of our country. obviously, 
could not suit our purposes once we were determined to 
take our destiny into our own hands.35 
~'Jh.ether or not DeGaulle could have actually made good on hie thr.eat to 
~ 
leave the Community permanently is not clear. On the onAhand, France'u 
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-withdrawal from NATO seemed to demonstrate that DeGaulle would remove France 
from any orsanization that threatened her sovereignty, no matter how crucial 
that organization was to other French intereste. At the time, DeGaulle seemed 
mOre than willing to remove France from the su.pranational Europe, betting that 
his vision of Europe des E1ats would triumph in the end. To him, it seemed 
another example of' the leader's vision exceeding that of those around him, 
and of the leader making an unpopular decision at the time in h{es of eventual 
vindication. I1Practical terms however, DeGaulle still held One valuable card: 
the EEC without France ~ould inevitablj become only a shell. despite loose 
talflf(, at the. time abo'ut inviting Britain to fill in the empty chair. The EEC 
seemed to need Fra.~ce more than France needed the EEC J and seemed likely to 
compromis{t if Franco rf:mained obstinate. 
-'-".~ ,,-'. 
On the other hand, DeGaulle found himself paying a heavy political price 
for his polley of th <:ll&ise..:.vi~, both at home and abroad. For the five, 
:l.mpressions ()f' DeGaulle a.s an obstinnto old fool who would J"ingle-handedly 
stop the building of Europe seemed to be confirmed. More easily than ever 
before, Df-~Gaulle could be portr~yed 0(, opposi~ Europe :i.n favor of old-fashioned 
nationalism. Vilification of DeGaullc in the luropean press reached new 
heights. l{m1ever) the most severet10litical costs to DeGaulle were incurred at 
llome. As the crisis continued into the fall, it became more of a factor in 
the president ial election slated for DeCember. DeGnulle'r; empty chair policy 
was extr(-lTllely unpopular even wi thin France. 36 No doubt believing that DeGa1.tlle 
would indeed carry through his threat to leave the community permanently, 
and fearlng "1;;he loss of enormous economic benefits at what seemed a fairly 
small pol:t tical cost, public opposition to DeGaulle mounted. Even the f~rmers 
would turn against DeGaulle, in a stinging statement insued in October by the 
Federation Hationale des Syndicats d'F.~ploitants Agricoles: 
What is at stake in the present cr1S1S is not only the future 
of economic Europe J but of 1)01i tical Europe as well. The 
realization of the Common Narket calls for the ti I Hmate 
realization of a politically united Europe, which remains the 
hope of the Euopeul1 peoples. France has fixed her signature 
to the Treaty of Home; she cannot remove it. Certainly, 
she has the right to discuss the modalities of a European 
construction that must be realized in a community spirit, 
but for this dtscuasion, France must bring no assumptions 
contra,..y to the Treaty of Rome. The farmers demand this 
\"/i th insistence. 37 
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Public dissatisfaction'with the empty chair policy reached its climax. in the 
:presldential election that December. Perhaps deliberately delaying a solution 
to the cri.sis so as not to appear ... /cakened in the storm of internal and ex-
ternal crt tlcisnl, DeGaulle reruso4to :'11:»ow the French to l'legotiate until after 
the election. The candidate of the leftist coalition, Francois Mitterand, in 
) 




a mere 55% 
campaign, and reaped the benefits of French support for the Com-
Mit'trand forced DeGaulle into a run-off, which the latter won with 
., 39 
of the vote. Across the reline, Ludwigh Erhard benefi~od by the 
general dissatis:factinn with DeGaulle, and Bubstsntlally improved his party I s 
standing in the Bundestag elections that :fall. DeGaulle's opponents seemed 
to be on the f"'S~ everywhere, confining the French president to a ferociously 
defended, but ultiniately untenable isolation amonB mnjor Europeans. 
Still, i'li th the election behing him, DeGaulle decided that the time was 
ripe for a solution of the cris.Ls, if one could be workerl out with terms 
fovorable to the French. Couve de r.iurville p.greed to attend a foreign ministers 
r.leetins if' the Six agreed to hold the meeting in Luxembourg rather than in 
that den of supranational iniquity. Brussels. Over the next 'f:e .... " w6eks an 
agreement \,as reached on the issue of majority voting. Thp. a.greement achieved 
a type of' circumspect logic rivaled only by that of the Bonn Declaration on 
poli tical unity ba.ck in 1961. The ~;hre~ maj or provisions of the agreement 
bear quoting in full: 
~'Jhen issues very important to one or more member 
countries are at stake, the members of the Coimcil will 
try, within a reasonable time, to reach solutions which 
can be adopted by all the members of the Council, while 
respecting their mutual intereets r fmd those of the 
Cor.ununity, in accordance with Article 2 of the Treaty. 
The French delegation considers that, when very 
important interests nre ::It ntake, the discussion must 
be continued until unanimous agreement is reached. 
The six delegF,+.ions note 'chat there is a divergence 
of views on what slould be done in the event of a 
:failure to reach ;omplete RJitreement. 40 
Thus, the Si~ consented to what was essentially an agreement to disagree for 
the sake of mutual face saving. The Council of Ministers promised as much 
as possible to attempt to arrive at a unanimous deciSion, without stating 
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even vaguely what should be done i:f: this proved impossible. The Rome Treaty 
provisions for majority voting were changed de facto though not officially. 
I.iost importantly. the French agreed to resume participation in the European 
Communiti~. thus opening the way f'or a solution on administration of the 
Common Fund and the role of the Commission. 
This agreement was reachea IJj i.lay 11, 19Cf'i. The FEOGA was to take over 
agricultural subsidies starting July 1, 1967. lIalf of the funds would come 
from direct national contributions and half would come fror:\ levies on ag-
ricultura.l J..i\ports outsiCle the Six. 41 The European parlinment was iiven no 
specific power over the f·EOGA budget. liloreovcr. the CommisGion wne defined more 
clearly as subordinate to the Council of Ministers. Though the Commission 
retained the right to initiate various proposals for improving the Communities, 
the Council ~f- " iiInisters asserted its right to oversee the CommiSsion's 
work.42 Thus, the authority of the supranational bodies Was officially 
decla'i.-cd secondary to that of the Council of Ministers. 
Ostensibly, DeGaulle could claim victory. The supranational assaUlt 
on France had been effectively repelled. The state3 would retain cOfltrol 
over half of the FEOGA funds, and f'unds from industrial levies would hot be 
turned over to the EEC. The Commission's authority was not extended, the 
Q 
European Parlie.ment remained consul ta-cive body with no real authority. 
A _ 
DeiJaulle had gotten an agricultural common market without significant political 
concessions. Vlhen threatened with the prospect of French departure, the five 
conceded to French de!r~ds with regaru to the supranational organizations~ 
In his press conference of Fegruary 21, DeGaulle proclaimed his Victory, adding 
that only the principles be~~the Fouchet Plan stoQd a chance of success 
in achieving political union: 
Obviously, the issue for the Six is not to brandish 
asaii.'l absolute theories as to what should idealjy be 
the fUture European ~Jifice; not to impose a figid frame-
work conceived a Rriori for realities as complex and 
changina as those of the life of our continent and of 
its relations with the outside; not to assume the problem 
of the construction of Europe solved before even having 
begun to live together, politically speaking; in short 
not become lost again in the myths and abstractions that 
have always prevented the Six from undertaking in common 
anything other tha.nlpainful adjustment of their economic 
production and trade. NO!J What is imperative, on· the con-
trary, is that they work for the purpose of cooperation. 43 
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Still, DeGaulle had ,\Ton a pY~i'7 victory. lA'hi1e he had maintained the 
pol! tical status guo plus "ilining the inclusion of agriculture in the Common 
l'jarket, DeGaul1e ensured the isolation of France among the Six. , The 
si tuation 'ilould remain more or less frozen until DeGaulle left office in 1969. 
The Franco-German Treaty was reducec1 to total insigni Hcance. . Wi thin France. 
De,Gaulle' s stand during the crisis causee him to bes\::!cn Iilore as an old man 
rCtfef'o",' til> 
\'.'ho had overstayed his welcome. :forshudowing~ his 1!and1ing of the riots of 
1968. France's partners concluded that any more s~eps toward the kind of 
Europe they envisionud would have to vl~i t until DcGaulle left office. The 
French opposition to l.he second BX'itish applica.tion to enter the EEC in 1968 
seemed to verif'y this conclusion. In short, some form of Europe des·Etats 
had bean created by de:fault in that no major Community decision could be 
made lIrithout the approval of the States; yet such an atmosphere of animosity 
and dictrust had been created that the current European construction was 
hardly the ~'pe of confederation that DeGaulle had enviGionc(~ in 1961. 
," 
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Conclusion 
By the end of our 'period, the two visions of Europe had arrived at a 
stalemate. Deqaulle's attempt to create an Europe.d$s Etats with the Fouchet 
Plan f'ailed because France's parbers were unwilling to unite around an al-
liance, of states~~n~ich France would predominate, and which under French leader-
ship would \-/ork to\Jard greater independence from America. The failure of the 
Franco-Germ.a.n treaty demonstrated even more clearly that France's partners 
prefel[ed to clina to the American alliance rather than risk participating 
" :tn DeGaullels bold attempt to break out of the settlement imposed upon 
Europe by 'the superpowers at the end ot' \~orld War II. still, if DeGaulle could 
not impose his vision of Europe on his partners, they could not impose theirs 
em him. :a~{ successfully rebuffing ~~o of Dri tain' s attempts to enter the 
E:EC, and by tor-pedoing the Commission proposals on the common a"ricul tural 
fund in 196~, DeGau1le made sure that no more assaults on the nation-state 
"Jou1 d take place while he W0.8 in office. B\..\t DeGaulle had paid a heavy 
price in resisting his opponents. Ilis obstinate and often impolite way of 
conducting diplomacy had played a heavy role in defeatiro..g the Fouchet and 
Franco-German initiatives. and by the end of our period would result in the 
=.solntion of France tlHong the Six. To an extent ~ the Europoan Union built 
by the end of our period was a form of 1 in F. Roy \I1i11is' f.3 words "organized 
dh)a8reeme~1.t.1I1 DeGaulle would seek to break out of the Europe unilaterally. 
through his Beries of overtures to the Eastern bloc powers in the second half 
of' the 19GO'fl. France's partners become content to preserve the status quo -
'~ith regard to European unification. and simply wait for DeGaulle to leave 
office or dit1 before starting any new initiatives. 
DeGaulle took the initiative in the East hoping that V/estern Europe would 
eventually take his example in choosing detente over American pipe dreams 
:for ending the Cold \'Jar through a show of strength to the Soviet bloc. However, 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact in 1968 demonstrated that 
the Soviets were no more willing to let go of the Cold VIaI' than the Americana. 
Wi th his attemPt to reali~~e his vision of Europe frustrated in both the East 
and the \'lest, DeGaulle left office in 1969 embittered and pessimistic about 
1\lil1is, France: Germal1.,Y" and the New Euro£e, p. 278. 
Europe's prospects. He told Malraux in 1969: 
We are certainly witnessing the end of Europe. • •• You 
know as well as I do that Europe will be a compact among 
the states or nothing. Therefore nothing. We are the 
last Europeans in Euro;?3 :~,hich was Christianity. A 
tattered Europe. but it did exist. The Europe whose 
nations hated one another had more rea.lity than the Eur9pe 
of today. It is no longer a matter of wondering whether 
France will make Europe, it is a matter' of understanding; 
that sh~ is threa'l;ened with death through the death of 
Europe. 
"fr~'c."" 'today, ten years after DeGaulle1s death, the influence of his ideas 
remains strong. The agricultural common market he pressed for so strongly -._' .. _ ...... 
remains in place, though overabundant supplies '. depleted subsidy :funds, and 
l.~rs. Thatcher's Government may soon change this. In terms~ of international 
poli tics t Europe is more independent of the United states 'corJay than at any 
tiue since t.he Second Uorld \'Jar. DeGnulle would no doubt take a degree of 
satisfaction in Washington's decreasing ability to dicta.te the foreign policy 
0;' Vestern Eurort~. Htl would probnbly also be plnased at the recent stand 
taken by tj'le BEC Council of r.Iini!!lt:en; on tbe crisis in Iran, in which a con-
sensus was ironE-~d out through consul tntj.ons between rqpresEmtntives of the 
States. Considerina these factorB. :I t l,lay be tho.t the vindlcation of 
D~Gaulle I s vision of an Europe des F.tnt;? is beginning to tnke place. ~.r O~'<f.,tle ~04;/J 'S~!J 
~~~ I 
how;z,.,er, ~e."wait for history to render the final verdict. 
!. -
2f;ialraux. Felled Oaks, p . 123-124. 
~ . • 
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Appendix 1: Excerpts from the 
, . '* Bonn Declaration, 1ssued July 18, 1961. 
The Heads of State of Government of Belgium, FranC$ the Federal 
Rebublic of Germany t Italy, LU:{:::idbourg and the Prime Minister and the 
Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, desirous of affirming the spiritual 
values and political traditions which form their common heritage; united 
in an awareness of the great tasks that Europe is ca'l1ed upon to fulfil 
\1ithin the Community of f~ee peoples in order to safeguard freedom and 
peace in the world; anxious to strengthen the political, economic, social, 
end cultural ties that exist between their peoples, especially in the 
framework of the European Communities, and to advance towards the union 
of !urope; 
convinced that only a united Europe, allied to the United States of 
Aloerica and -to"'other free peoples, is in a position to face the dangers 
that menace the existence of Europe and of the whole free world. and tha'l; 
1'(; is important to pool the energies, capabili ties l and resources of all 
for whom libcu·ty is an inalienable possession; resolved to develop their' 
political co-operation with a view to the union of Europe and to continue 
at the same time the work already undertaken in the European Communities; 
desiring the adhesion to the European Communities of other European 
states ready to assume in all spheres the same re~ponsibilities and the 
seme obligations, have decided: 
1) To give shape to the will for political union alrea~y implicit in the 
Treaties, establishing the European Communities, and for this purpose to 
organize their co-operation, to provide for its development ar.d to secure 
for it the regularity which will progressively create the conditions 
for a common policy and will ultimately make it possible to embody in 
institutions the work undertaken; 
2) To hold, at regular intervals, meetings whose aim will be to compare 
their views , to concert their policies and to reach common positions in 
order to further the political union of Europe, thereby strengthening th~ 
Atlantic Allianc$. The necessary practical measures will be taken to prepare 
these meetings. In addition, the continuation of active co-operation among 
the Foreign Ministers will contribute to the continuity of the action 
undertaken in comlllon. The co-operation of the Six must go beyond the 
political field as such, and will in particular be extended to the sphere 
of education, of culture, and of resee,rch, where it will be enGured by 
periodical meetings of the Ministers concerned; 
3) To instruct their Committee to submit to them proposals on the means 
by which a statutory form can be given as soon as possible to the union 
of their peoples. 
*Source: Silj. Europe's Po~tical Puzzle, p. 133-134. 
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The Heads of State or Government are convinced that by thus organizing 
their co-operation, they will further the application of the Treaties of 
Paris and Rome. They also believe that their co-operation will facilitate 
any reforms that might appear opportune in the interests of the Communities' 
greater efficiency. 
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Appendix 2: Excerpts from the 
* first draft of the Fouchet Plan. submitted November 2, 1961. 
Title I - Union of the European peoples 
Article 1 
By the present Treaty, a union of States, hereafter called Itthe Union," 
is established. 
The Union is based on respect for the individuality of the peoples 
and of the Member States and for equality of rights and obligations. It 
is indissoluble. 
Article 2 
It shall be the aim of the Union: 
to bring about the adoptiol'l of a common foreign policy in matters ths>t 
are of corrmon interest to Member States; 
-- to ensure, through close co-operation between Member States in the 
scientific and cultural field, the continued development of their common 
heritage and the protection of the values on which their civilization rests; 
- to contribute thus in the Member Sta.tes to the defence of human rights, 
the fundamental freedoms and democracy; 
- to strengthon, in co-operation with the other fr.ee nations, the security 
of Member States against any aggression by adopting a common. defence policy. 
Article 3 
The Union shall have legal personality. 
Th4-J Union ahall enjoy in each of the member States the most extensive 
legal capacity accorded to legal persons under their domestic law. It 
may .. _ in particular, acquire or dispose of movable or immovable property 
and may go to law. 
Title II - Institutions of the Union 
Article 4 
The Institutions of the Union shall be as follows: 




- the European Parliament; 
the European Political Commission. 
Article 5 
The Council shall meet every four months at Head of State or Gavern-
ment level, and at least once in the intervening period at Foreign Minister 
level. It may, moreover, at any time hold extraordinary sessions at either 
level at the ~request of one or more Member States. 
At each of these meetings at Head of State or Government level, the 
Council shall appoint a President who shall take up his duties two months 
before the subsequent meeting and continue to exerc·t se them for-two months 
after the meeting. 
Meetings of the Council held at Foreign Minister level shall be 
p~ided over by the Foreign Minister of the State whose representative 
presides over meetings at Head of State or Government level. 
The President in office shall preside over extraordinary meetings 
that may be held during his term of office. 
The Council shall choose the place for its meetings. 
Article 6 
The Council shall deliberate on all questions whose inclusion on its 
agenda is requested by one or more Member States. It shall adopt decisions 
necessary for achieving the aims of the Union unanimously. The absence or 
abstention of one or of two members shall not prevent a decision from 
being taken. 
The decisions of the Council shall be binding on Hember States that have 
participated in their adoption. Member States on which a decision is not 
binding, by reason of their absence or abstention, may endorse it at any 
time. From the moment they endorse it, the decision will be binding on them. 
Article 7 
The European Parliament provided for under Article 1 of the Conven-
tion relating to certain instituti0ru¥common to the European Communities 
signed in Rome on 25 March 1957, shall deliberate on matters concerning 
the aims of the Union. 
It may address oral or written questions to the Council. 




The Council, on receipt of a recommendation addressed to it by the 
European Parliament, shall give its reply to the Parliament within a 
period of four months. 
The Council, on receipt of a recommendation addressed to it by the 
European Parliament, shall inform the Parliament of the action it has 
taken thereon within a period of six months. 
The Council shall each year submit to the European Parliament a report 
on its activities. 
Article 9 
Ths European Political Commission shall consist of senior officials 
of the ForeignrAffairs departments of each Member State. Its seat shall 
be 1n Paris. It shall be presided over by the representative of the Member 
State that presides over the Council, and for. the same period. 
ThE~ European Political Commission shall set up such working bodies 
as it considers necessary. 
ThE!' European PoU tical Commission shall have at ito disposal the 
staff and departments it requires to carry out its duties. 
Article 10 
The European Political Commission shall assist the Council. It shall 
prepare its deliberations and carry out its decisions. It shall perform 
the duties that the Council decides to entrust to it. 
Xitle V - General provisions 
Article 15 
The present Treaty may be reviewed. Draft amendments shall be sub-
mitted to the Council by Member States. The Council shall pronounce on such 
drafts and decide whether or not they should be passed on for an opinion 
to the European Parliament. 
Draft amendments adopted unanimously by the Council shall be submitted 
for ratification by the Member States, after the European Parliament, 
where appropriate, hus expressed its opinion. They shall come into force once 
all the Member States have ratified them. 
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Article 16 
Three years after this Treaty comes into force, it shall be subjected 
to a general review with a View to considering suitable measures for 
strengthening the Union in the light of the proaress already made. 
The main objects of such a review shall be the introduction of a 
unified foreign policy and the gradual establishment of an organization 
centrali.zina, wi thin the Union, the European Communi ties referred to in 
the Preamble to the Present Treaty. 
The amendments arising from this review shall be adopted in accordance 
wi th the procedure outlined in Article 15 above. 
Article 17 
The Union shal.l be open for membership to Member States of the Council 
of Europe t~at accept the aims set out in Article 2 above and that have 
previously acceded to the European Communities referred to in the Preamble 
to this Treaty. 
The aomission of a new r.tembar Stat~ shall be decided unanimously by 
the Council after an addi tional Act has been 6.ra~m up to this Treaty. 
This Act shall contain the necessary adjustments to the Treaty. It shall 
come int..o force once the State concerned has submitted its instrument of 
ratification. 
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Appendix 3: Excerpts from the 
draft adopted by the Fouchet 
Committee on March 15, 1962.* 
The left-hand column represents the text proposed by the French 
delegation; the right-hand column rep~esents the text proposed by the 
other delegations. The articles for which only one text is geven were 
agreed upon by all delegations. 
TITLE 1 
UntDn the European peoples 
Article 1 
By "the present Treaty, a union of States and of European peoples. 
hereafter called "the European Union i " is established 
Article 2 
It shall be the aim of the Union 
to reconcile, co-ordinate and unify 
the policy of f.1ember States in spheres 
of common interest: foreign policy, 
economics, cultural affairs and 
defence. 
Article 2 
1. It shall be the task of the 
European Union to promote the unity 
of Europe by reconciling, co-ordi-
nating and unifying the policy of 
Member States. . 
2 . For the purpose of accomplishing 
this task, the objectives of the 
Union shall be: 
--the adoption of a common foreign 
policy 
--the adoption of a common defence 
policy within the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance 
as a contribution towards 
strengthening the Atlantic 
Alliance ; 
--close co-operation in the edu-
cational, scientific and cultural 
fields; 
--the harmonization and unifi-
cation of the laws of Member 
States; 
--the settlement, ina spirit of 
mutual understanding and construc-
tive co-operation, of any dif-
ferences that may arise in rela-
tions between Member States. 
Draft Treaty for the 
establishment of a union 
of States 
PREAMBLE 
The High Contracting Parties, 
resolved to pursue the task of re-
conciling 'choir essential interests 
already initiated, in their re~pec­
tive fields~ by the European Coal 
and Steel Community, the European 
Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community; 
3. Objectives other than those 
laid down in the precedinR para-
graph may be defined by the Coun-
cil after consultation with the 
European Parliament. 
4. This Treaty shall not dero-
gate from the competence of the 
European Communities. 
Draft Treaty for the estab-
lishment of a union of States 
and of Europpean peoples 
PREAJmLE 
resol ved to pursue the taslt; of 
reconciling their essential inter-
ests, already the objective, in 
their respective fields ! of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, 
the European Economic Community and 
the European Atomic Energy Community, 
in order to lay the foundation for a 
destiny to be irrevocably shared; 
desirous of welcoming ready to welcome to their ranks other countries 
of Europe that are prepared to accept in every sphere the same responsibil-
i ties and the sali1S obligations and conscious of thus forming the nucleus of 
a union, membership of which will be open to other peoples ~f Europe that are 
as yet unable to t~<e such a decision ; 
resolved, to this end, to give statutory form to the union of their peoples, 
in accordance with the declaration of 18 July 1961 .by the Heads of State or 
Government; 
who, having exchanged their Full Powers, found in good and due form, have 
agreed as follows: 
TITLE II 
Institutions of the Union 
Article 5 
'.rhe Institutions of the Union shall 
be as follows: 
TITLE II 
Institutions of the Union 
Acticle 5 
1. The Institutions of the European 
Union shall be as follows: 
- the Counci 1 ; 
--the Committees of Ministers; 
--the Political Commission; 
--the European Parliament. 
Article 6 
'rhe Council shall consist of " the 
Heads of State or Gevernment of 
Member States. _I1:~ shall meet in 
pl'inciple evel"Y four months and 
not less than three times a year. 
Article 7 
The Council shall deliberate on 
questions whose inclusion on its 
agenda is requested by on or more 
Member States. The agenda shall 
be drawn up by the President. The 
Council shall adopt decisions neces-
sary for achieving the aims of the 
,. 
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--the Council and the Committees 
of Ministers; 
--the European Parliament; 
--the Court of Justice$ 
2. The Council and the Committees 
of Ministers shall be assisted by a 
Political Commission and a S~cretary­
General. 
Article 6 
1. The Council shall consist of 
the representatives of the Member 
States. Member States shall be 
represented on the Council, in 
accordance with the constitutional 
requirements and the usage pre-
vailing in each country, by the 
Heads of State or Government and, 
where appropriate, by the Foreign 
Ministers. 
2. Tht. Council shall meet in I 
ordinary session three times a 
year and in principle every four 
months. 
Extraordinary sessions of the 
Council may be convened at any 
time by its President on his 
own initiative or at the request 
of one or more il1.ember States of 
the European Union. 
3. The office of the President 
shall be exercised 1n rotation by 
each member of the Council for a 
term of six months one year • 
4. The Council shall lay down 
its own rules or procedure. 
Article 7 
1. The Council shall deliberate 
on all ~uestions whose inclusion 
on the agenda is requested by one 
or more Member States or by the 
Secretary-General under the terms 
of Article 2. The agenda shall be 
drawn up by the President. 
- Union unanimously. The Council's 
decisions shall be binding on Member 
States. The abstention of one or of 
two members shall not prevent a 
decision from being taken. 
The decisions of the Council shall 
be implemented by Member States that 
have participated in their adoption. 
Member States that are not bound by 
a decision, by reason of their ab-
sence or abstention, may endorse it, 
at .any timo ... _F'rom the moment they 
endorse it, the decision shall be 
binding on them. 
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The meetings of the Council shall 
be prepared by the Committee of 
Foreign Ministers. Decisions neces-
sary for achieveng the aims of the 
European Union shall be passed by 
the Council unanimously. 
2. The decisions of the Council 
shall be carried out in accordance 
with the constitutional requirements 
in force in each Member State e The 
Council may. by a unanimous deciaion t 
vmive the principle o~ unanimity in 
specific cases. The ab::Jtention of 
one or of two members shall not 
prevent decisions requiring una-
nimity from beiug taken. 
3. If a decision that requirez: 
unanimity cannot be adopted becnuse 
it is opposed by one Member State, 
the Council shall adjourn th~ 
deliberation to a later date to 
be specifj.ed by it. Before this 
second deliberation takes place. 
the Council may decide to obtain 
the opinion of the European 
Parliament. 
Article 8 
1. The Council may conclude agre~­
ments on behalf of the European 
Union with Member States, third 
countries of international 
organizations. It shall lay 
do~ the methods to be followed 
in its rulos of procedure. 
2. The agreements shall be sub-
mi tted to the Parliament for an 
opinion. They shall not come into 
force until they have! been ap·~ 
proved in all Member States by the 
bodies that, under the respective 
constitutional reqUirements, must 
where appropriate, approve such 
agreements concluded by these 
States. 
Article 9 
The Political Co~~ission shall 
consist of representatives ap-
pointed by each Member State. It 
shall prepare the deliberations of 
the Council and ensure that its 
do(::isions are curled out. It 
shall perform such other duties 
as -i:he Council decides to entrust 
to it. It shall ~~vo at ita dis-
posal the necessary staff and de-
partments. 
. "
..... -- --.- -- .-._.-. --
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3. Ar,roomcnts concluded in ac-
cordance with the preceding pro-
visions shall be binding on the 
institutions of the European 
Union and on Member States. 
Article 10 
The Political Commission shall 
consist of senior officials ap-
pointed by each State. This 
Commission shall prepare the 
deliberations of the Council and 
of the Committees of Ministe~B 
and perform the duties which the 
Council decides to entrust to it. 
Article 11 
1. The Council shall appoint for 
a period of ••••• a Sccretary-
General who shall be independent 
of the Governments of the Member 
states of the European Union. 
His term of office ohallbe re-
newable. 
2. He shall be assisted in the 
performance of his duties by a 
staff appointed by him in ac-
cordance with a procedure to be 
laid down, on his proposal, by 
the Council. 
3. The functions of the Secretary-
General and of members of the 'SecI'e-
toriat shall be deemed to be incom-
patible with the exercise of any' 
other office. 
4. In the performance of their 
duties, the Secretary-General and 
the members of the Secretariat shall 
neither solicit nor accept instl"uc-
tions from any government. They 
shall abstain from any act that is 
incompatible with the nature of 
their functions • 
---
TITLE IV 
Finances of the European Union 
Article 12 
3. The draft budget .. drawn up by 
the Political Commission, shall 
be adopted by the Council which may, 
where appropriate, make such amend-
ments as it considers necessary. 
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5. The Member States undertake 
to respect the i~depcndence of tho 
Secretary-General and of his staff 
and to refrain from influencing 
them in the accomplishment of 
their task. 
Article 14 
1. The Court of ~ustice of the 
European Communities shall be com-
petent to decide on any dispute 
between Member States connected 
with the interpretation or ap-
plication of this Treaty. 
t:lember States undertake not to 
su~ject such disputes to any other 
form of settlement. 
2. The Court of Justice of the 
European Communities shall be 
conlpetent: 
a) to decide on any dispute 
bet\'/cen Member States where 
the said dispute is SUbmitted 
to the COUl~t under a special 
agreement between them; 
b) to a;ve a decision pursuant 
to any arbitration clause con-
tained in a contract, whether 
governod by public law or pri-
vate law, concluded by or on 
behalf of the European Union. 
TITLE IV 
Finances of the European Union 
Article 15 
3. The draft budget, drawn up by 
the Secretary-General with the 
assistance of the Political Com-
mission, shall be adopted by the 
Council, after obtaining the Par-
liament's opinion. 
Article 14 
The budget shall be implemented by 
the Political Commission. 
A:C"l=icle 15 
This Treaty may be reviewed. 
Dr.:..ft amendments shall be submit-
'ted to the Council by the Govern-
ments of the Member States. 
Draft amendments adopted unani-
mously by the Council shall be sub-
mitted for ratification to the Member 
States, after the European Parliament, 
where appropriate, hns expressed its 
opinion. They shall come into force 
once all the ~lember States have 
ratified them. 
Ar-cicle 16 
Three years after this Treaty 
comes into :forcc, it shall be 
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zubjected to e review in order to con-
sider suitable measures either tor 
strengthening the Union in general in 
the light of progress already made or, 
in particular, for simplifying, rntion-
alizing and co-o.rdinating the ways in 
which Member States co-operate. 
Article 17 
The budget shall be implementc 




1. This Treaty may be reviewed, 
without prejudice to the general 
review referred to in Article 20. 
2. Draf't amendments shall be 
submitted to the Council either b~ i 
the Member States or by the Pax'-
liament. If the Council, after hav-
ing consulted the Parlirunent where 
a draft is proposed by one of the 
Member States, unanimously adopts 
such a draft amendment, this shall 
be submitted to Member States for 
ratification. 
Such draft amendment shall come 
into force when all the Member States 
have ratified it in accordance with 
their respective constitutional 
requirements. 
Article 20 
1. At the time fixed for the tran~ 
sition from the second to the third 
stage laid down l,n the Treaty estab-
lishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, the present Treaty shall be 
subjected to a general review. 
This shall aim at determining suit-
able mensures for strengthening the 
European Union and the powers of its 
institutions in the light of the 
progress already made. 
Vii th this end in view, a draft 
constitution of the European Union 
shnll be drawn up by the Council 
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Article 17 
___  .._. before expiry of the time-limit 
specified above, and submitted to 
the European Parliament to its 
opinion. 
2~ The general review shall in 
particular have the following ob-
jectives: 
a) To associate the European Par-
liament more closely with the 
work of defining the common 
policy and carrying out the 
provisions of Article 138 of the 
Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community relating to 
the election of the Parliament 
by direct universal suffrage; 
b) To gradually introduce the 
majority principle in deci-
sions of the Council of the 
Union. 
3. At the time of the general 
review, the conditions shall be 
fixed under which, at the end of the 
transition period of the Common 
Market, tho European Union and the 
European Communities will be incor-
porat~ed in an organic institu- .~ 
tional framework, without preju-
dice to the machinery provided for in 
the Treaties of Paris and Rome. To 
facilitate this process, reforms 
shall be undertaken, in accordance 
w:i.th the procedures laid down in ths 
Treaties of Paris and Rome and be-
fore the general review is carried 
out, VIi th a vl.ew to oimplit:ying and 
rationalizing the machinery pro-
vided for in those Treaties. 
4. The competence of the Court of 
Justice shall be extended in the 
light of reforms introduced by the 
general review. 
Article 21 
The Union sha.ll be open for membership to States that have 
acceded to the European Communities referred to in the Preamble 
to this Treaty. 
The admission of a new State shall 
be decided unanimously by the Coun-
cil after an additional Act to this 
Treaty has been drawn up. 
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Accession shall come into effect 
once the State concerned has sub-




The Co:nmon Declaration o.nd the Treaty bet\,lcen the French Republic and 
* the Federal Republic of Gerr.:<"ny, i:atod ;:~2 Jo.nuary, 1963 
CO; ~i!mr DECLARATION 
General Charles de Gaulle, President of the French Republic, and Dr. 
:Conrad AdollaUOl". Chancellor of the Federal Hcpublic of Germany. 
At the close of the conference vhich was held in Paris on January 21 
and 22, 19133 and \'!hich \'Ias attended, on the French side, by the Premier, 
the l<'1inicter of Foreign Affcdrs, the raniotcr of the Armed Forces, and the 
l.!inister of National Education and, on the German side, by the Minister of 
Foreign. Affairs, the ranister of DoFense, and the rUnister of Family and 
Youth Affairs. -
Convinced that the reconciliation of the German people and the French 
people to bringinrt an end to the age-old rivalries t COf1f:1ti tutcs a historic 
event which prof0Ul1dly transform:::; the relations of the tV!O peoples, 
Conscious of the solideri ty which unites the bro peoples both with 
respect to their sec uri t;,' end "Ii til recpect to their economic and cultural 
(~cve lop men t, 
Observing particularly that young people have become aware of this 
solidarity and find thcmselvcs callcd upon to pl&y the determinant role 
in the consolidation of Franco-German fri.endshipj 
Recognizing that a strengthening of cooperation bebloen the two coun-
tries constitutes a vit,al st..-.~c along thc road to a unitcd Europe, ';/hich 
is the goal of the t\'lO peoples, 
Have agreed to the organization and to tIle pdncip1cs of the cooperation 
bet\1een the two Stntca ('.n they ;:-\rc s ':;nte,} in thc TrcDJ;y td v.ned this day. 
TIlE TREATY 
Follo\':ir:.g the Cor.1r.10n Declo.ration of the President of th,~ French HeIJublic 
<,.nr1 the ChQncellor of the Federal nepublic of Germany, dated January 22, 
19(;3, or; the organiz~tion and the principles of the coope.cntion bet'wecn 
the t~:o States, the fol10\>line provisions have bean aereed upon: 
I Organization 
1. The ilcads of State end of Government \'/il1 give "/henover required the 
necessary direct! vos and "Jill follot: rC3ularly the impl<HnentGti.on of' the 
prograr.l net hcreinunder. They vlill meet for this purpose vrhenever this is 
nccesnary :.md, in Ylrinciplo, at lca~;t; tWl.CC n yeur. 
2. The :,;inisters of Foreisn Affairs will see to the implementation of' 
the prograr.l a.s a \':h01e. Thcy \lill r,wet at least once every three months. 
\~i thout prejudice to the contacts norr"ally cG l:nblishcd through the channels 
of the embassies~ high officialc of the t;'IO l!inistrien of Foreign Affairs, 
responsible rcppcctivcly for political, economic nnel cultural affairs, will 
meet euch l:tonth in Paris and Donn al ternntcly to survey current problems 
nnd to prepare the Hinisters' meeting. In addition, the diplomatic"' mi3sions 
and the consulatcs of the two countries, and o.lso the perr.1anent miscions 
to the interno.tionnl organizations, will mai<e all the nCceSBo,r'y contact 
on problems of COr.~on interest. 
II- Source: AmlJassade de france, Service de Prm.iSC et c1 'Information, New York, 
19:-.3 Of translation nppcnring in Pnt t ison de 1';oni1, \'1110 0.l2caks For Europe?, 
p. 213-2:17, 
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3. Rer;ular meetings will tal<:e place between the responsible authorities 
of the tVJO countries in the fields of defense. education and youth. These 
meetings will not in nl\y VHly ufrec'\; tho functioning of the already existing 
bodies - Franco-Gerraan Cultural Commission, Permanent General Staff Group -
whose acti vi ties v/ill on the contrary be extended. Both the Uinisters of 
Foreign Affairs will be represented at these meetings in order to ensure the 
overall coordination of the cooperation. 
(a) The Ministers of the Armed Forces or of Defense will meet at least 
once every three months. Similarly. the French Minister of National 
Education will meet. at the sarac intervals, \·Ii th the person who will be 
designated by Germany to fol10\'! up the Pl"ogram of cooperation on the cul-
tural level.. 
(b) The Chiefs of Staff of the bro countries will meet at least once every 
two monthG; in the event of their being unable to meet~ they will be re-
placed by their responsible_ representatives 0 
(c) The F'rench High Commissioner for Youth and Sports vl111 meet, at 
least once every two months, with the Federal Minister for Family and Youth 
Affairs of his . .representative. 
4. In each of the countries I an interministcria1 co01r:1i6sion will be, 
charged \.,ith :follo\-ting problens of cooperation. It will be presided over 
by a high Foreign l'-linistry official nnd it will include representatives of 
all the adr.linis·trations concerned. Its role \.,i11 be to coordinate the 
action of the !.i:inistric3 concerned and to rC:lort periodically to its 
Government on thc str-.te of Franco-Gernan cooDcration. It will also have 
the task of pre:::cr,cir:s 0.11 ul:.leful suggestions ,lith 11 vic\'! to implementing 
the program of cOol)Cr'ation and to it::; ul timatc c}:tcnGiol1 to nev domains. 
II Program 
A - Foreign /\ffairs 
1. Tht' 1;wo Govcrm'icnts will cOlu~ult each other, prior to emy decision, 
on all important questions of foreign policy~ and in the firGt place on 
questions o:::~ comDon interest, \ii t11 a vlev! to arriving. insofar as possible, 
at a similQr ~o8ition. 
Thi~; consultatio,1 ,-:ill cover, ~r;long ether I:mbjccts, the follo\-!in~~ : 
- Prot'ler:tG relative to tllc turo , ~can CO!auuni ties and to Europearl 
political coop\}ro.tiol1; 
~. East- \"Jest relation, both on the political and econoT;iic levels; 
- Subjects dealt ,·:5 th. in the ;;orth Atlr.mtie Treaty Or'ganization and the 
variouo internationn1 or[,anizations in which the two Governments nre intc;reoteo., 
notably the Council of Eurore I ':Jectern Euro[J()8.n Union t the Or[;anization for' 
Econonic Coopcrv.tion and Deve10pr:lcnt, the United Uations and its specialized 
agencies. 
2. The cooperation already established in the area of inforraation will 
be: continued and developed between the services concerned in Pares and 
Donn and between the diplomatic missions in other countrics. 
3. With regard to aid to the emergent countries, both Governments \l/ill 
sy:.:;tcr..atice.lly compare their program:J with a vicw to maintaining close 
coopera.tion. They ,·:ill study the possibility of engaging in join under ... 
to.1dnf~. Since several 1.1inistcria1 dcpartracnts are responsiblc for these 
r.1atterc in both France and Gernany, it \r/i11 be the duty of the I.Jinistries 
of Foreign Affairs to deternine tOLcthcr the practical bases for this 
cooperation. 
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4. Tho t9\.' Governments \'lill study together the means for strengthening 
their cooperation in other important nectors of economic policy, such as 
agricultural and forest policy; energy policy; communications and trans-
portation problems and industrial development, within the :frameworl< of the 
Cornmon r,·larl .. et; as \'loll as exp0rt crc(li tn policy. 
13 - De:fense 
1. The following obj octi ves \lill be purGued in this domn,in: 
(a) On the level of strategy and tactics, the competent au.thorities of both 
countries w111 cvdeavor to harmonize their doctrineo with a vic,.. to ar-
riving at mutual concepto. Franco-German Inctit1.ltes for operat;ional research 
vlill be created. 
(b) Exchlulges of personnel bet\'leen the o.rned forces will be increased. 
These particularly concern professors and students from the general staff 
schools. They may include temporary detachments of entire units. In order 
to facilitate these e,=cr.anges, an effort will be made on both sides to 
give the trainees practical langua3e instruction. 
(c) \"Ji th regal'd to armaments, both Governments \,Ji 11 endeavor to organize 
0. joint 'program frof:1 the time of drafting appropriato armaments projects 
and for~ulating financing plnns. 
To this end, joint cOOlmi ttees ',:ill !3tudy the research being conducted 
on these projects in both countric~ und will carry out 0. comparative study. 
They \,lill submit proposals to the ;:,inisters, \'Iho will examine them during 
their quarterly meetings and \'li11 E;ivc the nece:Js<:(l'Y ciirectivos for imple-
f.1entation. 
2. The Govcrnncnts wi 11 mnl:e: n G tur1y of the conditions in which Franco-
Gcrl:lan coope:.:-ation could be cnt.:cblirillCc.l in the urea of civil defense. 
C - EC:t:cn [;ion nnd Youth 
\:1th regO,rd to cduG~tion nnJ youth, the proponalc contained in the French 
C.l1G Gerraan memoranda of Septci;,bcr 1!J and November 8, 19G2 \"il1 be studied, 
in accordance \':1th the iJrocedures indicated hereinabove. 
1. In the field of education, the effort will chiefly concern the 
fol10\1ing points: 
(a) Le.nguc\ec instruction: 
The tt.'o Governr:1Cnts recognize the e::;r;ential importance that the knowledge 
in each of the t~ .. jQ countries 0:(' the other I s language holds for Franco-
German coopcra.tion. They uil1 cll<.lenvor p to thir; c~1d, to take conc!'ete 
r.leasures with a vie','J to incre~ ... -::in:.:; the number. of' German students learning 
the French lan"uage and that of' French students learninp, the German language. 
The Federal Governr.:ont will e::a:d.ne, ';:i tIl the government::; of the Lander 
cOr.1petent in this E1Utter, bm.' it is ilossi~le to introduce re~ulations 
r.lD.ldng i.t :')oE;siblc to achieve this objective. 
In all t:'le ost~blishrlents for l1igher education, practical cour~es in 
french -.:i1J. be organized in Gerr;'Gny al'\ci practical courses in German vlill 
Lc organized in Fr<::.nce, which \'.'111 t'e open to all students. 
(b) The r·roblc,,: of cqui valenccc: 
The competent authorities of both countries will be asked to accelerate 
the aJ.ortion of provisions concerning the equivalence of academic periods, 
e):ar:'.inations and uni vcrsi ty degrcer:: and dip lomas. 
(c) Cooperation in scientific research: 
Re::::carch bodies nnd GClcnti fie i 1):';-[;1 tutm; \:i 11 incrcru::e their conta.cts, 
." 
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beginning \'1i th more cxtemd vo reciprocal information. Concerted research 
;JrograP.ls will be established in the areas in which it \l/i11 appear possible. 
2. All opportunities \llill be offered to the youns.t people of both countries 
in order to dra\lr closer the ties that unite them and to strengthen their 
r.lutuo.l cooperation. CollectiYc cxchc,ngcs, particularly, \';ill be increased. 
A body vlhose purpose will be t:; develop these possibilities and to 
promote exchanges \·;i11 be created by the two countries v:i th an autonomous 
administrative council at its head. This body will have nt its disposal 
a joint Franco-German fund :for the exchange between the two countries of' 
pupils, students, YOU,~rtists, and workers. 
III - Final Provisions 
1. The necessary dircctiven v:il1 be given in each country for imr,lediate 
en.actment of the cbcve. The ranisters of Forcian Affairs \Ifill e~~amine the 
progress made at each of their meetings. 
2. The -Cwo Governments will I<eep the Governments of the mamber States 
of the European Communities informed on the development of Franco-German 
cooperation. 
3. With ~.;;heexccption of the previsions concerning defense, the present 
TreatY\'1ill also be applied to the Lund of Berlin, barring a contrary dec-
laration made by the Government of the l"cderal Hepublic of Gerrllany to the 
Government of the French Republic in the three months following tho entry 
into force of the present Trea".:;y. 
4. Tho two Goverm:lcnts muy r:al·:c any improvements \·rhich T;li[J1t appear 
de. iro.ble ,:'or the ir.lplementution of the present Treaty. 
5. The ~')rcscnt T!~caty will enter into force as soon as each of the 
t\:o GovcrnLlclltn '.:ill have l:lnc1c j.:llo".m to tho athol" that, on the domcotic 
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